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ABSTRACT 
A SYSTEMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION 
(RFID) HAZARD MITIGATION IN THE BLOOD TRANSFUSION SUPPLY CHAIN 
FROM DONATION TO DISTRIBUTION 
 
by 
 
Natalie Rahming 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012 
Under the Supervision of Professor Timothy Patrick, Ph.D. 
 
 
The RFID Consortium is developing what will be the first FDA-approved use of radio 
frequency identification (RFID) technology to identify, track, manage, and monitor blood 
throughout the entire blood transfusion supply chain. The iTraceTM is an innovative 
technological system designed to optimize the procedures currently employed when 
tracing blood from the donor to the recipient. With all novel technologies it is essential to 
consider not only the advantages, but also the potential harms that may come about from 
using the system. The deployment of the iTraceTM consists of two phases: 1) Phase One – 
application of the iTraceTM from the donor to blood center distribution, and 2) Phase Two 
– application of the iTraceTM from blood center distribution to transfusion. This 
dissertation seeks to identify the possible hazards that may occur when utilizing the 
iTraceTM during Phase One, and to assess the mitigation and correction processes to 
combat these hazards. A thorough examination of verification and validation tests, as 
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well as of the system design, requirements, and standard operating procedures was 
performed to qualify and quantify each hazard into specific categories of severity and 
likelihood. A traceability matrix was also established to link each hazard with its 
associated tests and/or features. Furthermore, a series of analyses were conducted to 
determine whether the benefits of implementing the iTraceTM outweighed the risks and 
whether the mitigation and correction strategies of the hazards were effective. Ultimately, 
this dissertation serves as a usable, generalizable framework for the management of 
RFID-related hazards in the blood transfusion supply chain from donor to blood center 
distribution. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The elimination of tragic, yet avoidable, medical errors is not an impractical illusion but, 
rather, a purposeful objective to pursue. Working towards this goal will improve 
healthcare delivery, reduce healthcare costs, and most importantly, expunge the human 
cost of such preventable tragedies. Medical errors occur frequently and, while many 
impose little potential for harm, those that do result in injury can lead to severe 
consequences (1). It has been estimated that as many as 44,000 to 98,000 Americans die 
from medical errors each year (1-6). As such, this vast magnitude of errors in medicine 
underlines the need for improved safeguards during healthcare delivery. Despite the 
common practice of identifying and penalizing the persons committing the errors, it has 
become increasingly evident that it is more effective to focus on the healthcare systems 
themselves (1, 7). The systems can utilize technology to both mitigate and correct errors. 
A systems analysis of medication errors found that the top eight of the 16 major types of 
system failures discovered could have been averted with better medical information 
systems (1, 7). Hence, using technology to enhance the access, availability, and 
dissemination of healthcare information, and thereby restructuring current methods, is 
worthwhile. In order to embark on the path towards an idealized medical system absent 
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of avoidable missteps, a deliberate approach involving the addition of innovative 
technologies and the optimization of current processes is valuable. 
One area of healthcare where the elimination of medical errors is vital is the blood 
transfusion medicine supply chain. According to a 2005 US Department of Health and 
Human Services Report (8), in 2004 approximately 1,322 national medical treatment 
centers reported a total of 32,128 transfusion-related adverse events. These include 
various issues involving sample documentation, labeling, storage, and lab handling 
throughout the entire supply chain process (9). Ultimately, these seemingly trivial errors 
can lead to the most critical transfusion hazard: mis-transfusion (2, 10-16).  
Mis-transfusion occurs when the wrong blood is given to the wrong person. All humans 
possess a type within the ABO blood group (Table 1). The four key types are A, B, AB, 
and O. There are two antigens (i.e. A, B) and two antibodies (i.e. Anti-A, Anti-B). An 
individual’s blood type is determined by whether or not an individual’s red blood cells 
carry the A antigen (i.e. Blood Type A), the B antigen (i.e. Blood Type B), both the A 
and B antigens (i.e. Blood Type AB), or neither antigen (i.e. Blood Type O). Healthy 
individuals produce red blood cell antibodies against A or B antigens that are not 
expressed on their own cells. For example, an individual carrying the A antigen, who 
therefore has Type A blood, will make anti-B antibodies. These anti-B antibodies will 
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attack and destroy the red blood cells carrying the corresponding antigen. Thus, if a Type 
A individual receives Type B or Type AB blood, red cell hemolysis or agglutination may 
take place (Table 2). At best, mis-transfusion necessitates therapeutic and diagnostic 
interventions and, at worst, it may result in death. In order to evaluate the best means of 
eliminating medical errors such as mis-transfusion from the blood transfusion supply 
chain, it is necessary to describe this process end-to-end. 
Table 1: ABO Blood Types 
ABO  
Blood Type 
Antigen 
A 
Antigen 
B 
Antibody 
Anti-A 
Antibody 
Anti-B 
A Yes No No Yes 
B No Yes Yes No 
AB Yes Yes No No 
O No No Yes Yes 
  
Table 2: Blood Compatibility 
Patient Type Compatible Red Cell Blood Types 
A A, O 
B B, O 
AB AB, A, B, O 
O O 
 
The blood transfusion supply chain begins with the collection of blood from the donor. 
At this time, essential data elements such as blood type, donor identification number, and 
other patient information details are gathered and stored. The next step in the chain 
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involves physically packing blood products into their appropriate containers. Containers 
have associated temperature properties and capacity constraints which dictates the type 
and quantity of items that can be included. After that, the containers are loaded onto 
transport trucks and released for pick-up. The containers then go through the check-in 
stage, where station operators inspect the containers for missing or excess items. The 
products are labeled with information taken at the time of collection and moved to 
inventory. Finally the product and its associated information are verified and distributed. 
At any point during this process, there exists the potential for misplacement of items, 
inaccurate transfer of data, or imprecise monitoring of products and information. As such, 
it is clear that improving the identification, tracking, monitoring, labeling, and storing of 
blood products during the entire supply chain process would reduce the incidence of mis-
transfusion.  
Many blood centers and hospitals have examined the utilization of radio frequency 
identification (RFID) as a means of enhancing the tracking, monitoring, labeling, and 
storing in the blood transfusion supply chain, and have found it to be very promising (17-
27). RFID is the interaction and exchange of electromagnetic radio waves between tags 
and readers, enabling automatic identification and data capture (AIDC) and real-time 
information of marked objects (28-30). RFID is a technology that is composed of 
transponder tags, readers, and a hardware system to which information is written. Also, 
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RFID systems operate at a range of frequencies. The antennas of RFID readers exchange 
electromagnetic radiation waves with the tags. The readers then send information to 
servers via wireless networks or docking stations. Readers may be handheld or located in 
gates and tunnels where they can read multiple items simultaneously, as opposed to the 
current system of using barcodes which require line-of-sight individual readings.  
Given the capacities for speedy information transmission and batch reading of multiple 
items, RFID is capable of supporting the need for rapid and effortless access to process 
data generated in the blood supply chain including collection, manufacturing, testing, 
labeling, inventory, and distribution (30). Furthermore, RFID is a reputable technology in 
logistics for identifying and tracking items, aiding in the monitoring and optimizing of 
logistical processes (17, 31, 32). For example, RFID technology is common in the 
automotive industry and is gaining widespread acceptance in supply chain processes such 
as retail applications (17). Additionally, the benefits of RFID have already been 
demonstrated in medical asset management. By tracking medical devices using RFID, 
both the amount of time spent searching for a device and the cost of replacing lost items 
can be significantly reduced (32, 33). Moreover, several other logistical areas have 
examined RFID as a potential solution including: access control and time registration; 
protection of expensive equipment; localization of equipment, staff, and patients in 
6 
 
 
 
healthcare facilities; organization of logistic processes for beds, containers, and apparel; 
safe identification of products and patients; and, protection against imitation drugs . 
In response to the potential of RFID for automatic identification and data capture (AIDC) 
and monitoring of blood and blood products across the whole transfusion medicine 
supply chain, a consortium of blood centers (BloodCenter of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, 
Carter Blood Care, Dallas, TX, and Mississippi Blood Services, Jackson, MS), hospitals 
(Baptist Health Systems, Jackson, MS, and University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, Iowa 
City, IA), the University of Wisconsin-Madison RFID lab, and several technology 
partners (SysLogic, Inc., TAGSYS, Zebra Technologies, Psion TekLogix, Mediware 
Information Systems) are developing and evaluating the first comprehensive RFID 
system to document and track blood from donor to recipient (19). This system is designed 
to identify, manage, track, and monitor the condition of blood products from the 
beginning to the end of the blood supply chain. RFID technology is capable of both 
preventing medical accidents in the health industry as well as initiating an effective, 
rapid, and corrective response in the case of an emergency (34). For instance, in cases 
where it is possible for incorrect administration of medication to occur, RFID has been 
shown to enable accurate medical data transmission by offering a control for the 
identification and facilitating the administration of the correct quantity and type of drugs 
(34). 
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The system being deployed by the consortium will be the first FDA-approved use of 
RFID technology throughout all phases of the blood supply chain. This system, iTraceTM, 
utilizes passive RFID technology that is superior to simple barcode-based AIDC 
methodologies in several ways (19, 35-38). Unlike barcode-based AIDC technologies, 
RFID technology does not require line-of-sight. This means that the tag and reader are 
not required to be within visual range of one another in order for data transmission to 
occur. Also, while barcodes must be read one at a time, RFID allows for batch – or 
concurrent – reading of multiple items simultaneously without disrupting the processing 
of the data or its accuracy. In addition, RFID possesses a broader field of readability, is 
more durable and capable of enduring harsh environments, and is able to store more 
editable information on its chips than barcodes. This is important as it demonstrates the 
ability of RFID to more efficiently track and monitor products and information by 
working at longer ranges, withstanding damage, and holding more relevant information 
on its chips. Additionally, whereas barcodes are generally used once and discarded, RFID 
technology enables the data to be completely erased and the tag to be reused if necessary. 
Moreover, RFID tags may be integrated with sensors to assist with time and temperature 
tracking, reducing waste and diminishing patient danger due to spoiled products.  
RFID technology is generally applied when there is a need to read tagged items outside 
of the short visual range of a bar code (39). In addition, processes like the transfusion 
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medicine supply chain may involve environmental conditions such as temperature, dirt, 
or contamination that make optically scanning barcodes ineffective (40). Also, RFID 
technology allows for better tracking and reconciliation of products. Additionally, it 
augments the precision of product locations by utilizing its tag memory qualities of data 
encoding and storage, as well as its broader field of readability and batch reading 
capabilities (30). Furthermore, RFID may boost the accuracy of tracking time and 
temperature, reducing product waste and increasing the quality and availability of blood 
products due to its integration of temperature sensors to assist with time and temperature 
tracking (30). Hence, RFID is the preferred solution for the blood transfusion medicine 
supply chain. While the employment of barcodes alone has been somewhat effective at 
reducing medical errors, the systems are not fully efficient as individual scanning of each 
item and searching for relevant data does little to reduce staff workloads (41-46).  
The iTraceTM system incorporates RFID technology as a complement to the traditional 
procedures. It will initially serve as a supplement to, not a replacement of, the barcode so 
that it will work with current processes, not against them (37). The integration of 
barcodes and RFID tags has the potential to improve complex systems and support, and 
align all components to produce optimal outcomes (6). This is significant as it will reduce 
tragic errors such as mis-transfusion, eliminate the human cost of these errors, and enable 
better delivery of healthcare. 
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Bar codes will still be utilized as a backup in case of unforeseen RFID troubles or system 
failures during the implementation and testing period. Barcodes will be applied as a 
secondary identification source for ensuring that the products are properly labeled. The 
iTraceTM was created for a more intelligent blood supply chain where every element 
works together cohesively (47).   
The impact of integrating these technologies into a useful system triggers an evaluation 
of the value proposition. In other words, in order for the tool to be implemented, it must 
be apparent that the return on investment is sufficient (1), and that the deviation from 
inexpensive barcode-alone processes would be worth the venture of implementing this 
new system. The consortium conducted an impact analysis to quantitatively model and 
estimate the effects of RFID on the business metrics of the blood center (38). The 
analysis consisted of two primary components: organizational impact and cost/benefit 
analysis. In terms of the business metrics, it was concluded that the key gains would be in 
productivity and quality due to automated processes, reduction of discarded products, and 
enhanced inventory management. For the cost/benefit model, the chief outputs measured 
were total expected costs, total expected benefits, expected payback period, and net 
present value. The consortium projected that there would be a $83,560 (11.2%) return on 
investment (ROI) over 5 years resulting in an approximate 4 year payback period. For 
larger organizations, the recovery may be less than three years (approximately 30 
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months), but for smaller institutions the payback period may be as much as 6.9 years (2). 
Ultimately, the researchers of the consortium estimated that, by improving quality control 
and identification procedures through RFID, the blood banking industry would save more 
than $9 million per year and result in 40,000-45,000 fewer units of discarded blood 
products (9). Thus, it may be justifiable operationally and economically, particularly for 
larger organizations, to employ RFID technology in the blood supply chain. 
Moreover, since iTraceTM software introduces a new technology to the Transfusion 
Medicine field, a pre-market approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is 
essential before employment of the new software is permitted. All technological devices 
in their infant stages trigger an array of questions concerning the effects of their use. 
Although the benefits of using the tool may appear tangible, the uncertainty of the actual 
advantages or consequences of using the technology remains until confirmation is 
attained through research and testing. Thus, it is very important to identify and 
understand not only the gains, but also the hazards of employing new technologies.  
The potential hazards of using new technologies can be seen in the story of the Therac-25 
(48). This notoriously defective system would malfunction up to 40 times per day as a 
result of its software. In a 20-month period, the software defects led to massive radiation 
overdoses for six cancer patients, leading to the deaths of three. In dealing with medical 
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devices and, hence, the lives of others, the existence of potential harms may outweigh the 
likely advantages.  
Several types of hazards – technological, implementation, functional – may occur. 
Technological hazards are potential sources of harm originating from technology or 
system conditions, or from the interaction of human activity with these conditions. 
Implementation hazards are potential harms related to technology usage in an everyday 
setting. Functional hazards are the potential harms which may disrupt the ability of the 
system to perform its intended duties appropriately and accurately. Full awareness of the 
hazards, as well as system specifications and strategies for mitigation and correction are 
essential. Since the iTraceTM is the first tool to account for complete blood supply chain 
management from the donor to the recipient, the risks of utilizing RFID in blood supply 
operations has not previously been assessed. 
There are two phases for the implementation of the iTraceTM. “Phase One” encompasses 
all of the activities at the blood center starting with blood donation, manufacturing, 
testing, inventory management, shipping, and distribution of blood products to the 
hospital. “Phase Two” comprises all activities of transfusion services at the hospital 
starting with receiving blood products and ending with cross-matching and transfusing 
patients. The consortium has completed development and a pilot for both phases and is 
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currently finalizing all documentation and deliverables necessary to submit for Medical 
Device Class II clearance from the FDA for iTraceTM Phase One. The submission will be 
done in accordance with Section 510(k) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which 
requires device manufacturers to register and notify the FDA of their intent to market a 
medical device. This is known as Premarket Notification - also called PMN or 510(k).  
In this instance, the RFID Blood Transfusion Consortium becomes a medical device 
manufacturer that is required to submit a premarket notification because of the intent to 
introduce a device into commercial distribution for the first time or reintroduce a device 
that will be significantly changed or modified to the extent that its safety or effectiveness 
could be affected. In the case of the iTraceTM, the substantial change is the addition of 
RFID to the current blood supply chain processes. Building a comprehensive analysis of 
its technological, implementation, and functional hazards is a key component of receiving 
approval before releasing to the commercial market. Since the project is still in its early 
phases and the types of hazards that would be encountered vary extensively between the 
two Phases, the analysis presented here will focus solely on Phase One.  
A major function of any new project or development is a thorough risk analysis. It 
includes rigorous, fact-based methodologies with predefined criteria for assessing the 
risks associated with all elements of the offering. It also consists of structured reviews of 
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each potential hazard to assess the status, severity, problems, issues, and dependencies. 
Additionally, mitigation strategies are developed to define the preventive actions required 
to minimize the risk, and correction strategies are designed to address the hazard in the 
instance of occurrence. SysLogic’s Quality System Manual and FDA guidance 
documents provided preliminary direction for these analyses.  
Although the Consortium used these applicable standards and pre-identified hazards for 
the implementation and functional portions of the project, assistance was needed on the 
technology portion. Using RFID in this environment is an entirely new practice, and help 
from someone with biomedical and health informatics training was essential in 
uncovering the issues that could potentially occur. In response to this need, I was tasked 
with discovering what these technological hazards could be. The consortium also wanted 
help in producing a thorough analysis – including the categorizing, qualitative and 
quantitative ranking, and mitigation/correction strategy evaluation – of all of the hazards 
that could take place throughout Phase One. As this assessment was a requirement for 
FDA 510K approval and critical for the system evaluation overall, I was responsible for 
completing this initiative as well. My role was a key component in revealing potential 
harms, assessing the system’s value, and answering questions regarding the system’s 
usability.   
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Therefore, the purpose of this project was to conduct a hazard analysis of this new 
medical device to deduce answers to the following inquiries: 1) how the benefits of the 
tool outweigh the existence of the potential hazards, 2) how sufficient are the applied 
mitigation and correction strategies, and 3) how may the methods employed to qualify 
and quantify the hazards into specific categories be transferred to other new medical 
devices.   
There were several objectives to this study. The first was to identify all of the possible 
hazards that may occur when using the iTraceTM from donation at the blood center to 
blood product distribution at the hospital, and rate the severity of each. The consortium 
had already begun to identify hazards based on the SysLogic Quality Document and FDA 
guidance documents which detailed what hazards are commonly encountered with 
medical devices, as well as which steps to take during the verification and validation 
milestones of product development. I managed the identification and assessment of the 
technological hazards associated with RFID use in the blood supply chain. Next, an 
analysis of the severity and likelihood for all hazard types was performed. The strategies 
taken to eliminate, mitigate, prevent, or respond to those hazards were then documented. 
Third, the effectiveness and success of these methodologies were assessed. Fourth, an 
evaluation of whether the application benefits of the iTraceTM were worth the risks was 
completed. Lastly, the ultimate goal of the project – to construct a comprehensive hazard 
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analysis and traceability matrix, establishing the foundation of a systematic framework 
for managing RFID-related hazards in the blood transfusion medicine supply chain from 
donation to distribution for generalized use with other technologies – was completed.   
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
RQ 1: How do the benefits of using the iTraceTM outweigh the potential 
RFID-related hazards?  
RQ 2: How sufficient are the mitigation and correction strategies for 
managing RFID-related hazards in the blood transfusion medicine supply 
chain from the donation to blood center distribution? 
RQ3: How can the methods utilized in this paper effectively qualify and 
quantify the associated hazards into standard categories which may be 
transferable to other newly deployed RFID-based healthcare technologies? 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
This chapter will provide insight into the primary design features of the iTraceTM. It will 
also give details on the particular “pain points” or situations in which there is the highest 
demand for RFID use, as well as on the “touch points” or areas within the blood 
transfusion supply chain where RFID-enabled processes are the most advantageous. In 
addition, the types of hazards that may be encountered during Phase One will be 
described. Lastly, background information on the RFID consortium itself will be 
supplied. 
iTRACETM DESIGN 
The iTraceTM design consists of specific RFID technologies, various RFID touch points, 
and a particular architecture formulated for best use practices from donation to blood 
center distribution. 
 
RFID Technology 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology which identifies items by using 
electromagnetic radio waves (wireless air interface) to interact and exchange data 
between transponder tags and readers (30) (Figure 1). It is generally composed of 
transponder tags, readers, and a hardware system to which information is written, and it 
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operates at a range of frequencies. Tags may be active, passive, or semi-active/passive. 
Active tags are battery-powered and able to emit signals without activation by a reader. 
Passive tags “awaken” when in the field of the reader. The power from the reader 
prompts them to communicate. Semi-active/passive tags use a thin battery, which can be 
used to increase the read range of the tag, to power the chip. The iTraceTM solution uses 
the passive tag, which is the most widely accepted for healthcare supply chain solutions 
(40, 41, 49). 
                                                                                              
 
Figure 1: RFID Technology Structure 
The readers of RFID systems have antennas that exchange electromagnetic radiation 
waves with the tags. The information that is read by the reader is sent to servers via 
wireless networks or docking stations. Readers may be handheld or located in gates and 
tunnels where they can read multiple items within a single container at once.  
Computer
RFID Reader
Antenna
Antenna Coil                    IC Chip 
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There are three different kinds of frequencies on which RFID can work that determine the 
range at which the tags can be read. The first is low frequency. Low frequency (LF) 
bands typically work at frequencies of 125-134 KHz. High Frequency (HF) bands operate 
at 13.56 MHz. This is the global ISO-standardized frequency, and is widely accepted for 
use in the healthcare industry. Ultra High Frequency (UHF) works at 850-900 MHz. 
These are the most expensive tags, possessing the best ranges and transferring data the 
fastest. However, UHF licenses vary in allowance due to health and safety issues. UHF is 
capable of exciting water molecules in blood products to the extent that they would likely 
raise the temperature of the blood beyond acceptable levels. The iTraceTM employs the 
international standard 13.56MHz, which is the recommended standard for blood 
transfusion medicine (30, 38, 40, 50). 
Furthermore, RFID tags are capable of storing information and carrying all major data 
about the product. The minimum suggested memory capacity of 2 Kbits enables the use 
of International Society of Blood Transfusions (ISBT) 128 data structure and messaging 
(30). The data on the tag may be locked to protect sensitive information, or it may be 
unlocked to allow for reuse of tags. Data carrier-independent ISBT 128 compliant figures 
which use 7-bit ISO 646 (ASCII) characters are used for the tag memory (35). Tag user 
memory is distributed in 4-byte physical memory blocks which are individually 
addressable and locatable (35). 
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iTraceTM Architecture  
The iTraceTM is made up of a set of devices installed and used at the central blood center, 
remote fixed donation sites, and remote mobile donation sites as described in the 
iTraceTM Technical Specifications documents.  
The components of the central blood center facility include a server on which the 
software and application are installed, a network of fixed and handheld RFID/barcode 
readers and antennae that are connected to a server via the blood center’s local area 
network (LAN), one or more servers on which the blood center’s Blood Establishment 
Computer System (BECS) is installed, one or more client workstations used to access the 
iTraceTM, and a network connection through which a server connects to and interoperates 
with devices at remote donation sites. 
Remote fixed and mobile donation sites both contain hardware components such as a 
server software installed on a PC connected to the internet and a Wi-Fi LAN at the 
donation site, one or more handheld RFID/barcode readers that are connected to the 
donation site Wi-Fi LAN and interact with the server, and printers and supplies used to 
print shipping manifests, blood donation record forms, and labels. Additionally, for fixed 
remote sites, an electronic interface between the electronic blood donation record and the 
server software which reduces manual entry for each collection may be employed. 
Similarly, a USB thumb drive may also be used to store donation record information. 
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For all site types, there is a set of design features and underlying assumptions on which 
all of the applications that comprise the iTraceTM depend. These include the physical 
items tracked, the use of RFID tag identification numbers (TINs) and user memory, 
containers, locations, notes and tracks, and hardware devices supported at each touch 
point. Moreover, the physical location and movement of the following items are all 
tracked with the iTraceTM: blood donation records (BDRs), test tube sets, blood bags, and 
containers. Each item is distinguished and identified by the RFID system using a 
combination of RFID tags and bar code labels using ISBT128 format. While blood bags 
and containers have RFID tags attached, test tube sets and BDRs are identified by bar 
codes. Collection bags use 14 x 31mmRFID tags placed under the standard ISBT 128 
DIN label (35). The items are tracked both individually and as a set. All of the 
applications that comprise the iTraceTM are designed to work with either bar code only or 
RFID-enabled blood bags and containers, allowing the RFID application to have a back-
up in case the tag becomes unreadable.  
Every item within a collection, as well as the set itself, shares the same donation 
identification number (DIN). However, each item is further identified by its type (BDR, 
test tube, or blood bag), content type name (RBC-1, RBC-2), and globally unique tag 
identification number (TIN). The TIN is fixed at the time of manufacturing, can never be 
changed, and is guaranteed to be unique even across different tag manufacturers. 
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Each RFID tag has a small amount of random access user memory that can be used to 
store information about the item to which it is attached. The tags record the following 
information: Product Code, ABO/Rh, Donation Identification Number, and Product 
Expiration Date. The Procedure Code is also collected to assist in the manufacturing 
process. The user memory can be read and written multiple times. Areas of the tag may 
be hidden to inhibit modification. Furthermore, the tags are capable of responding to a 
one-time “kill” signal, which triggers the self-destruction of the tag such that neither the 
TIN nor the user data memory can ever be read or written again. 
There are four readers that are used in the iTraceTM: Tagsys L400, PA600, Tracient 
Paddle, and traditional barcode scanners. They can be directed to read tag TINs or read 
and write tag user memory. During the writing of information to the tag’s user memory, 
the software first directs the reader to write the desired data to the tag’s user memory and 
then read the data back from the tag. The software confirms that the data was successfully 
written to the tag. Data written to the blood bag tag is never read or used by the system 
software. Only the TIN is read at each of the RFID-enabled touch points to associate, 
retrieve, and process blood bag information from the database. Figure 2 depicts the RFID 
reader display. 
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Figure 2: iTraceTM Reader Display 
 
 
 
 
PAIN POINTS 
The dynamic nature of the blood transfusion supply chain results in considerable 
difficulties in information acquisition, processing, and management (51). As the volume 
of information increases, so does the potential for human error. Consequently, blood 
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with charging cradle 
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centers are turning to information technology resources to improve the productivity and 
efficiency of blood banking processes (17-27). 
Blood banks are looking to RFID technologies for identification, authentication, tracking, 
traceability, management, labeling, inventory, security, sensing, and regulatory purposes 
(32, 52).  The auto identification and data capture capabilities of RFID enable the 
elimination of mistakes and the optimization of processes. RFID technology in healthcare 
has also been shown to be cost effective for healthcare operations (53). The combination 
of these benefits helps facilitate the construction of transparency and trust for the 
healthcare system through the use of a total quality systems approach. 
The goal of the iTraceTM is to enhance the delivery of transfusion medicine by supporting 
the operational process at critical points. Process owners from blood banks participating 
in the consortium identified “pain points” in the current transfusion supply chain 
processes. “Pain points” denote areas throughout the supply chain where inefficiencies or 
errors often occur (38). Each pain point was ordered according to the frequency of the 
incidence and the magnitude of the consequence.  
In Phase 1 – from donation to blood center distribution – there were four primary pain 
points (35, 38) (Figure 3). The first involved reconciling data with physical reality. This 
means it was necessary to ensure that the data record detailing the expected amount and 
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type of products matched the amount and type of products that were actually delivered. 
With the current barcode process, each blood product must be tracked and accounted for 
individually. The RFID-enabled iTraceTM solution was designed to construct 
unit/container relationships, allowing for better tracking and faster container 
reconciliation of products. 
The second pain point dealt with physically locating products. Like the first pain point, 
this was reflective of single product tracking constraints. The solution was to use RFID to 
capture details and log data/update a database with the most recent location of all 
products encountered during searches to enable better traceability.  
Similarly, the third pain point was the difficulty in scanning multiple items. Unlike the 
barcode-based processes currently in place, the RFID processes enabled by the iTraceTM 
will support the preferred capacity to read multiple units simultaneously and without the 
necessity of line-of-sight reading. This will facilitate rapid donation check-in and 
shipment verification at the blood center. The iTraceTM is capable of reading all of the 
units in a closed container at the same time, considerably increasing efficiency.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
The final pain point identified during Phase 
temperature. Existing barcode
alerts. The iTraceTM solution remedied this pain point by providing alerts if and when the 
time between scans/reads in uncontrolled or incorrect temperature locations ex
expectations. As such, it appears evident that RFID is capable of solving many of the 
challenges facing traditional blood banking operations. The analysis of the current 
processes and pain points served as the groundwork for designing the iTrace
enabling its application across various process touch
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Figure 3: Pain Points 
One was difficulty in tracking time and 
-only procedures do not utilize temperature
 points. 
Reconciling data with 
physical reality  
 
Physically locating 
products  
 
 
Rapid check-in and 
shipment verification 
 
 
Track time out of 
temperature- controlled 
locations 
 
• Build RFID unit  RFID container 
relationships enabling better tracking and 
faster reconciliation 
 
• Use RFID to update “last seen” location of all 
products encountered during searches
 
• Use RFID’s ability to read multiple units in 
closed containers to dramatically reduce labor
 
 
• Provide an alert if the time between “last 
seen” in a uncontrolled temperature locations 
is too long 
25 
 
-controlled 
ceeded 
TM
, and 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
iTRACETM TOUCH POINTS 
The touch points are the areas of the blood supply chain in which the iTraceTM 
complements the current processes (Figure 4). According to the Functional Specifications 
Document of the consortium, they include the following actions throughout the supply 
chain: collection, pack container, load and release pickup, check-in container, label 
product, check-in inventory, verify container, check-in returns, check-in imports, and 
inventory management functions. 
 
Figure 4: iTraceTM Touch Points 
Collection 
During donation collection, RFID technology is used to uniquely identify and track 
physical components that make up the collection such as BDRs, test tube sets, and blood 
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bags. It is also used to gather key data elements for collection. The selected information 
about the collection is encoded and stored in the RFID tag memory associated with the 
blood bags included in the collection. 
 
Pack Container 
When packing the container, RFID associates items with their containers by their DIN as 
they are physically packed into the containers. This facilitates fine-grained tracking of 
each item’s location, as well as the formulation of pick-up documentation to be used in 
reconciliation activities. Each container has an associated type, capacity, and temperature 
property, which is used to determine the maximum quantity and kinds of items that can 
be packed in the container. The container types and capacity constraints are verified as 
each item is packed. 
 
Load and Release Pickup 
RFID technology enables the association of containers with a pick-up as they are loaded 
onto transport trucks, allowing the detailed tracking of the container’s location. The 
technology also permits automatic creation of pick-up documentation for use in 
reconciliation. This establishes a chain of custody transfer from the donation site to the 
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pick-up transport service as well as visibility for products in transit from remote donation 
sites to blood centers to assist in advanced production planning. 
 
Check-In Container 
During the check-in stage, the RFID technology reconciles the content of each container 
individually and as a whole, giving the check-in station operator the ability to view and 
classify containers, as well as found, missing, and excess items within each container. 
Items are “batch read,” meaning they are read simultaneously. The information that is 
read is sent electronically to the Blood Establishment Computer System (BECS) to 
check-in the items. 
 
Label Product 
Product labeling information from the BECS for the blood bag being returned to the 
blood center is received. Additionally, the RFID encodes, updates, and verifies the 
information (DIN, product code, expiration date, ABO/Rh, etc.) on the bag’s RFID tag 
memory. 
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Check-in Inventory 
The RFID provides chain of custody details when newly-labeled products move from the 
labeling area into inventory, updating both the back-end BECS as appropriate as well as 
the product’s inventory storage location information that is maintained in the RFID 
system. 
 
Verify Container 
RFID, again, allows for batch reading of an outbound shipping container’s contents and 
performs a final verification of a packed shipping container’s content before the container 
leaves the blood center. 
 
Check-in Returns 
When the blood bag is returned to the blood center, product labeling information from the 
BECS is received. Simultaneously, encoding, updating, and verifying of the information 
on the bag’s tag memory occurs. Any patient information that is located on the tag is 
removed. 
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Check-in Imports 
During check-in imports, product labeling information from the BECS is received, and 
the information on the bag’s RFID memory is encoded, updated, and verified. The 
product’s inventory storage location is also updated. 
 
Inventory Management Functions 
The RFID technology helps the user find blood bag products in inventory and move them 
to new locations in single batch operations. Additionally, it helps the user update the 
inventory of items currently stored in a specified location as a single batch operation. The 
BECS is updated appropriately. 
The impact of RFID appears to be substantial. Yet, until the risks of utilizing the 
technology are examined, the full impact of its application cannot be measured. The 
hazards of using RFID technology in the first half of the blood transfusion supply chain 
must be assessed and the appropriate responses disclosed so that a functional, valuable 
framework may be established.  
POTENTIAL iTRACETM HAZARDS 
The three primary types of hazards that are encountered are during Phase 1 of the BSC 
are technological, implementation, and functional. My role was to serve as the project 
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lead for the technology hazard group, identifying, testing, and analyzing technological 
hazards that may occur with the introduction of RFID technology into the blood supply 
chain processes. The implementation and functional hazards listed were derived from the 
SysLogic Quality Plan document which details hazards commonly met with the adoption 
of new medical devices. The Project Manager and various members of the consortium 
identified them as potential hazards that may impact the use of the iTraceTM tool. 
 
Technology Hazards 
Technological hazards involve the read/write efficiency of the RFID system and the 
effects of the high frequency (HF) radio frequency magnetic waves on other medical 
devices and the blood products themselves. They also include tag and system capabilities 
and survivability under harsh conditions. There are safety and critical functionality 
requirements that must be fulfilled in order for the successful mitigation of the hazards 
associated with the iTraceTM. The safety and critical design requirements for the potential 
technology hazards of the iTraceTM include the following: 
• Preventing Read/Write Errors or Failure. 
• Ensuring No Adverse Effects of RFID Technology on Blood Products. 
• Ensuring Performance Capability of RFID Tags During the Most Common Blood 
Supply Chain Processes. 
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• Ensuring RFID Tag Survivability After Experiencing the Most Demanding 
Conditions in the Blood Supply Chain. 
• Ensuring No Interference of RFID High Frequency (HF) and Electromagnetic 
Interference (EMI) with Other Systems. 
 
The specific hazards that were pinpointed and assessed will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Implementation Hazards 
SysLogic, Inc. maintains a list of recognized or foreseeable hazards associated with 
medical devices under both normal and abnormal conditions. Previously identified 
hazards are also taken into account. Possible implementation hazards encompass a broad 
range of issues related to the realization or execution of the device specifications. They 
include matters involving the database, interface, data processing, data corruption or loss, 
and audit trail items. The safety and critical design requirements for the implementation 
of the iTraceTM consist of the following: 
• Preventing Sequencing or Timing Errors 
• Preventing Data Loss / Corruption 
• Preventing External Interface Errors 
 
 
Functional Hazards 
The functional hazards identified and tested are also components of SysLogic, Inc.’s 
known and foreseeable list of risks associated with medical devices. Functional hazards 
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consist of any potential risks to the performance of the system/device in a daily 
operational setting. They are comprised of concerns related to the ability of the system to 
record read/written information appropriately and accurately. They also include other 
software design and capability issues such as security, access, traceability, notification 
alerts, monitoring, tracking, and labeling. The safety and critical design requirements 
associated with the functionality of the iTraceTM include: 
• Preventing Unauthorized Entry or Override of System Data 
• Preventing Loss of Traceability 
• Preventing Packing in Improper Containers at Collection Sites 
• Ensuring Reconciliation of Materials from Collection Site 
• Ensuring Blood Product Labeling Information is Properly Captured from BECS 
• Preventing Unsuitable Products from Being Released to Distribution 
 
CONSORTIUM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Due to the existence of several valuable players in the RFID Blood Center Consortium, it 
is important to identify the roles and responsibilities of each. This will enable a better 
understanding of the project’s organization. The consortium consists of personnel from 
the multiple aforementioned organizations working under the guidance of the Program 
Director, Rodeina Davis. Members of the consortium make up various components of the 
organizational structure including the Steering Committee, Project Management Team, 
Product Manager, Project Manager, Project Coordinator, Grant Administration Team, 
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Activity Team Leads, Activity Teams, and Grant Administration Team members (Figure 
5). 
Figure 5: RFID Consortium Organizational Chart 
 
My role in the consortium fell under Team 4 for Quality/ 510(k). I served as the project 
lead for technology hazard analysis. I identified, documented, and analyzed the hazards 
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associated with the technology itself. Additionally, I participated in the analysis of the 
implementation and functional hazards. Furthermore, I assisted Alfonso Gutierrez and the 
UW RFID team in performing and analyzing the Wireless Communication Protocols 
study. Finally, I constructed the traceability matrix, linking all of the hazards and 
mitigation strategies with verification and validation procedures. 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
The hazard analysis for Phase One consisted of four primary steps: the identification, 
definition, crosschecking, and ranking of hazards based on the impact the hazard has on 
the system, patient, or safety of the blood product when the system fails or a design flaw 
is uncovered. Verification and validation of the mitigation strategies, as well as corrective 
actions, were examined through extensive use of protocol testing, unit testing, and system 
testing. This was done to ensure that the functionality of the system remained continuous 
and effective. A traceability matrix was also constructed to illustrate the sources, 
methods, and results of the tests of each hazard mitigation strategy. Upon complete 
analysis of the results of each test, complete operational understanding of the new 
iTraceTM throughout the entire supply chain was achieved. Then, a subjective evaluation 
was completed to determine the resultant risk and appropriate steps to be taken. There is 
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no consistent or standard method for estimating this, but the severity and likelihood 
matrix which will follow generally derives acceptable results for low- to medium-risk 
devices. 
   
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
The process undertaken for identifying the hazards began with a thorough analysis of the 
use of the iTraceTM in the entire blood transfusion supply chain. It entailed detailed 
consideration of the system’s intended use, features, and functions throughout each stage. 
The first step involved the review and gathering of potential relevant harms from a list of 
known and foreseeable hazards. These hazards were found in the SysLogic Quality 
Document standard. They tended to consist of implementation and functional hazards 
such as those involving security, access, alerts, and notifications.  
The next step consisted of the analysis of distinguishable iTraceTM characteristics using 
the system design and requirements documents. Hazards identified for this group 
comprised those which had an impact on the basic functionality of the system. General 
system attributes and properties such as read/write failures, bad tag data, and altered tag 
data were found by reviewing the possible vulnerabilities or threats associated with each 
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feature or requirement. In other words, harms were diagnosed by accounting for any 
inadvertent instances of system failure or deviation from intended use.  
After that, additional hazards were discovered by analyzing factors presented in the 
protocol studies. The Limit Testing protocol revealed hazards dealing with the effects of 
13.56 MHz radio frequency (RF) magnetic field radiation on the temperature elevation 
and toxicity of cellular protein structures of red blood cells (RBC), aged red blood cells 
(aRBCs; near expiration of the 42 day shelf life), whole blood derived platelet products 
(WBDP), plasma, and plasma coagulation factors under extreme RF exposure conditions. 
This study was concerned with the potential consequence of 13.56 MHz on blood 
products, and its possibility of leading to: 1) a rise in the temperature of blood products 
(red cells, pooled platelets, and plasma) due to dielectric heating generated by extended 
exposure to the intense RF field, or 2) cellular or protein degradation from extended 
exposure to the intense RF field. Therefore, hazards were uncovered by noting the 
adverse thermal or biological effects on the transfusion safety or efficacy of blood 
cellular products and coagulation factors that may arise from exposure to intense RF 
radiation from 13.56 MHz RFID readers. 
Additionally, the Performance Testing protocol sought to determine the commercial 
applicability of the RFID system solution in the blood transfusion medicine industry. As 
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many aspects of the performance capability of RFID tags as possible during the most 
common blood supply chain processes were evaluated. The study combined the four 
different types of readers: (1) TagSys HF RFID Tunnel, (2) TagSys HF RFID Flatbed, (3) 
Unitech handheld, and (4) Tracient PadL with all of the traditional containers used for 
blood products – Coleman cooler, tray, two generic Styrofoam boxes and platelet boxes – 
in varying groupings to determine the efficacy. The different combinations were applied 
at each of the RFID-enabled checkpoints in the blood supply chain process to thoroughly 
assess where and what types of hazards may occur, as well as how to combat them. 
Hazards were revealed by probing the scenarios which could occur if the system did not 
perform as expected with any of the above-mentioned combinations of commercial 
application. 
Furthermore, analysis of the RFID Tag Survivability Protocol helped to identify hazards 
by investigating functional tag performance changes that could arise from exposure to 
centrifugation, blast freezing, and gamma irradiation. The studies simulated operational 
conditions equivalent to those a blood product would traditionally undergo. These 
methods can lead to degradation in tag functionality or, ultimately, failure. As a result, 
hazards were discovered by understanding the worst case effects that these processes 
could have on the system and users. 
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The HF RFID Application in Blood Centers Wireless Considerations Protocols 
investigated the potential effects of electromagnetic interference (EMI) on existing 
medical equipment and systems, as well as among High Frequency (HF) RFID entities. 
Such consequences included instances in which there was an interruption or failure in 
wireless, waveform data, or communication transmissions. Hazards were identified by 
assessing unfavorable outcomes related to EMI effects and erroneous and/or incomplete 
system communications. The culmination of all these aforesaid processes has led to the 
comprehensive group of hazards identified, described, and rated in this study. 
In analyzing the hazards and the procedures that may be taken to mitigate them, the 
following verification and validation methods were employed. 
 
VERIFICATION STRATEGY 
For each, the team analyzed the risk of implementing the technology to avoid potential 
hazards.  Testing protocols were created to ensure that each technology hazard was 
mitigated.  It was verified that the technology used met safety and critical functionality 
requirements, via the following: 
a. Limit Testing Protocol – Ensured RF radiation had no adverse effects on blood 
products. Limit testing in phase 1 of the RFID project indicated 13.56 MHz RF 
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energy had insignificant temperature and biological effects on RBC products that 
were < 11 days old and whole blood-derived platelets even at very high magnetic 
field levels of 5 amperes/meter and extended exposure durations. Results of initial 
limit testing were reported to the FDA on January 21, 2008, which confirmed the 
safety of 13.56 MHz RF with RBC and platelets and led to the agency’s consent 
to proceed with prototype testing and pilot use of the system with those products.  
Aged red cells (nearing expiration of the 42 day shelf) and thawed plasma 
products were also tested.  
This protocol was initiated to examine the effects of 13.56 MHz radiofrequency 
energy under the most extreme conditions possible in order to demonstrate the 
slight likelihood that the identified potential hazards could arise. It was utilized to 
evaluate the effects of RF frequency because, if the conditions established for the 
study far exceeded any to which a blood product would customarily be subjected, 
then the probability of the hazard occurring would be minimal. Thus, this test of 
extreme conditions was highly valuable for ranking the hazards associated with it 
by demonstrating the ways in which the hazard could be reduced. 
All of the blood products were tested in the same manner. The only variation was 
in the bag volumes and normal storage and testing temperature requirements for 
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each type of product. Therefore, all of the normal processes that blood products 
would experience were considered, yet with the unique requirements essential for 
each. 
b. Tag Survivability Protocol – This protocol was used to confirm the safety, 
reliability, and performance of the 13.56 MHz RFID technology as follows:  
RFID tag survivability and resiliency under centrifugation, irradiation, extreme 
cold (blast freezing and thawing), as well as RFID tag security and integrity, 
electromagnetic interference effects and temperature and biological effects of 
13.56 MHz RF energy on plasma and aging red blood cells. 
The Survivability studies were designed to either simulate operational conditions 
equivalent to those a regular blood product would normally undergo or subject the 
blood product to extreme exposure when encountering centrifugation, blast 
freezing, and gamma irradiation. Since the solution will be commercialized in the 
transfusion medicine industry, it was critical to uncover the impact of both. The 
survivability tests were intended to serve as a complement to the standard systems 
software test.  
The protocol was selected because of its ability to account for different processes 
and show the functionality of the tag in a general commercial environment. All of 
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the different types of tests were run in the same manner, and the potential hazards 
that arose from each process – centrifugation, blast freezing, gamma irradiation – 
were identical as they could lead to similar functionality deviations and failures. 
c. Performance Testing Protocol – Evaluated RFID tag read/write performance 
during the most common blood supply chain processes using a defined set of 
performance measure indicators. Tag performance refers to whether the coupled 
system tag/reader performs satisfactorily (reading/encoding tag content) in 
simulated scenarios including different bag containers, packaging materials, and 
different types of readers. 
This protocol was significant as it tested varying combinations of system 
functionalities. It was selected to mimic traditional processes. As it was based on 
the performance of the system, it was important to have protocols which would 
imitate scenarios that would occur in common settings. Likewise, it was valuable 
to evaluate all possible reader/container relationships to investigate all potential 
situations that could take place. 
d. EMI Testing Protocol – Determined whether there is potential electromagnetic 
interference (EMI) from high frequency (HF)-based RFID systems on existing 
medical equipment, as well as the potential EMI of HF RFID equipment on 
43 
 
 
 
existing wireless devices and systems found in donation and processing centers.  
The protocol also identified any potential for erroneous and/or incomplete 
communication between HF RFID entities (e.g., between tag and reader or 
between reader and server) due to EMI from other devices.  Where applicable, 
proactive measures to minimize or eliminate EMI effects were also suggested. 
This protocol was essential as it demonstrated the effectiveness of the system 
when placed in proximity to other similar technologies. It showed the ability of 
the system to still function without impeding the capabilities of the other systems. 
It also demonstrated the ability of the iTraceTM to work as intended without 
leading to the harm of patients as a result of disrupting wireless, waveform, and 
communication transmissions.  
The capabilities of the system were tested by placing the iTraceTM at varying 
proximities to a range of other medical devices. This methodology was selected in 
order to determine its effects within and between technologies at different 
distances. It was a worthwhile procedure as it showed the impact of the 
technology on an array of different systems and from a range of distances. 
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VALIDATION STRATEGY 
Validation tests were used to determine whether the technological design, 
implementation, and functional capabilities of the system operated as expected. The 
instances in which the system was unsuccessful at achieving anticipated results served as 
demonstrations of potential weaknesses, risks, and hazards to system use. The tests 
consisted not only of desired outcomes, but also of unfavorable circumstances that could 
potentially cause malfunctioning of the system or the reading/writing of inaccurate data. 
The thoroughness of the testing was essential to the discovery of both the benefits and 
hazards of employing the system.   
a. System Testing – Final end-to-end test of the RFID solution conducted by the 
RFID Consortium. All system functionalities of the iTraceTM were evaluated. 
The system tests were conducted in accordance with the Consortium’s 
software development life cycle. Successful completion of system testing was 
required prior to release for user acceptance testing. During system testing, the 
proper interdependency between hardware, software and interfaces was 
validated. Each system capability throughout each stage of the blood 
transfusion supply chain from donor to blood center distribution was 
evaluated. 
A total of 29 system tests were run on the iTraceTM. The common operational 
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functions and systematic procedures of the iTraceTM are all referenced in one 
or multiple system tests. System testing was selected as it took into account all 
of the possible system functionalities and capabilities, as well as potential 
hazards and hazard mitigation/correction procedures that could be applied 
from the beginning to the end of Phase One. 
During testing, team members validated that the functionality included in the 
system operated accurately and reliably as a whole and met performance 
criteria prior to user acceptance testing. Testers validated the system by: 
• Following the System Test Plan (developed using the 
Consortium’s System Development Life Cycle) 
• Checking that the interface is properly designed 
• Proceeding “top down” or “bottom up” as required 
Nonconformance was documented on the system testing results documentation and 
summary documentation. Correction and retesting occurred as required. 
b. Unit Testing – Extensive unit testing was conducted on the iTraceTM. The 
principal objective of unit testing was to take individual components of 
testable software and processes of the application, isolate them from the 
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remaining elements, and analyze their behavior. Units were tested 
independently prior to incorporating them with other processes. In other 
words, each stage within the blood transfusion supply chain was tested 
separately. Several hazards anticipated as a result of the implementation or 
functionality of the iTraceTM, as well as some based on the technology of the 
system, may be linked to one or many unit tests.  
The unit tests were performed to verify that the iTraceTM and its middleware 
software piece would accurately capture data relating to the Blood 
Transfusion Supply Chain collection, tracking, monitoring, and processing of 
products and materials. The aim of the system is not only to enable greater 
traceability, but also to enhance the efficiency of key supply chain operations. 
There was a total of 21 Unit Tests carried out to effectively test the 
functioning of the system throughout all stages of the supply chain from donor 
to blood center distribution. Various conditions that could occur within these 
stages, as well as expected results, actual results, and discrepancies were 
documented for each test. The test was deemed successful if the operation 
concluded as anticipated. The test was considered a failure if the incident 
which actually ensued was a deviation from the intended design or 
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functionality of the system. These steps were taken to comprehensively 
evaluate all aspects of the system from end-to-end.  
c. Performance Qualification – Formal validation completed by a 
user/customer in a regulated environment. The purpose is to validate use of 
the system tested solution within the context of specific operations using 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or Quality System Designs (QSDs) 
and training documentation. It further ensured that key functions perform at 
acceptable speeds. Key functions are identified (e.g., remote and on-site user 
access screens, system processing and data retrieval, network interfaces and 
external system interfaces) and an acceptable performance standard is 
achieved.  This validation ensured that the system, training of users, and 
SOPs/QSDs work together, as expected.  Successful completion of 
Performance Qualification (also referred to as user acceptance testing or beta 
testing) was a precursor to allowing use of the system in the pilot phase. This 
test was done to demonstrate the usefulness of the system in a real, 
commercial environment. 
Prior to testing, the test team received training for conducting testing. During 
testing, users thoroughly tested and accepted the RFID application before it 
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could be authorized for pilot use. They tested the system in the QA instance 
by: 
• Following the Performance Qualification Test Plan (developed using 
BCW’s QSDs relating to Performance Qualification) 
• Testing their own SOPs or QSDs 
• Validating the training received to use the system 
• Validating the user guide 
Nonconformance was documented according to performance qualification QSDs in place 
at BCW. Correction, retest, and validation occurred as required before placing the system 
into the pilot phase. Following a successful pilot, the system was released for production 
use.  After the Performance Qualification Test was executed, a summary was prepared 
and approved.  
Thus, the methods described illustrate the foundation of a comprehensive strategy for 
identifying hazards and assessing the strategies for reducing or mitigating them. There 
was a detailed, thorough process for identifying the hazards, as well as an all-inclusive 
approach for testing them with simulated, extreme, regulated, actual, and end-to-end 
methodologies. All tactics were valuable for the overall formulation of a practical 
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procedural framework for hazard identification and testing. 
 
SEVERITY AND LIKELIHOOD ANALYSES 
The hazard class was determined by the impact of the hazardous effects on the system, 
other systems, or individuals. The level of injury was rated by the damage done or degree 
of harm. For example, if the hazard had the potential to simply interrupt current 
processes, then it was given a severity level of one. On the other hand, if the hazard led to 
the complete destruction of the system, failure of the tag, or mis-transfusion to the 
patient, then the severity rating was the highest at five – critical. 
 
 
Severity Estimate 
 
The severity estimate has been determined in keeping with definitions, criteria, and 
guidance as defined in SysLogic’s Quality Plan.  It is defined as the qualitative rating of 
the possible consequences of a hazard. There are four (4) levels of severity ratings as seen 
in the Guidance on Severity Levels table (Table 3):  
1- Negligible (no injury; irritation and/or discomfort only) 
2- Minor (recoverable minor injury; no loss of function) 
3- Moderate (moderate injury or recoverable, non-life-threatening injury) 
4- Critical (major/life-threatening injury, or death) 
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Table 3: Guidance on Severity Levels 
Severity Level Description 
Negligible 1 No injury; irritation and/or discomfort only 
Minor 2 Recoverable minor injury; no loss of function 
Moderate 3 Moderate injury or recoverable, non-life-threatening 
injury 
Critical 4 Major/life-threatening injury, or death 
 
 
 
 
Likelihood Estimate 
 
Consideration was also given as to the likelihood that each identified hazard might occur. 
As the iTraceTM is a new technology, the probability of occurrence was deemed by 
assessing the number of times the hazard actually occurred during system testing and/or 
by taking the opinions of consortium experts into account. The final estimate was the 
weighted average of all responses. The number of outcomes that were possible were also 
specified and discussed. The number of times the event may occur over a particular 
period of time in relation to the number of possible outcomes is the means by which the 
likelihood estimate was established. 
SysLogic’s Quality System uses five (5) likelihood ratings as seen on the Guidance on 
Likelihood table (Table 4): 
1- Improbable (so unlikely that it is assumed it will never occur) 
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2- Remote (unlikely but may occur over the range of users) 
3- Occasional (once per device over its intended life, or once in 6 months) 
4- Probable (less than once per week but greater than once per month) 
5- Frequent (greater than once per week) 
 
Table 4: Guidance on Likelihood Levels 
Likelihood Level Description 
Improbable 1 So unlikely that it is assumed it will never occur 
Remote 2 Unlikely but may occur over the range of users 
Occasional 3 Once per device over its intended life (6 months) 
Probable 4 Less than once per week but greater than once per month 
Frequent 5 Greater than once per week 
 
Risk Acceptability Rating: 
By weighing the severity of a risk against its likelihood of occurrence, an overall risk 
acceptability rating was obtained. SysLogic’s Quality System uses the legend and matrix 
below (Table 5) to assign a risk acceptability rating. The way to compute the Risk 
Acceptability is shown in Table 6. 
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Table 5: Legend for Determining Resultant Severity Risk of the Device 
Risk/Hazard Class Severity Probability Risk Level 
 
No damage; inconvenience 
only 
 
1-Negligible 
1-Improbable A-Acceptable 
2-Remote A-Acceptable 
3-Occasional B-Tolerable 
4-Probable C-Intolerable 
5-Frequent C-Intolerable 
 
Minor damage, no loss of 
tag/system function, or 
recoverable minor damage 
 
2-Minor 
1-Improbable A-Acceptable 
2-Remote B-Tolerable 
3-Occasional B-Tolerable 
4-Probable C-Intolerable 
5-Frequent C-Intolerable 
 
Moderate damage or 
recoverable non-permanent 
impairment/loss of function 
 
3-Moderate 
1-Improbable B-Tolerable 
2-Remote B-Tolerable 
3-Occasional C-Intolerable 
4-Probable C-Intolerable 
5-Frequent C-Intolerable 
 
Major damage (permanent 
impairment or total loss of 
function) 
 
4-Critical 
1-Improbable B-Tolerable 
2-Remote C-Intolerable 
3-Occasional C-Intolerable 
4-Probable C-Intolerable 
5-Frequent C-Intolerable 
53 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Risk Acceptability Computation Table 
    
    Severity 
    Negligible Minor Moderate Critical 
Likelihood 1 2 3 4 
Improbable 1 A A B B 
Remote 2 A B B C 
Occasional 3 B B C C 
Probable 4 C C C C 
Frequent 5 C C C C 
 
 
 
SysLogic’s Quality System defines the risk acceptability ratings as follows (Table 7): 
 
 
Table 7: Definitions of Risk Acceptability Ratings 
A Acceptable Risk: The risk comes within the broadly acceptable (green) region, i.e., either the severity 
of the harm or the likelihood of occurrence of an event is so slight that the risk can be neglected 
compared to the risks of other hazards. There is not necessarily a need to reduce this risk. 
B Tolerable Risk: The risk comes within the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) region 
(yellow), between the broadly acceptable and unacceptable region; i.e., the risk is reduced to the lowest 
reasonably practicable level. Risks in this area must be carefully weighed with regard to the efficiency 
of the device and the workload/expenditure for reduction of the risk. A risk ranging near the 
unacceptable region will normally be reduced even though this may involve high cost expenditure. 
C Intolerable Risk: The risk comes within the (red) unacceptable/ intolerable region, i.e., the risk of the 
hazard is so severe that a system/ device involving such hazards would be intolerable. A risk within 
this region has to be reduced by reducing the likelihood of occurrence of that hazard. 
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Risk Assessment Process and Inter-rater Reliability 
The risk assessment process involved determining the extent of the consequence as well 
as the frequency with which it was expected to occur. The severity was determined by 
measuring the impact to the system, staff, or patients. For example, the wireless 
communication hazardous event in which unauthorized access occurs during the 
communication between the transmitter and receiver was given a level three severity. 
This is because the unauthorized access could lead to enough problems that it would 
generate a fair amount of concern, yet not enough to cause irreparable damage to the 
system or harm to the patient.  
Additionally, this hazard was assigned a level one likelihood. This is primarily due to the 
rigor applied to reduce it. There were several techniques performed including adhering to 
provisions in air protocols and standards which make it difficult to inappropriately access 
data during communication, limiting the communication range between the tag and 
reader, designing the tag to ensure data integrity, neglecting to include transmission of 
confidential medical data, and incorporating data encryption security on the wireless 
network. The combination of these approaches minimized the potential of occurrence to 
the point that it was improbable. Furthermore, the number of times the hazard was 
experienced during any of the verification or validation procedures was also taken into 
account. Ultimately, this hazard received a Pre-Mitigation Risk level score of B.  
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Nevertheless, since this assessment took place prior to completely implementing the 
device, the evaluation was obviously highly subjective. As such, inter-rater reliability was 
essential. My assessment and scoring assignments were reviewed, discussed, and 
approved by the teams of consortium members. The consortium met and agreed on the 
risk assessment assignments for each hazard. 
  
SUPPLEMENTAL SEVERITY ASSESSMENT  
As a supplement to assessing the risk using the accepted SysLogic, Inc. technique, I 
included an additional measure. Since the severity of the hazard is partially calculated by 
the success of the method of control, the following scale was included to further illustrate 
its impact. 
I. Prevents/Mitigates the Hazard from Occurring: This measurement reflects 
the ability of the method of control to deter the risk from happening.  It is the 
most highly desired effect of the controls. The risk legend would extend to, 
for example, AI. 
II. Corrects/Remedies the Situation Following the Occurrence of the 
Hazard: This measurement reflects the ability of the method of control to 
respond to the hazard post-occurrence. It includes resolution strategies and 
back-up plans to account for hazards. It is not as appealing as the prevention 
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methodologies, but it does provide an effective solution to dilemmas that may 
unfold. The risk legend could potentially extend to AII or BII for example. 
III. No Effect on Hazard Mitigation or Correction: This measurement reflects 
the total inability of the strategy to proactively inhibit or counter the risks 
associated with iTraceTM use. It consists of the most undesired methodologies 
due to the lack of efficiency in negating or amending processes in the face of 
hazards. The risk legend could apply as CIII for example. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: TECHNOLOGY HAZARD ANALYSIS 
It is evident that it is necessary to analyze the risks of implementing HF RFID (13.56 
MHz) technology and system tools to avoid potential hazards. The impact a hazard would 
have on the efficacy of blood products and, perhaps ultimately, on patient safety in the 
event a failure occurs or a design flaw is discovered should be assessed. The technology 
hazards are the potential harms that may occur from technology or system conditions, or 
from human interactions with these conditions. These hazards were identified using the 
methods described above. The following safety and critical design requirements will be 
discussed in this chapter:  
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• Preventing Read/Write Errors or Failure. 
• Ensuring No Adverse Effects of RFID Technology on Blood Products. 
• Ensuring Performance Capability of RFID Tags During the Most Common Blood 
Supply Chain Processes. 
• Ensuring RFID Tag Survivability After Experiencing the Most Demanding 
Conditions in the Blood Supply Chain. 
• Ensuring No Interference of RFID High Frequency (HF) and Electromagnetic 
Interference (EMI) with Other Systems. 
 
TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT 
DATA READ/ WRITE FALIURE 
There are six potential system hazards which could potentially affect the ability of the 
iTraceTM to effectively read/write essential data. The first is a general read/write failure 
due to any malfunction of the handheld or pad RFID reader. The consortium team rated 
this as a one on the severity level and three on the likelihood level. This indicates that, 
while the hazard may occur occasionally, it will not cause any significant harm to the 
patient, blood products, or system. The mitigation applied to this is a simple, yet helpful 
solution that is reflective of the inherent functionality of the middleware used in the 
application. Each time a tag is read/written by a handheld or pad reader, an audible sound 
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is heard. This notifies the user that the tag was successfully read/written. Additionally, 
the handheld and/or work station display is also updated with the newly read/written 
information in the instance of successful completion of the activity. If an error is, in fact, 
detected, the application prevents the user from continuing the process until the current 
problem is resolved. Moreover, should the RFID reader fail, the user may revert to the 
standard barcode reader to read/write the same information. 
The pre-mitigation risk for this hazard was rated a B. Level B signifies a tolerable risk. It 
falls within the As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) region. The hazards which 
fall into this category must be measured in comparison to the advantages of utilizing the 
device and the methods taken to reduce the risk. In other words, the cost of minimizing 
the risk must be lower than the value of using the device. The results of the analysis on 
cost vs. benefit of employing the iTraceTM with regards to each hazard described will take 
place in the Discussion Chapter. 
Likewise, the second hazard is again an overall read/write failure, this time due to any 
breakdown in the process associated with the RFID tunnel reader. The RFID tunnel 
reader reconciles blood product containers and their contents as they are checked into the 
Blood Center and shipped to/from the Blood Center. Reconciling refers to the system’s 
role in verifying that the expected container and its contents correctly match what is 
59 
 
 
 
actually presented.  As with the first hazard, the consortium rated this hazard a one on the 
severity scale and a three on the likelihood scale, showing that it has the potential to 
happen intermittently, but will not lead to any harm when it does.  
The mitigation strategy used here was the application of yet another inherent 
functionality of the middleware: the software driver for the tunnel reader. The software 
driver can determine whether items are missing or excess items are present in containers. 
If a RFID tag is detected for a product that is not anticipated to be included in a container 
during the tunnel read check-in process, the product is flagged as an “excess” item. The 
operator is then required to manually inspect the container and its contents to correct the 
issue. 
Similarly, if the RFID tag for an expected product is not identified during the tunnel read 
check-in operation, the application notifies the operator of the potentially “missing” item. 
Again, the operator is instructed to manually inspect the container to determine if the 
product is, in fact, missing, if the RFID tag failed, or if the tag was blocked by other 
container contents. For this hazard, the operator is always charged with manually 
examining the container to resolve any discrepancies. In addition, in the event of an RFID 
reader failure, the user maintains the option to use the standard barcode reader to read the 
same data which is barcoded on the label. 
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The pre-mitigation risk for this hazard is also a Level B. The risk is tolerable, yet there is 
a need to diminish it. We must assess whether the benefits of employing the device 
outweigh the cost of mitigating this hazard. 
The third hazard that must be lessened to meet the safety critical design requirement of 
preventing data read/write errors/failures is the risk of bad data on the tag. This RFID 
hazard is caused by corrupted data existing on the tag. This hazard was given a level 
three severity and level one likelihood. The ratings indicate that the risk is of moderate 
severity, leading to relative, though recoverable and non-permanent, damage, injury, or 
loss of function; however, it is improbable, assuming it will likely never occur. This 
presents the highest severity, yet least likelihood, thus far.  
Bad data on the tag could hypothetically be the result of harsh conditions experienced by 
the tag such as centrifugation, blast freezing, and gamma irradiation; but, formal protocol 
testing was conducted on tag survivability, examining the effects of these techniques 
under extreme and excessive circumstances. The study, which will be explained in more 
detail subsequently, demonstrated that these methods would not significantly affect the 
performance or survivability of the tag. 
Furthermore, a new ISBT128 data structure was developed to enable more advanced 
detection of tag memory corruption. An ISBT-128 local data identifier is used to facilitate 
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the parsing of this field from other ISBT-128 data structures. Also, the ISBT-128-
compatible memory checksum data structure is used. The system is designed to 
recalculate and rewrite the data every time the tag data changes. When the full tag data 
structure is read, the reader calculates and compares its result with the data values already 
stored in the memory block. If even one bit of the tag memory is corrupted, the 
recalculated and stored data identifier will disagree, indicating that memory corruption 
has occurred. 
The pre-mitigation risk for this hazard is a Level B. As such, the hazard is determined to 
be tolerable. Despite the moderate risk presented with this hazard, it is still acceptable 
due to the unlikely possibility that it will occur. 
The next RFID system hazard that falls into the read/write error category involves the 
subsequent alteration of the donation identification number (DIN) written on the tag at 
collection. This hazard may be due to the lack of enforcement of the DIN field locking on 
the tag. It was rated a two on both the severity and likelihood scales, indicating a minor 
severity with no loss of tag/system functionality and a remote possibility of occurrence.  
The method of control involves the configurable design of the application, which allows 
the organization to use the DIN locking feature at the point of collection or at labeling. 
The locking process unfolds as follows:  
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1. The DIN labels for the entire blood collection set are placed on individual bags 
prior to collection. This includes placing an RFID tag on the RBC bag. All bags 
receive both an RFID tag and DIN label during apheresis collection. 
2. The handheld reads the DIN bar code label and writes the ISBT-128 DIN data 
structure contained in the bar code directly into the tag without any data 
transformation. 
3. Every ISO 18000-3 mode 1 RFID produced has a Tag ID Number (TIN). The 
TIN is a unique factory-programmed 64-bit serial number, which includes the 
manufacturer ID and tag model number. Both the TIN and the DIN are recorded 
in the RFID database. 
4. The DIN data structure is read back into the RFID reader to verity that it was 
written precisely.  
5. The four 32-bit data blocks containing the DIN on the tag are then permanently 
locked by the RFID reader, inhibiting the threat of the data ever being modified or 
overwritten. 
6. The lock bits can be read back by the reader to confirm that locking did actually 
take place. 
In the rare instance in which the tag failed to physically lock the DIN memory blocks, 
and the DIN was altered, the DIN and TIN are associated in the RFID database. 
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Therefore, if the DIN on the tag changes, the next time the tag is read, an error will be 
displayed to alert the operator that the DIN and TIN do not match. 
The pre-mitigation risk for this hazard was rated a Level B by the consortium. Here, the 
risk is highly tolerable because it is both minor and rare. Nevertheless, as with all 
tolerable risks, the value in relation to the reduction of the risk must be assessed. 
The next hazard to be evaluated was the potential for the DIN created at final labeling to 
be altered. As with the last hazard, this hazard may be the result of the DIN field locking 
not being enforced. Additionally, this hazard also receives a severity and likelihood rating 
of two and two.  
The method of control executed to mitigate this was as follows. If there was no RFID tag 
present at final labeling, a blank RFID tag was affixed to the product bag. The process of 
printing, applying, and verifying the barcoded final label occurred as normal. The 
labeling operator then began the process of programing the ISBT 128 label data structure 
by placing the product on an RFID pad reader which is connected to the RFID server. 
The server had an application titled “Label Product,” which the operator launched. The 
operator then scanned the DIN and Product Code barcodes from the blood bag, and 
selected the “Label” button. The data was then uploaded to the RFID server, which 
gathered all other required information from the BECS. The pad RFID reader wrote all 
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the required ISBT-128 data structures including the ISBT-128 DIN Data Structure into 
assigned memory blocks. All memory fields on the tag were then read again to confirm 
that the data was successfully written to the RFID tag’s memory, and coincided with data 
received from the BECS’ master file. The tag’s TIN was read by the RFID server and 
permanently associated with the DIN and product code in the database. Finally, the two 
32-bit blocks containing the ISBT-128 ABO data structure and the four 32-bit blocks 
containing the ISBT-128 DIN data structure were locked, rendering them unalterable. 
Here, again, the Pre-Mitigation Risk was a Level B. It fell in the middle of the tolerable 
risk category, putting it at the exact midway point between the acceptable and intolerable 
region. Consequently, it was likely that it could be reduced without a great deal of cost 
expenditure. 
The final risk falling into the category of read/write RFID system errors was the potential 
hazard of the ABO being rewritten on the tag. The severity and likelihood ratings of this 
hazard were three and one respectively. This indicates a moderate severity with an 
improbable chance of occurrence. The method of control applied here dealt with the 
placement of the ABO label for the blood bag on the individual bags during final 
labeling. It included placing an RFID tag on products that did not already carry one. The 
process of printing, applying, and verifying the barcodes on the final label remained 
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unchanged. As with the hazard of the alteration of the DIN at final labeling, this 
procedure for programing data structures was applied, ultimately rendering the ABO data 
structure unchangeable. The Pre-Mitigation Risk was a B for this hazard. The risk 
remained tolerable, yet needed to be mitigated or decreased. 
 
TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: ENSURE NO 
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF RFID TECHNOLOGY ON BLOOD PRODUCTS  
The five hazards that could impact the safety and critical design requirements necessary 
to ensure no adverse effects of RFID technology on blood products were examined 
through the use of a formal protocol and testing procedures. The Limit Test Protocol for 
Radio Frequency Exposure Testing was performed. The background for the protocol 
testing was as follows. 13.56 MHz is the global standard frequency recommended for 
blood transfusion medicine by the International Society for Blood Transfusion (ISBT) 
working party.  There were several criteria for selection of this operating frequency, 
including: 1) 13.56 MHz is a global standard frequency for RFID usage, supporting the 
ISBT’s global mandate, and 2) at this frequency, the RF signal contains only a magnetic 
field component and the electric field is suppressed, thereby minimizing the possibility of 
biological interaction. 
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In order to prevent adverse occurrences resulting from the use of RFID in the transfusion 
medicine supply chain, the objective was to outline test protocols and success criteria for 
evaluating the worst-case effects of 13.56 MHz RF magnetic field radiation on the 
temperature elevation and toxicity of cellular protein structures of red blood cell (RBC), 
whole blood derived platelet products (WBDP), plasma and plasma coagulation factors 
under extreme RF exposure conditions.  
The RFID Consortium, under the guidance of the FDA, developed and undertook this 
protocol testing regimen to ensure that the proper methods of control for mitigating the 
potential hazards were established. The RBCs, WBDPs and plasma products followed 
identical RF testing protocols. The only difference was in the bag volumes and normal 
storage and testing temperature requirements for each type of product. 
The testing methodology for these protocols included three iterations of identical 
exposure conditions to CONTROL and TEST bags appropriate to the product being 
tested under exposure guidelines provided by Center for Devices and Radiological Health 
(CDRH). The testing was designed to focus results in two primary areas of interest to 
CDRH and Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) respectively:  
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• Any rise in temperature of blood products (red cells, pooled platelets, and plasma) 
due to dielectric heating generated by extended exposure to the intense RF field, 
and 
• Cellular or protein degradation from extended exposure to the intense RF field. 
The potential hazards included: 
1. High Frequency RF radiation could increase the temperature of RBCs and 
platelets beyond acceptable level of 1.5 °C due to Joule heating. 
2. High Frequency RF radiation could lead to increased degradation of RBC cellular 
and protein structures beyond acceptable level of hemolysis of ≤1%.  
3. High Frequency RF radiation could lead to increased degradation of WBDP 
cellular and protein structures, such that the pH decreases beyond acceptable level 
of ≥6.2. 
4. High Frequency RF radiation could increase the temperature of plasma types 
(FFP, FP24, and TP) beyond acceptable level of 4 °C due to Joule heating. 
5. High frequency RF could degrade the activity of the coagulation factors (PT, 
aPTT, Antithrombin Activity, Factor V, Factor VIII, Factor XI, Protein C, Protein 
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S, VWF: RCo) levels of three types (FFP, FP24, and TP) of thawed plasma 
products beyond an acceptable level of 20%. 
The joint mitigation strategy for all of these hazards was associated with this protocol. 
The RFID Consortium study team chose to enlist the involvement of the FDA CBER at 
an early stage to determine its level of interest or uncover any concerns related to the use 
of RFID in transfusion medicine. The FDA emphasized the necessity of identifying and 
assessing the total impact, if any, that radio frequency energy may have on the safety and 
efficacy of blood products. The FDA also prohibited the use and transfusion of blood 
products in an RFID-enabled pilot study until they had reviewed the in vitro test results 
of an accepted protocol. 
As a result of the testing conducted at the CDRH (54, 55), the FDA CBER and CDRH 
proposed the execution of a more specific and exhaustive protocol consisting of a limit 
test that would simulate worst-case scenarios. These organizations, along with the 
consortium, collaborated to develop the Limit Test Protocol, including the parameters to 
be studied, the length of time the products would be exposed to RF energy, the RF 
magnetic field strength, the type and number of products to be studied, and the 
acceptance criteria. A single RF Limit Test Protocol would be performed for all products. 
69 
 
 
 
The intent of the Limit Test was to expose blood components to extraordinarily higher 
RF power levels and for longer durations than would ever be seen in practice, and 
compare those results with an unexposed control group. The Limit Test in question would 
test for both thermal (Joule Heating) effects on the blood products, as well as assay 
changes in cellular and chemical parameters.  
The consortium estimated that the average exposure of a blood bag over its entire useful 
life would be at a RF magnetic field strength of 1 Ampere/meter for a discontinuous 
period of less than 21 minutes. The Limit Test simulated a 13.56 MHz RF magnetic field 
strength of 5 Amperes/meter for a continuous exposure period of 23-25 hours (56). In 
other words, the blood products were tested at hundreds of times the exposure they were 
anticipated to experience during normal use. 
Because there was no known apparatus that was of the size and capability to hold a blood 
bag in a uniform, intense 13.56 MHz RF magnetic field of 5 Amperes/meter field 
strength, Hohberger and Tsirline of Zebra Technologies designed and constructed a 
segmented 86cm Helmholtz coil with 90 Watts RF input (56). This simulated a constant 
repeating RFID reader interrogation. Zebra Technologies donated the entire apparatus to 
the University of Wisconsin RFID Lab. 
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Each test used identical test and control bags, with only the test bags experiencing the full 
RF exposure. The control bags were placed outside of the RF field. Product samples were 
collected from each bag prior to the start of the test, after 7 hours, and at the end of the 
test period of 24 hours. In vitro chemical, morphological, and biological assays on both 
control and test bags were performed. The temperature at each bag’s surface and core 
were measured every minute. The detailed testing and results have been documented and 
published (19, 57). 
There were two rounds of Limit Tests. The first round included tests performed on young 
red blood cells (RBCs) and whole blood-derived platelets (WBDPs) at the BloodCenter 
of Wisconsin. Personnel from the University of Wisconsin RFID Lab, under the direction 
of Alfonso Gutierrez, and from the BloodCenter of Wisconsin under the direction of 
Graminske, conducted the Limit Testing on both AS-1 packed RBC products at 4◦C that 
were six to nine days old and fresh WBDP at 22-24◦C. These Limit tests were performed 
at RF magnetic field levels of 5A/m and extended exposure durations for 24 hours. Three 
pairs of bags were tested, with each pair consisting of a control bag (placed 2m outside of 
the coil center) and a test bag (placed at the center of the Helmholtz coil). Due to the 
extension of the magnetic field beyond the Helmholtz coil, the control unit was exposed 
to only 0.64% of the RF magnetic field strength generated at the location of the test 
product (56). This exposure was deemed acceptable and negligible in the protocol review.   
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The study results demonstrated that RBC and WBDP products had no increased 
cellular/protein degradation after extended exposure to RF. Joule heating by the RF field 
had acceptable effects on the temperature rise of RBC and WBDP (35). More 
specifically, the findings were as follows (19): 
• Hemolysis of young (6-9 days old) RBCs after 23-25 hours of RF energy 
exposure was <0.2% for all TEST and CONTROL RBC units, well within the ≤ 
1% limit of the FDA-approved acceptance criterion.  
• While there was minimal RBC TEST versus CONTROL bag center temperature 
rise due to Joule heating, the average 0.14 ± 0.35 °C relative temperature increase 
measured at the end of the test between TEST and CONTROL units never 
exceeded the 1.5 ºC acceptance criterion. 
• No clinically significant changes were observed in RBC, Hb, Hct, MBC, RBC 
morphology and potassium in the RBC TEST versus CONTROL group. 
• For WBDP, the mean pH of the measured TEST group pH was 7.27; CONTROL 
group pH was 7.19, exceeding the minimum pH criterion ≥ 6.2.  
• The maximum temperature increase of the WBDP TEST unit relative to the 
CONTROL was 0.30 ± 0.27°C, not exceeding the  1.5° C criterion. 
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For the second round of testing, the FDA expressed concern that aged red blood cells 
(aRBCs) – those near expiration of the 42-day shelf life) might be more susceptible to the 
effects of radio frequency than young RBCs and should be tested. This study utilized the 
same testing protocol as the first, and allowed measurement of peak transient 
temperatures in the aRBC and plasma bags prior to their achieving thermal equilibrium 
(57). 
Pairs of aRBC control and test bags of the same age and blood type from no later than 
day 41 of storage were used so that testing was completed by the 42-day product 
expiration. For the plasma tests, the objective was to show that long-term RF exposure 
did not impact the coagulation factor levels of thawed plasma products. All plasma 
products were donated by females of blood group O. The Applied Research Lab at 
BloodCenter of Wisconsin (BCW) thawed the frozen plasmas at 30-37◦C. Nine pairs of 
aged frozen plasma products, three each of three types, were randomly selected by the 
BCW’s Component Department. Nine pairs of aged frozen plasma products, three each of 
three types, were randomly selected by the BloodCenter of Wisconsin’s Component 
Department. The three types of plasma units selected for testing were: 
1) FFP (plasma frozen within 8 hours from collection) was freshly thawed and 
stored at 1°C - 6°C for up to 24 hours. Testing started on the day of thaw. 
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2) FP24 (plasma frozen within 24 hours of collection) was freshly thawed and 
stored at 1°C - 6°C for up to 24 hours. Testing started on the day of thaw. 
3) Thawed plasma (TP) (plasma frozen within 8 hours from collection) was 
thawed 4 days prior to testing and stored at 1°C - 6°C for up to 5 days. Testing 
started on day 4 of thawed storage. 
Plasma testing always began on the day prior to shelf life expiration so that the end of the 
testing was on the same day the product expired. Prior to any Limit Testing, the thawed 
plasma pairs were each aseptically pooled together, mixed and then equally divided into 
test and control bags.  
The RF exposure protocol for all plasma pairs was identical to that used in the aged RBC 
trials. All plasma products were assayed at zero, seven, and 23-25 hours for Prothrombin 
Time (PT), activated Partial Thromboplastin (aPTT), Antithrombin III, Factor V, Factor 
VIII, Factor XI, Protein C, Protein S, and von Willebrand factor ristocetin cofactor 
(VWF:RCo) activities.  
The results for the second round of testing for aRBCs were consistent with earlier tests on 
young RBCs (19). The results were as follows:  
• Hemolysis after 23-25 hours of RF energy exposure was < 0.3% for all TEST and 
CONTROL aRBC units and well within the ≤ 1% acceptance criterion. 
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• No notable changes were observed in red blood cell count, hemoglobin, 
hematocrit, mean cell volume (MCV), RBC morphology score, free hemoglobin, 
and potassium or percent hemolysis in the TEST versus CONTROL group. 
• The maximum transient relative center temperature increase between TEST and 
CONTROL units of 0.77 ± 0.17 °C due to Joule heating. The highest peak 
recorded of 1.00 °C never exceeded the 1.5 °C criterion.  
• Biological test results were within acceptance criteria and consistent with earlier 
tests on 6-9 day RBCs. 
• There was no detectable acceleration in cellular degradation of aRBCs over young 
RBCs.  
Similarly, the 3x3 sets of thawed FFP, FP24 and TP paired plasma units had comparable 
results between test and control bags, demonstrating that long-term RF exposure does not 
impact the coagulation factor levels of thawed plasma products (57).  The results of the 
plasma testing were as follows: 
• All three groups of plasma products (FFP, FP24, TP) with one exception met the 
FDA limit test acceptance criterion of<20% difference between TEST and 
CONTROL parameters assayed before and after RF exposure for Antithrombin 
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activity, Factors VIII and IX; PT and aPTT; Proteins C and S; Fibrinogen and 
VWF:RCo. (There was a single exception in TP pair #1.  For that pair, the 
CONTROL product VWF:RCo inexplicably dropped much lower than the TEST 
product.  Since, however, the CONTROL sample had negligible RF exposure, the 
anomalous result is not likely due to any RF exposure process). 
• While Joule heating was present in the TEST bag, the average relative 
temperature increase between TEST and CONTROL units’ centers was 1.36 ± 
0.68 °C. The highest peak temperature recorded of 2.30 °C never exceeded the 4 
°C criterion for plasma. 
Overall, the results demonstrated that 13.56 MHz-based RFID technology is unlikely to 
have any significant temperature or biological effects on RBC and WBDP units under 
normal RFID operating conditions. More specifically: 
• Both young RBCs and aRBC products do not have any increased cellular/protein 
degradation after high levels of extended exposure to RF energy. All results on 
aged RBCs were consistent with the earlier tests on young RBCs (57). 
• WBDP products do not have any increased cellular/protein degradation after high 
levels of extended exposure to RF energy (19). 
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• All tested plasma products (FFP, FP24, TP) with one explainable exception met 
the FDA limit test acceptance criterion of<20% difference between TEST and 
CONTROL parameters assayed before and after RF exposure for all test 
coagulation factors. 
• The RF field emitted by the Helmholtz coil had no significant effect on the 
temperature of RBC and WBDP blood products, and an acceptable effect on 
plasma products. The relative temperature increase of the exposed blood products 
did not exceed at any time their acceptance criteria.  
Consequently, in review of the five hazards which could affect the safety and critical 
design requirements of ensuring there were no adverse effects of RFID technology on 
blood products, the methods demonstrated in the Limit Test Protocol and Results show 
that this will not likely occur during application of the technology. For these five hazards, 
the entity at risk of the RFID radiation hazard was the product or patient. Furthermore, all 
were given the same severity and likelihood measurements of two and one respectively, 
indicating that, even in the very unlikely incidence that the hazards will occur, they will 
only lead to minor, recoverable injury. Moreover, the results of the aforesaid method of 
control described in the Limit Test protocol can be applied to all. 
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The first hazard involves the event in which the maximum temperature increase of the 
RBCs and Platelets exceeds the acceptable levels of 1.5◦C. The results demonstrated that, 
for RBCs, the maximum average transient temperature increase of test versus control 
units due to Joule heating was 0.77 ± 0.17°C. There was no transient increase of greater 
than 1.00°C. For platelets, the maximum average transient temperature increase of test 
versus control units due to Joule heating was 0.30 ± 0.27◦C.  
The second hazard was the potential of the cellular and protein structures of RBCs 
(complete blood counts including sample weight, RBC count, Hb, Hct, MCV; potassium, 
aluminum; free hemoglobin; level of blood gases) being degraded or altered beyond the 
acceptable level of ≤1% hemolysis. Test results demonstrated that, for young RBCs, 
Hemolysis was < 0.2% for both test and control RBC units. Additionally, for aRBCs, hemolysis 
was < 0.2% for both test and control RBC units.  
The third potential hazard was the possibility of the cellular and protein structures 
(Lactate, Aluminum, P-Selectin, and complete blood counts including sample weight, 
WBDP count, Plt, and MPV) of WBDPs being degraded such that the pH decreases 
beyond the acceptable level of ≥6.2. The results of the Limit Test Protocol showed that 
the average pH of the test bags was 7.27. The average pH of the control bags was 7.19.  
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The next hazard involves the potential for the maximum temperature increase of plasma 
types (FFP, FP24, and TP) to exceed the acceptable level of 4 °C. The study showed that 
the maximum average transient temperature of the test vs. control bag was 1.36  ± 0.68 
°C. Also, there was no transient temperature increase that exceeded 2.30 °C. 
Finally, the last hazard in this group deals with the potential activity of coagulation factor 
(PT, aPTT, Antithrombin Activity, Factor V, Factor VIII, Factor XI, Protein C, Protein S,  
VWF: RCo) in all types (FFP, FP24, and TP) of thawed plasma products being altered 
beyond an acceptable level of 20%. The protocol results revealed that all three groups of 
plasma products (FFP, FP24, TP) with one exception met the FDA limit test acceptance 
criterion of <20% difference between test and control parameters assayed before and after 
RF exposure for PT, aPTT, Antithrombin activity, Factors V,  VIII and IX; Proteins C 
and S; Fibrinogen and VWF:RCo. There was a single exception in TP pair #1.  For that 
pair, in the control product VWF:RCo inexplicably dropped much lower than the test 
product.  Since, however, the control sample had negligible RF exposure, the anomalous 
result was deemed unlikely to be due to any RF exposure process. 
The Pre-Mitigation Risk of all five hazards in this category was determined to be at Level 
A. Level A is indicative of acceptable risk. This means that either the severity of the harm 
or the likelihood of occurrence of the event is so small the risk can be considered 
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negligible compared to the risks of other hazards. As a result, there is not a great need to 
reduce this risk.  
 
TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY AND CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: 
ENSURE THE PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY OF RFID TAGS DURING THE 
MOST COMMON BLOOD SUPPLY CHAIN PROCESSES 
Similar to the hazards potentially impacting the previous safety and critical requirement 
of ensuring no adverse effects of RFID on blood products, the hazards which threaten this 
requirement of ensuring the performance capability of RFID tags during the most 
common blood supply chain processes were all tested under the same protocol. The 
Performance Test for RFID Tags in Blood Products Protocol was conducted.  
In order to best understand the iTraceTM and the Performance Test for RFID Tags in 
Blood Products Protocol, it is important to be aware of the type of tag used, as well as the 
reason for why this particular tag was selected. Standard ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1 
passive RFID tags, which are also compliant with the ISO 15693 standard, were selected 
for use at 13.56 MHz frequency. These tags were chosen for several reasons: 1) ISO 
18000-3 is the international standard for passive RFID tags and describes the parameters, 
which are specifically optimized for healthcare applications, for use at 13.56 MHz, 2) 
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The tags are read/write capable, 3) The tags have the ability to store up to 3 kilobit of 
memory, some of which would be locked on the tag, and 4) The tags are unaffected by 
water and are able to withstand harsh environments. Avery Dennison AD-730 HF RFID 
tags with an operating temperature range of -40 to +85◦C were placed underneath the 
DIN barcode on the 0.9N saline filled blood bags. The tags operate using the 1 kilobit 
NXP|*Code SLI integrated circuit, consist of aluminum antenna external dimensions 
measuring 14x31 mm, and has an average free air resonance tuning of 14.0 MHz.  
To determine the commercial applicability of the RFID system solution in the blood 
transfusion medicine industry, this protocol was designed to develop procedures and 
success criteria for evaluating the performance capability of RFID tags during the most 
common blood supply chain processes. The protocol used a defined set of performance 
measurement indicators. Tag performance was measured according to whether the 
tag/reader system performed satisfactorily when dealing with tag content in simulated 
scenarios including: different bag containers, varying types of readers, and packaging 
materials. 
The UW RFID lab attached the RFID tags to simulated blood bags (actual blood bags 
filled with saline-based liquid content). The protocol considered all typical containers 
used for blood products at the BloodCenter of WI: Coleman cooler, tray, two generic 
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Styrofoam boxes, and platelet boxes. The performance of each tag was measured by 
reading the containers with four different RFID specified readers (tunnel reader, flatbed 
reader, dual barcode-HF handheld, and HF paddle reader). Acceptance thresholds were 
set for each test metric after analyzing the results from pre-testing and practicality 
considerations for real world application. Furthermore, the thresholds were established 
prior to fine tuning, thereby reflecting the worst case acceptable operation conditions. 
The testing methodology for this protocol included 41 test scenarios and 23 separately 
analyzed experiments of container-reader combinations that have been documented by 
the BloodCenter of Wisconsin. The instances which involve reading all blocks with the 
handheld or the paddle were executed one blood bag at a time. The handheld devices 
cannot read more than one at a time since having multiple tags in the reading field creates 
reading problems for these readers. Therefore, the application will limit the use of these 
devices to reading one bag at a time.  
The testing was designed to focus results in three primary areas of interest:  
• Time to read (header) – Time in milliseconds to the point when the tag was seen 
for the first time after start of test, 
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• Time to read (memory blocks) – Time in milliseconds to read the predefined 
number of memory blocks from the tag memory, and 
• Time to write (only done with single bag scenarios) – Time in milliseconds to the 
point when the tag acknowledges encoding completion; which includes reader 
header, reading the current data in the tag, erasing the tag by writing all zeros, 
writing a random pattern and finally verifying that the data was written correctly. 
All operations would be done to a predetermined number of blocks in the tag 
memory after start of test. If the written operation is not completed the trial is 
ignored and repeated.  
The three potential hazards that may be experienced are as follows: 
1. The time to read the headers of 20-bags-equivalent exceeds the maximum 
threshold established for specific container/reader combinations. 
2. The time to read/write all memory blocks of 20-bags-equivalent exceeds the 
maximum threshold established for specific container/reader combinations. 
3. The time to write all blocks exceeds the maximum threshold established for 
specific container/reader combinations. 
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The RFID Consortium is seeking to implement the RFID systems solution into 
commercial applications of the transfusion medicine industry. In doing so, a series of 
tests were planned to complement the standard software systems test. These included two 
phases of testing: tag survivability and tag performance testing. This portion of the 
document discusses the tag performance testing protocol execution and results. The 
survivability testing aspect will be discussed later.  
The consortium developed this protocol based on the most common scenarios where 
RFID tags would be utilized in the blood supply chain. The goal was to evaluate as many 
aspects of the performance of RFID tags as possible in order to determine its full 
potential. The method was to combine the four different types of readers: (1) TagSys HF 
RFID Tunnel, (2) TagSys HF RFID Flatbed, (3) Unitech handheld, and (4) Tracient PadL 
with all of the traditional containers used for blood products at the BloodCenter of 
Wisconsin – Coleman cooler, tray, two generic Styrofoam boxes and platelet boxes – in 
varying groupings to determine the efficacy. The different combinations were applied at 
each of the RFID-enabled checkpoints in the blood supply chain process. 
The UW RFID lab used a factorial design to formulate a total of 41 test scenarios. The 
combination of scenarios generated 23 experiments. The factors or variables that were 
manipulated during each experiment were the amount of data processed and the number 
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of units in the container. There were also two test levels for each variable: the two 
extreme values for the number of bags and the number of memory blocks. For the 
number of bags variable, the 60 bags were randomly grouped into the corresponding 
number of bags per container and tests were run until all 60 bags were read in each 
scenario.  
The testing team worked closely with the software developer (S3Edge) and the tunnel 
manufacturer (TagSys) to ensure the tunnel configuration was appropriately attuned for 
the test purpose. Since tags were read individually using the handheld and paddle reader, 
it was found that the packaging type did not matter and the only variable that had an 
effect was the number of tagged units. The units were tested in groups of 2, 4, 10, 17, and 
30, and the only difference was the absence of the container. 
Using two level factor analysis on preliminary data collected on the variables’ effect 
between the different levels, it was estimated that a minimum of 60 test units was 
required as a sample size to ensure 95% confidence of results applying two replications 
per run. 
The acceptance thresholds were set for each test metric after analyzing results from pre-
testing the most difficult scenarios of the blood supply chain. The time to read/write was 
taken as the average value of all data obtained for the scenario. If the average time to read 
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or write exceeded the threshold by a statistically significant amount at α=0.05, the test 
failed. 
All measurements were converted to 20-bags-equivalent and compared with its 
corresponding 20-bags-equivalent threshold.  
The results of this protocol show that RFID tags demonstrate acceptable levels of 
performance in all scenarios of real world application. More specifically, the results were 
as follows: 
• All scenarios passed the statistical t-test with a confidence level of 95% when 
compared to the pre-determined threshold. 
• Some scenarios, such as the tray with the flatbed were dependent upon the 
operator because the flatbed reader only used a single antenna that had 
dimensions smaller than the length of the tray. 
• The system can be fine-tuned to improve performance over the results obtained 
through this study. 
• The handheld and paddle reader need to have exactly one tag in the reading field, 
making it difficult to read all blocks within packaged containers where there is 
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interference from neighboring tags – each bag must be read individually with 
these devices. 
• When reading headers with handheld and paddle readers, the type of packaging 
did not significantly affect the performance. 
Thus, all scenarios passed the performance thresholds that were set based on actual pre-
test data and practicality considerations for real-world applications. The tunnel reader 
was found to perform the best with the fastest read times in its applicable scenarios. Next 
was the flatbed, then handheld, and the last was the paddle reader. Other tests showed 
that the paddle antenna had the highest Q, thereby reducing its sensitivity to RFID tags 
which are detuned form the 13.56 MHz reader interrogation frequency. Consequently, 
this increased the number of retries needed to read these tags and boosted the average 
reading time.  
Additionally, when using the handheld and paddle readers, bags had to be read 
individually. As a result, the performance of the system in some of these scenarios 
depended on the user’s ability to properly employ the device and the software user 
interface.  
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Furthermore, when comparing the time to read barcodes on individual bags with the 
results obtained from the RFID tags, a marked improvement in performance is shown. 
The improvement can be highlighted by the read time for the tunnel where one can read 
at a rate of less than a second per bag without having to open or unpack the container. 
This compares with approximately 0.5-1 minute per tag for unpacking and reading the 
barcodes on each bag individually, depending on the operator’s skill level, as measured 
by the check-in process in other studies. RFID considerably improves the time it would 
take to read barcodes from each bag, serving as a major source of return on investment in 
the blood center.  
Even with the poorest performing reader, the paddle reader, it is possible to read a tag 
every 2 seconds. Moreover, through additional fine-tuning of the tunnel reader’s 
parameters, the possibility of greater performance improvement is feasible. This 
enhancement will take place in tandem with the fine-tuning of the final user application 
development. 
As a result, the evaluation of the three hazards which could affect the safety and critical 
design requirement of ensuring performance capability of RFID tags during the most 
common blood supply chain processes could be attributed to the Performance Test 
Protocol and Results. For these three hazards, the entity at risk of the RFID hazard is the 
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system itself. In addition, the hazards are all caused by system capability. Furthermore, 
all were given the same severity and likelihood measurements of one and two 
respectively. This means that, even in the remote chance that the hazards will occur, they 
will only lead to negligible injury. What is more, the results of the abovementioned 
mitigation strategy for the Performance Testing Protocol can be applied to all three 
hazards for their methods of control. 
The first hazard refers to the potential scenario in which the time to read headers of 20-
bags-equivalent exceeds maximum threshold established for specific container/reader 
combinations. The results of the Performance Test Protocol demonstrated the following: 
Tunnel Reader:  
1. Maximum threshold = 15-25 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on 
container.  
2. Maximum average time to read only headers was 6.19 seconds.  
3. Mean time to read the header of any one tag was 0.26 seconds. 
 
Flatbed Reader:  
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1. Maximum threshold = 20-40 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on 
container.  
2. Maximum average time to read only headers was 23.7 seconds.  
3. Mean time to read the header of any one tag was 0.87 seconds. 
Handheld Reader:  
1. Maximum threshold = 35-45 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on 
container.  
2. Maximum average time to read only headers was 37.7 seconds.  
3. Mean time to read the header of any one tag was 1.27 seconds. 
Paddle Reader: 
1. Maximum threshold = 70, 75, & 80 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, 
depending on container. 
2. Maximum average time to read only headers was 68.9 seconds. 
3. Mean time to read the header of any one tag was 1.95 seconds. 
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The second hazard deals with the possibility in which the time to read/write all 28 
memory blocks of 20-bags-equivalent exceeds maximum threshold established for 
specific container/reader combinations. The results of the Performance Test Protocol 
were as follows:  
Tunnel Reader:  
1. Maximum threshold = 25-40 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on 
the container.  
2. Maximum average time to read all blocks was 26.5 seconds.  
3. Mean time to read all blocks on any one tag was 0.89 seconds. 
Flatbed Reader:  
1. Maximum threshold = 30, 50, & 60 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, 
depending on the container.  
2. Maximum average time to read all blocks was 45.6 seconds.  
3. Mean time to read all blocks on any one tag was 1.23 seconds. 
Handheld Reader:  
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1. Maximum threshold =80 & 60 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, depending on 
the container.  
2. Maximum average time to read all blocks was 25.0 seconds.  
3. Mean time to read all blocks on any one tag was 1.27 seconds. 
Paddle Reader: 
1. Maximum threshold =130, 140, & 150 seconds for the 20-bags-equivalent, 
depending on the container.  
2. Maximum average time to read all blocks was 102.4 seconds.  
3. Mean time to read all blocks on any one tag was 4.4 seconds. 
The third and final hazard of this category involves the potential situation in which the 
time to write all blocks exceeds the maximum threshold established for specific 
container/reader combinations. The protocol test results showed the following: 
Flatbed Reader (Write): Tag read and written twice:  
1. Maximum threshold =70 seconds. 
2. Mean time to write one tag was 50.7 seconds. 
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Handheld Reader: Tag read and written twice: 
1. Maximum threshold = 130 seconds. 
2. Mean to write one tag was 120.5 seconds. 
All three of the hazards described in this section received a Pre-Mitigation Risk Level of 
A. Again, a level of A indicates acceptable risk. It denotes that there is not necessarily a 
need to reduce the risk. 
 
TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY AND CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: 
ENSURE RFID TAG SURVIVABILITY AFTER EXPERIENCING THE MOST 
DEMANDING CONDITIONS IN THE BLOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 
There are several hazards that could impact the safety and critical design requirement of 
ensuring the RFID tag survivability after experiencing the most demanding conditions in 
the blood supply chain. In order to investigate these hazards, a formal protocol study 
entitled “RFID Tag Survivability Testing Protocols: Centrifugation, Blast Freezing, and 
Gamma Irradiation” was conducted.  As the RFID Consortium is seeking to implement 
the RFID systems solution into commercial applications of the transfusion medicine 
industry, this protocol represented the survivability portion of a series of tests that were 
designed to complement the standard software systems test.  
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The general objective of this protocol was to evaluate RFID tag survivability and changes 
in functional performance as a result of exposure to the effects of centrifugation, blast 
freezing, and gamma irradiation. Whereas centrifugation and blast freezing generally take 
place during processing at the blood center, gamma irradiation may be performed in 
either the blood center and/or prior to transfusion in the hospital. The studies were 
designed to simulate operational conditions equivalent to those a regular blood product 
would normally undergo since the solution will be commercialized in the transfusion 
medicine industry. Basic scenarios were devised to observe the behavior of the functional 
RFID tags before and after the simulated units experienced the demanding conditions. 
The survivability tests were intended to serve as a complement to the standard systems 
software test. 
The first condition measured was centrifugation. The objective of the centrifugation 
protocol was to test the applicability of the use of RFID technology in the transfusion 
medicine supply chain. It was performed in order to evaluate the RFID tag survivability 
and resiliency when exposed to the effects of centrifugation under high levels of exposure 
conditions (higher number of processes than typically expected with three centrifugation 
cycles approximately 10 minutes long at a speed of 4,200 RPM (4750g), rather than the 
expected maximum of two centrifugation cycles for approximately 10 minutes in 
duration at a speed of 4,200 RPM (4750g). The duration and speed of the centrifugation 
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cycles were consistent with the maximum values normally used in standard 
manufacturing processes. Sixty operable RFID tags were sampled testing their post-test 
operability at each distance of 0cm, 5cm, and 10cm. The tags were tested for read/no read 
and write/no write capabilities, as well as the time to read (header), time to read (all 
blocks), time to write, and data integrity. The RFID Blood Center Consortium developed 
and undertook this testing regimen to ensure that the proper methods of control for 
mitigating the potential hazards were established.  
The potential hazards that could result from centrifugation were the following: 
1. RFID tag may not survive the exposure to centrifugation process. Evidence of 
survivability should be proven by complying with the acceptable performance 
criteria laid out by the other potential hazards described below. 
2. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may decrease the ability of the 
RFID tag to read tag data within 30 seconds of the start. 
3. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may decrease the ability of the 
RFID tag to write information within 30 seconds of the start. 
4. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may increase the time it takes to 
read the tag after it was seen for the first time (header) by greater than 20 seconds. 
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5. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may increase the time it takes to 
read all blocks of tag memory by greater than 45 seconds. 
6. Increased exposure to centrifugation processes may increase the time it takes to 
write information after the tag acknowledges encoding completion of all blocks 
by greater than 75 seconds.  
The next condition investigated was blast freezing. The objective of the blast freezing 
protocol was to determine the applicability of using RFID technology in the transfusion 
medicine supply chain. It was performed in order to evaluate RFID tag survivability and 
resiliency when exposed to the effects of blast freezing under high levels of exposure 
conditions. Sixty operable RFID tags were sampled testing their post-test operability at 
each distance of 0cm, 5cm, and 10cm. The tags were tested for read/no read and write/no 
write capabilities, as well as the time to read (header), time to read (all blocks), time to 
write, and data integrity. The tags were affixed to plasma bags and subjected to blast 
freezing for approximately 50 minutes, and then placed in a walk-in freezer set to -30°C. 
After being stored in a frozen state for about 72 hours, the bags were thawed in a water 
bath using standard plasma thawing procedure. The RFID Blood Center Consortium 
developed and undertook this testing regimen to ensure that the proper methods of 
control for mitigating the potential hazards were established.  
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The potential hazards that could result from blast freezing include the following:  
1. RFID tag may not survive the exposure to blast freezing techniques. Evidence of 
survivability should be proven by complying with the acceptable performance 
criteria laid out by the other potential hazards described below. 
2. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may decrease the ability of the RFID tag to 
read tag data within 30 seconds of the start. 
3. Increased exposure to blast freezing techniques may decrease the ability of the 
RFID tag to write information within 30 seconds of the start. 
4. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may increase the time it takes to read the 
tag after it was seen for the first time (header) by greater than 20 seconds. 
5. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may increase the time it takes to read all 
blocks of tag memory by greater than 45 seconds. 
6. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may increase the time it takes to write 
information after the tag acknowledges encoding completion of all blocks by 
greater than 75 seconds.  
7. Exposure to blast freezing techniques may affect the integrity of the written data. 
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The final condition examined under this protocol was gamma irradiation. The objective 
of this study was to determine the applicability of the use of RFID technology in the 
transfusion medicine supply chain. It was performed in order to evaluate the RFID tag 
survivability and resiliency when exposed to the worst-case effects of gamma irradiation 
under high levels of exposure conditions. Sixty operable RFID tags were sampled testing 
their post-test operability at each distance of 0cm, 5cm, and 10cm. The tags were tested 
for read/no read and write/no write capabilities, as well as the time to read (header), time 
to read (all blocks), time to write, and data integrity. The tags were affixed to blood 
product bags and subjected to a higher number of process cycles of Cs137 gamma 
irradiation than normal. In standard manufacturing processes, exposure to gamma 
irradiation will be limited to a total of approximately 3.8 minutes to reach the desired 
dose of 25 Gy. Under typical circumstances, an RFID tag is expected to be exposed to a 
maximum of two gamma irradiation cycles. The test units in the study were exposed to 
that maximum level of two 25 Gy doses of gamma irradiation exposure. The RFID Blood 
Center Consortium developed and undertook this testing regimen to ensure that the 
proper methods of control for mitigating the potential hazards were established.  
The potential hazards associated with blast freezing include: 
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1. RFID tag may not survive the exposure to gamma irradiation processes. Evidence 
of survivability should be proven by complying with the acceptable performance 
criteria laid out by the other potential hazards described below. 
2. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may decrease the ability of the 
RFID tag to read tag data within 30 seconds of the start. 
3. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may decrease the ability of the 
RFID tag to write information within 30 seconds of the start. 
4. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may increase the time it takes 
to read the tag after it was seen for the first time (header) by greater than 20 
seconds. 
5. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may increase the time it takes 
to read all blocks of tag memory by greater than 45 seconds. 
6. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may increase the time it takes 
to write information after the tag acknowledges encoding completion of all blocks 
by greater than 75 seconds.  
7. Increased exposure to gamma irradiation processes may decrease the integrity of 
the written data. 
99 
 
 
 
Thus, although the harsh conditions may differ (i.e. centrifugation, blast freezing, gamma 
irradiation), the hazards that may ensue from exposure to these conditions are the same. 
The testing methodology for these protocols included a simulation of operational 
conditions equivalent to those to which a regular blood product would be subjected under 
normal operating conditions. The basic scenarios were designed to observe RFID tag 
behavior before and after the simulated units underwent the demanding operational 
conditions of centrifugation, blast freezing, and gamma irradiation. 
A total of 180 RFID tags were sampled. Prior to affixing the tags to the test units, each 
sample tag was validated to ensure only operable tags were tested. Different test 
parameters were measured for each tag before and after each survivability scenario, and 
were collected at three different distances from the reader antenna – 0cm, 5cm, and 
10cm. The parameters measured included read success, write success, as well as time to 
read, time to write, data integrity, read rate, and signal strength.  
The mitigation strategy followed for all of these hazards were related to the tags. The 
RFID tags used for the RFID Blood Center Solution are compliant with the ISO 15693 
and ISO 18000-3 standards, and are specifically optimized for healthcare applications. 
Durable Avery Dennison AD-730 HF RFID tags were used and placed underneath the 
DIN barcode.  
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The risk mitigation strategy is three fold: 
1. RFID tag suppliers will be required to certify the readability of tags supplied by 
implementing internal controls to statistically sample production batches and 
eliminating defective tags prior to shipping tags to the blood center.  The blood 
centers should establish a procedure to periodically verify the certification levels 
established in the purchasing contract. 
2. In case of an eventual tag failure, the operator must follow the general procedure 
established for proceeding when an inoperable tag is detected in any blood center 
process:  The unit must be clearly identified as a “BAR CODE ONLY” unit and all 
subsequent operations with such unit must be performed thru the back up operating 
procedures (barcode scanning).  
3. Failed tags will be reported documenting the potential cause for failure (when 
apparent).  If failure rates surpasses the threshold established by the quality control 
department, a joint investigation with the manufacturer will be conducted to establish 
root causes. 
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The resulting performance levels observed for all of the survivability tests – 
centrifugation, blast freezing, and gamma irradiation – at least 92% of the tags survived 
with 95% confidence. 
• Centrifugation secondary analyses: There was a statistically significant increase in 
time to read/write and read rate performance mainly after the third centrifugation 
cycle. Some degradation was expected because the tags were exposed to the high 
levels of centrifugation (4750g) conditions twice in succession. However, despite 
the statistically significant difference, the resulting performance level observed 
was well within the acceptable operational ranges expected for a normal tag. 
• Blast freezing secondary analyses: There was no significant degradation in read 
rate or signal strength observed after the freezing and thawing cycles (Note that 
the tags rated operating temperature range is -40 to +85°C).  Statistically 
significant degradation was observed for mean time to read and write all blocks 
mainly after thawing. However, despite the statistically significant difference, the 
resulting performance level observed is well within the acceptable operational 
ranges expected for a normal tag. 
• Gamma irradiation secondary analyses: There was no significant degradation in 
read rate observed. However, there was a significant downward trend in signal 
102 
 
 
 
strength when measured at 10cm distance after each irradiation cycle. Signal 
strength was not a hazard in itself but one of the measurements used to explain 
poor performance.  In all cases except the time to read all blocks, there was not a 
statistically significant deterioration in tag functionality. The resulting 
performance levels observed were well within the acceptable operational ranges 
expected for a normal tag. 
Overall, although there was some degradation in tag functionality after the last exposure 
cycles, the degree of degradation observed was not considered critical in practical terms 
as the post-test measurements were still deemed appropriate for acceptable tag operating 
performance.  
The seven hazards which could impact the survivability of the RFID Tag subsequent to 
experiencing the most demanding conditions in the blood supply chain were all tested in 
the above Survivability Testing Protocol. All seven hazards are RFID-based, and they 
may affect the ability of the system to perform as desired. Additionally, the same method 
of control may be applied for all. This mitigation strategy is based on the tag itself. The 
durable Avery Dennison AD-730 HF RFID tags, which are compliant with the ISO 
15693 and ISO 18000-3 standards and specifically optimized for healthcare applications, 
were used and placed underneath the DIN barcode. 
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Survivability tests were conducted in which tags were exposed to higher numbers of 
process cycles of centrifugation, blast freezing, or gamma irradiation than those regularly 
applied during normal operations. After the tests, the tags behaved within acceptable 
performance levels. 
RFID tag suppliers will be required to certify the readability of tags supplied by 
implementing internal controls to statistically sample production batches and eliminating 
defective tags prior to shipping tags to the blood center.  The blood centers should 
establish a procedure to periodically verify the certification levels established in the 
purchasing contract. 
In case of an eventual tag failure, the operator must follow the general procedure 
established for when an inoperable tag is detected in any blood center process:  The unit 
must be clearly identified as a “BAR CODE ONLY” unit and all subsequent operations 
with such unit must be performed following back up operating procedures (barcode 
scanning). 
Failed tags will be reported by documenting the potential cause for failure.  If failure 
rates surpass the threshold established, a joint investigation with the manufacturer will be 
conducted to establish root causes.   
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Furthermore, with the exception of the first hazard, which was given a severity and 
likelihood score of three and two respectively, the remaining hazards were given severity 
and likelihood scores of two and two respectively. The first hazard described the general 
risk that the tag failed to survive the process. Understandably, it is essential for the tag to 
maintain functionality throughout the entire process in order to achieve the objectives of 
the iTraceTM. The severity rating illustrated the remote chance that moderate damage or 
loss of function could occur.  
Thus far in the analysis, this hazard has presented the greatest risk. While the Pre-
Mitigation Risk was still a B, the risk range was near the unacceptable region. 
Consequently, even though this hazard could be mitigated and the severity reduced, it 
may involve high cost expenditure. 
The remaining hazards all had severity and likelihood levels of two and two, but they all 
presented a Pre-Mitigation Risk of B. Although they had the same rating as the previous 
hazard, these hazards all fell within the middle of the tolerable risk range. Therefore, the 
cost expenditure or efforts that must be taken to mitigate the hazard were lower for these 
hazards than the former. 
The list of remaining hazards that fell in this category included: 
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• The ability of the RFID tag to read data within 30 seconds of the start is 
damaged. 
• The ability of the RFID tag to write information within 30 seconds of the start is 
damaged. 
• The time it takes to read the tag after it was seen for the first time (header) 
increases greater than 20 seconds. 
• The time it takes to read all blocks of tag memory increases by more than 45 
seconds. 
• The time it takes to write information after the tag acknowledges encoding 
completion of all blocks increases by greater than 75 seconds. 
• The integrity of the written data is compromised. 
 
TECHNOLOGY – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIRMENT: ENSURE NO 
INTEREFERENCE OF RFID HIGH FREQUENCY (HF) AND 
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI) WITH OTHER SYSTEMS 
There were 11 potential hazards identified that could impact the safety critical design 
requirement to ensure no interference of RFID High (HF) and electromagnetic 
interference (EMI) with other systems. Like the previous technology hazards described, 
these hazards were all tested through the use of a formal protocol. The protocol was 
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entitled: “Wireless Considerations Test – HF RFID Application in Blood Centers 
Wireless Considerations.”  
The objective of this protocol was to outline testing methods and success criteria for 
evaluating the potential effects of electromagnetic interference (EMI) on existing medical 
equipment and systems, as well on and between High Frequency (HF) RFID entities. The 
RFID Consortium developed and undertook this systematic and repeatable protocol 
testing regimen based on the recommendation of the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) to ensure that the proper methods of control for mitigating the potential 
hazards were established.   
There were four main goals of the study: 
1. Identify potential electromagnetic interference (EMI) effects from High 
Frequency (HF)-based RFID systems on existing medical equipment found in 
donation and processing centers. 
2. Identify potential EMI effects of HF RFID equipment on existing wireless devices 
and systems found in donation and processing centers. 
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3. Identify any potential for erroneous and/or incomplete communication between 
HF RFID entities (e.g. between tag and reader or between reader and server) due 
to EMI from other devices. 
4. Suggest proactive measures to minimize or eliminate EMI effects.  
A major prerequisite to understanding the possible effects that high frequency and 
electromagnetic energy from the iTraceTM could have on interfacing and communications 
transmission was learning how the iTraceTM itself operates. The implementation of the 
RFID blood center solution iTraceTM consists of RFID devices securely interfacing 
through servers to the Blood Establishment Computing System (BECS). The servers run 
the application iTraceTM that is built on a middleware developed by S3Edge that is based 
on the Microsoft BizTalk RFID platform.  
Wireless considerations for interfacing and communication transmissions were taken into 
account for the iTraceTM. The two types of wireless technologies that were applicable to 
this project were High Frequency (HF) RFID and Wi-Fi. HF RFID operating at 13.56 
MHz is the recommended technology for use in the blood supply chain under the ISBT 
Guidelines. It utilizes near-field magnetic induction coupling and the electric field is 
suppressed. The tag types – ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1 and downward compatible 
ISO/IEC 15693 – use the ISO/IEC 15693 wireless communications protocol. Wi-Fi, 
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which is already used in blood centers and at mobile donation sites, consists of 
technologies using wireless local area network (WLAN) based on the IEEE 802.11 
family of standards, device to device wireless connectivity. The coverage of one or more 
interconnected access points (hotspots) comprises an area the size of a few rooms 
depending on the number of access points with overlapping coverage. Both wired 
Ethernet LAN-based RFID readers and wireless battery-operated RFID readers interface 
to the iTraceTM server over the existing T-100 LAN, 802.11b/g wireless LANs.  
Prior research has shown that RFID systems, because of their wireless communication 
transmitters, may have the potential to both generate and fall victim to electromagnetic 
interference (EMI). In order for successful adoption and deployment of RFID technology 
in blood centers, key areas of concern such as quality of service, data corruption, security, 
and electromagnetic compatibility must be properly addressed, examined, and approved. 
The testing methodology for this protocol included three sub-protocols. The first was the 
HF Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Test Protocol (Protocol ID 1). For this 
protocol, medical devices at the blood center were set up to operate in normal working 
conditions with relevant measurements taken from each device and compared against the 
expected range of values. Operations of the RFID system were also monitored to assess 
successful completion of blood center software transactions. Two types of outcomes were 
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used in a binary pass/fail measurement – normal (i.e. no deviation from the expected 
range of operating values) and abnormal (i.e. deviation from outside the normal expected 
range of operating values). The acceptance criteria for this sub-protocol were as follows: 
• Blood center routine must be successfully completed in all the test locations. 
Failure is indicated by the following situations: 1) The reader is unable to 
complete the operation and/or emit error beeps, and 2) The routine is completed 
but the data in the server database has some mismatch with what is expected or is 
corrupted. 
• No medical device should show abnormal measurement pre-, in-, or post-test. 
The second sub-protocol was the Wi-Fi EMI/EMC Test Protocol (Protocol ID 2). The 
goal of this test was to verify the wireless functioning of the Unitech RFID handheld 
reader, as well as multiple medical and blood product handling and processing devices. 
The acceptance criteria for this sub-protocol were as follows: 
• The fraction of packets lost when running a ping command from the handheld 
must not exceed 10% in any location. 
• The blood center software routine must be successfully completed in all the test 
locations within the protocol. Transaction failure was indicated by the following 
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situations: 1) an error message appeared on the handheld indicating that the 
process was terminated prematurely for any reason whatsoever, and 2) the routine 
was completed but the data in the backend database had some mismatch with 
what was expected or was corrupted. 
• No medical device should show abnormal measurements pre-, in-, or post-test. 
The third sub-protocol was the Failure Recovery Test Protocol (Protocol ID 3). This 
protocol was designed to examine the behavior of the RFID blood center solution in the 
event of a sudden failure in Wi-Fi signal connectivity and to analyze the recovery 
mechanisms of the system. The acceptance criteria here were as follows: 
• There should be a clear indication on the device itself that informs the user about 
an interruption in wireless connectivity. 
• The handheld should clearly indicate that the transaction must be repeated in the 
instance of a failed attempt to store information to the central database field. 
• The central database should not contain erroneous or misleading information 
about the intermittently stopped transaction. It should notify the user of an 
incomplete entry. 
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• The handheld should complete the transaction when the wireless connection is 
resumed. 
• If applicable, entries created in the database after completion of the handheld 
routine should match up with the information on the RFID tag. 
Finally, the HF RFID tag write failure recovery application was examined. The purpose 
was to perform a write-read-verify cycle to confirm proper tag commissioning. If an error 
was indicated during the process, the solution used a configurable number of automatic 
retries to ensure the tag was correctly commissioned. The acceptance criteria here was an 
assessment of functionality, examining whether the software first detected a verified 
write, then a failed write, then another verified write to demonstrate the capability of the 
automatic retry. 
The potential hazards investigated under this protocol and sub-protocols included the 
following: 
1. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) effects could cause connections to be lost 
without warning. 
2. EMI effects could cause a failure to establish connections. 
3. EMI effects could lead to degradation of service. 
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4. EMI effects could produce delays and packet loss in the transmission of 
information to and from a handheld reader or a netbook/laptop. 
5. EMI effects could negatively impact the wireless transmission of critical medical 
device alarms. 
6. EMI effects could impede the transmission of physiological waveform data. 
7. EMI effects could prevent the real-time control of therapeutic medical devices. 
8. EMI effects could hinder the transmission of time-critical medical telemetry. 
9. EMI effects could obstruct the wireless control of therapeutic devices. 
10. EMI effects could lead to data corruption and/or errors. 
11. Communication between the transmitter and receiver could lead to unauthorized 
access. 
The mitigation strategy applied for these hazards was extensive. Several considerations 
were taken into account in the creation of the RFID blood center solution application. 
The first was RFID interference with wireless devices. This posed minimal concern 
because, aside from the extensive frequency separation between 13.56 MHz RFID and 
2.4 GHz for wireless communication that enables excellent signal filtering, the signal 
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propagation characteristics of RFID make interference with wireless communications 
unlikely. 
Next, the near-field magnetic propagation of the application reduced the potential for 
electromagnetic interference in all but the closest objects. The RFID reader operated at 
13.56 MHz and 22m wavelength with the electric field suppressed. Additionally, the 
magnetic field strength was largely limited to the antenna and the propagated field 
strength was inversely proportional to the cube of the distance from the antenna. 
Although the maximum operational range varied by reader power and antenna size, this 
generally remained less than 50cm. Consequentially, the magnetic field strength at λ/2 = 
11m made far field electromagnetic propagation essentially non-existent.  
Furthermore, the 2.4 GHz wireless antennas of the application lacked a metallic loop-
shaped device. This structure eliminates the possibility of EMI because the RFID 
magnetic field in the air cannot be induced without a complete loop. 
In general, EMI may be avoided in three ways: suppressing the source, breaking the 
interference path, or shielding the device at risk. The potential hazards depended on the 
severity of the EMI, which was determined by the power of both the electromagnetic 
leakage and channels. The two general guidelines applicable to reduction in all types of 
EMI are diminishing electromagnetic leakage and suppressing electromagnetic channels.  
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Electromagnetic radiation leakage is a consequence of most electronic devices operating 
with digital signals that have sharp temporal transitions. As a result, these devices serve 
as sources for EMI. As performance requirements increase, the speed of digital signals 
and the strength of radiation and leakage increase. Higher electromagnetic output power 
boosts the risk for EMI. Agencies such as the FCC regulate the amount of radiated and 
leaked electromagnetic power. EMI can be reduced by modifying the internal circuit 
design of the device. Two of the most commonly used methods to achieve this are the 
filtering and the spread spectrum techniques. The filtering technique blocks the frequency 
bands while the spread spectrum technique spreads the energy over a wider frequency 
range. With proper design following these principles, electromagnetic leakage from 
devices can be greatly reduced. Nevertheless, the operational frequency bands of HF 
RFID readers and Wi-Fi devices are restricted to specific regions of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, and most medical devices fail to generate electromagnetic fields at these 
frequencies.  
The next guideline, suppressing electromagnetic channels, consisted of three different 
types of electromagnetic channels that warrant consideration: electro-coupling, magnetic-
coupling, and electromagnetic radiation. Among them, magnetic-coupling may play a 
primary role in producing EMI between HF RFID readers and medical devices. Yet, 
electromagnetic radiation is the dominating factor of the EMI in Wi-Fi devices. For HF 
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RFID readers, suppressing the magnetic-coupling between devices can be implemented 
by providing electromagnetic shielding or pulling devices away from potential sources of 
EMI. Electromagnetic shielding blocks electromagnetic fields and is typically achieved 
by surrounding the susceptible device with a good conductor such as a metal film or foil 
cover. 
Another strategy was to pull HF RFID readers away from all medical devices as much as 
possible to significantly lessen electromagnetic channels which are constrained to within 
a few centimeters of the HF RFID antennas. The strength of the channels drops 
dramatically with distance. Most HF RFID readers that operate as per FCC regulations 
for maximum power have magnetic fields spreading less than 20 cm from the antenna.  
Electromagnetic shielding or spreading the distance between devices are valid measures 
for Wi-Fi as well. Even a thin sheet of metal is sufficient to provide significant 
electromagnetic shielding. As well, increasing distances between medical devices and 
Wi-Fi devices can reduce the efficiency of the channels since the radiation energy density 
is inversely proportional to the square of the distance. 
Furthermore, there are two EMI-related hazard mitigation strategies that blood centers 
and hospitals may need to implement. The first is to incorporate EMI test requirements 
into the new medical device/equipment sourcing policy. Device sourcing involves several 
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practices which are geared towards finding, evaluating, and engaging suppliers of goods 
and services.  The first EMI-test related step entails defining the specific electromagnetic 
frequencies and wireless communication protocols utilized in blood centers and hospitals. 
This will facilitate effective communication and reduce damaging interference between 
devices. The next EMI-test related step is to communicate those specifications in Request 
for Proposal (RFP) and Request for Quotation (RFQ) documents that are customized to 
particular use cases in order to record business requirements for and competitively price 
potential solutions. The final step in the sourcing strategy is to ensure that manufacturers 
provide evidence of EMI shielding specifications or methodology and testing of their 
products to confirm the safety of their use.  
The second strategy is to incorporate EMI test requirements into the procurement of new 
medical device/equipment or existing medical device/equipment upgrades policy. For 
implementing this policy, it is necessary to first define the appropriate EMI test protocols 
applicable for the device in question. It is also essential to consider the operating 
environment where the device will be employed. This will enable a comprehensive 
analysis of the effects of utilizing the device. The policy should then require the 
performance and documentation of the applicable EMI testing protocol prior to installing 
the device. 
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The results of the testing showed that all hazards successfully passed acceptance criteria, 
and that EMI and wireless communication issues will only be minor risks in the 
implementation of the iTraceTM. 
The 11 hazards tested with this protocol were all RFID hazards caused by EMI/Wireless 
communication and were capable of impacting the system. Two of the hazards: 1) 
Connections/communication links are lost without warning and, 2) Degradation of 
service/ transmission of information share the same method of control. The method of 
control involved the HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio communication protocols as dictated by 
the ISO/IEC 15693 standard, as well as the ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1 standard, which are 
used in the RFID readers for this application. The 16-bit cyclic redundancy check 
(CCITT CRC-16) is run on the message bits right from the start of the flags to the end of 
data and the CRC-16 accompanies the message as it is sent. This is used for 
communication both from the reader to the tag as well as from the tag to the reader, and 
is capable of detecting 99.998% of all possible bit errors. When an error is detected, a 
complete bit sequence must be retransmitted. Furthermore, the CCITT 16-bit CRC on the 
data stored in the tag memory serves as a second layer of protection against the remaining 
0.002% cases of bit stream corruption not caught by the original transmission CRC.  
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Another hazard in this category was the possibility that the systems will experience a 
failure to establish communication. Here, the strategy was to revert to the current 
standard. The key information for safe transfusion is carried in ISBT-128 barcodes, as 
well as in human readable form, on the bag itself. In the event of any communication 
failure of the RFID system, bar code data will be used. 
The next five hazards utilize the same method of control. The hazards which comprise 
this group are the following: 
1. The wireless transmission of critical medical device alarms is disabled. 
2. The transmission of physiological waveform data is impeded. 
3. The real-time control of therapeutic medical devices is prevented. 
4. The transmission of time-critical medical telemetry is hindered. 
5. The wireless control of therapeutic devices is obstructed. 
The method of control was reflective of the strategies as previously described for this 
protocol. All wireless communication and EMI interference tests in this protocol 
successfully passed acceptance criteria for the existing key devices operating in the Blood 
Center. EMI and wireless communications issues will involve minor risks in the 
implementation of the RFID blood center solution. 
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There are two steps for effective control for preventing these hazards from occurring for 
future acquisition or upgrading of key equipment.   The first is at the new medical 
device/equipment sourcing stage. The EMI study protocol described above defined the 
specific electromagnetic frequencies and wireless communication protocols utilized in 
blood centers. The specifications were documented and tested. These specifications are to 
be used as templates for defining EMI-related specification for new/upgraded equipment 
The second step is at the procurement of new or upgrading of existing medical 
device/equipment stage. Here, the appropriate EMI test protocols applicable for this 
device will be executed. The test results will be documented.  
Going a step further than the general practice described with the former hazards, the 
method of control for the next hazard – delays and packet loss in the transmission of 
information to and from a handheld reader or a netbook/laptop – took into account formal 
standards useful for WLAN communication. The WLAN communication used for the 
iTraceTM adhered to the IEEE 802.11b and 802.11g standards which define one Medium 
Access Control (MAC) layer and multiple physical layers (PHY). Various error detection 
and corrections steps were employed at both layers including Reed-Solomon codes (that 
can detect up to 8 byte errors) and 32-bit CRC that can detect more errors than a 16-bit 
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CRC in ISO 15693. The error detection and correction steps were achieved by appending 
a frame check sequence (FCS) at the end of each packet.  
All of the nine aforementioned hazards in this category were rated at a level two severity 
and a level one likelihood. That means that these hazards all represented improbable 
instances which would only lead to minor loss of function or impairment if they did 
actually come to pass. As such, they were all assigned a Pre-Mitigation Risk Level A. 
They were all acceptable risks that can be disregarded in comparison to other risks.  
However, the remaining two risks which threaten the fulfillment of the safety critical 
design requirement to ensure no interference of RFID HF and EMI with other systems 
both received severity and likelihood scores of three and one respectively. This moderate 
severity in conjunction with an improbable likelihood resulted in a Pre-Mitigation Risk of 
B. These risks were considered tolerable, yet the effort to mitigate the hazards may be 
greater. 
One of these hazards – data corruption and/or errors are produced – utilized the combined 
mitigation strategies of a few of those described above. The HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio 
communication protocols as dictated by the ISO/IEC 15693 standard, the ISO/IEC 
18000-3 mode 1 standard, the 16-bit cyclic redundancy check (CCITT CRC-16), the tag 
data encoding procedure, and the WLAN communication error detection and correction 
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(i.e. IEEE 802.11b and 802.11g) standards demonstrated a comprehensive mitigation and 
correction strategy for preventing and rectifying this hazard. 
The second of these hazards was the event in which unauthorized access during the 
communication between the transmitter and receiver transpired. The method of control 
engaged formal guidelines concerning access, encryption, and data manipulation security. 
There were particular provisions in the air protocols and standards that made it difficult to 
inappropriately access data while the transmitter and receiver were communicating.  
Furthermore, the RFID reader operates at 13.56 MHz and 22m wavelength with the 
electric field suppressed. Additionally, although the maximum operational range varied 
by reader power and antenna size, this generally remained less than 50cm. Because the 
communications range is limited to within a few centimeters around the RF tag and 
reader, it is almost impossible for an unauthorized individual to access or steal 
information. Also, the tag structure design included data bits stored on the tag with an 
associated CCITT 16-bit CRC stored in the tag memory to ensure data integrity and 
making malicious alteration difficult.  
Moreover, the key information for safe transfusion is carried in ISBT-128 barcodes and 
human readable form on the bag itself. The application does not and will not involve 
storage or transmission of confidential medical data, and all key information. Finally, the 
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wireless network included data encryption security that prevented hackers from 
connecting to protected networks and stealing information. The application utilizes the 
WPA2 AES security key as well as wireless intrusion prevention systems as an added 
layer of security. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION HAZARD ANALYSIS 
SysLogic, Inc. maintains a list of recognized or foreseeable hazards associated with 
medical devices under both normal and abnormal conditions. Previously identified 
hazards were also taken into account. The implementation hazards encompass the broad 
range of issues related to the realization or execution of the device specifications. They 
include matters involving the database, interface, processing, data corruption or loss, and 
audit trail items. The safety critical design requirements associated with the 
implementation hazards include the following: 
• Prevent Sequencing Timing Error 
• Prevent Data Loss/Corruption 
• Prevent External Interface Errors 
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IMPLEMENTATION – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: 
PREVENT SEQUENCING TIMING ERROR 
There were three implementation hazards found to have the potential to jeopardize the 
realization of the safety critical design requirement to prevent sequencing timing errors. 
The first was that processing steps did not occur in the sequence expected. This system 
hazard may be caused by user error. The feature of the iTraceTM which served as the 
method of control included the RFID tracking system. This system employed a finite 
state machine, which only enabled valid state transitions for each business object. The 
finite state machine also indicated the acceptable and anticipated series of events for 
given objects. Furthermore, the iTraceTM is made up of wizard-like user interfaces that 
are used to guide users through the sequence of steps necessary to accomplish tasks.  
Additionally, each component form contained validation logic preventing users from 
proceeding through the process unless the prior step was successfully completed. This 
method guaranteed that the correct sequence of events was followed, and that any errors 
were reported. 
This hazard received a severity score of two and likelihood score of one. As a result of its 
minor gravity and highly unlikely threat of occurrence, this hazard was given a Pre-
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Mitigation Risk level of A. The risk of this technology was acceptable due to the slight 
risk this hazard may pose. 
The second hazard described the event in which multiple users were provided with access 
to update the same record. This system hazard was a consequence of software design or 
unavailable software capability. The features and functions of the iTraceTM included a 
variety of techniques that were applied to mitigate this hazard. Included in this were 
relational database and transaction processing procedures that were incorporated 
throughout the tool’s software to allow for atomic, consistent, isolated, and durable 
(ACID) properties. The database transactions were designed to allow precise failure 
recovery, supply reliable units of work, and maintain consistency within the database, as 
well as inhibit multiple users from accessing the database simultaneously. 
Furthermore, the transactions used also apply “all-or-nothing” semantics, meaning that 
the transaction is either completed entirely or not at all. Additionally, in order to sustain 
the integrity of the database and make certain that data is successfully written into it, 
transactions that were initiated concurrently by multiple users were isolated from one 
another. These functions of the tool had been shown to be effective strategies for hazard 
mitigation of electronic devices. 
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The level of severity for this hazard was two. The level of likelihood for this hazard was 
three. As a result of its believed propensity to transpire occasionally and lead to minor 
injury in its occurrence, this hazard was given a Pre-Mitigation Risk of B. Although it 
made the cutoff, it still lies on the borderline of tolerable and intolerable risks. 
The next potentially hazardous event involved the system failure to receive timely data 
from an external application. There were two primary features of the design notable in 
this instance. The first was that external interface data remained parallel to database 
updates except in the case of dependencies. When data is not received, the omission is 
recorded in the log file. The second is reflective of the Blood Establishment Computing 
System (BECS). The interface of the BECS is defined based on Web services that 
produce definitions for error messages and information exchanged between applications. 
If an error were to arise that is outside of one of the definitions provided, a system-level 
assertion would appear forcing the operation to roll back. 
This hazard was given a level two severity and level one likelihood. Due to its minor 
severity and improbable likelihood of occurrence, it received a Pre-Mitigation Risk level 
of A. Thus, this risk was deemed acceptable. 
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IMPLEMENTATION – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: 
PREVENT DATA LOSS/CORRUPTION 
There were five hazards which could potentially impact the requirement to prevent data 
loss and corruption. The first hazard in this category dealt with the instance in which user 
error caused the data to be corrupted. This system error caused by the user was deemed 
likely to occur occasionally (three) but with a negligible severity (one). The function 
utilized to mitigate this hazard was again validation logic. Validation logic is 
incorporated in all forms – Web and handheld – in which the user enters information into 
the system. Additionally, before data is recorded in the database, the BECS may also be 
interrogated to verify the validity of the information. When invalid data is entered, the 
user will receive an error message and further action will be inhibited until the error is 
corrected. 
The second hazardous event in this set was the scenario in which data was lost or 
corrupted due to a hardware disk crash or other hardware or power failure. This was a 
borderline tolerable hazard, receiving a moderate severity score of three and remote 
likelihood of occurrence score of two. This hazard was tackled and mitigated as a result 
of the aforesaid ACID properties and all-or-nothing semantics. Additionally, it was 
recommended that multiple disks be used so that a back-up would be available to avert 
the potential loss of data. Finally, SQL can supply a warehouse for database backup and 
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recovery. The database may undergo refreshing and back-up procedures daily, and all 
data entered after the back-up took place would be restored from the SQL log-file. 
The third hazard referred to the situation in which data was lost or corrupted due to the 
malfunction of the program routine. This system hazard was caused by incomplete 
transactions. The seriousness of the event was deemed negligible (one) and there was an 
occasional probability of it happening (three). As with many of the above-mentioned 
hazards, the functions employed to mitigate this hazard were the ACID properties and all-
or-nothing semantics. Moreover, the iTraceTM itself, as well as the system’s middleware 
and the related relational database technology have all been constructed to work in 
conjunction with various fault tolerant hardware configurations. These included support 
for the redundant array of independent disks (RAID) subsystems, SQL server clusters, 
and completely redundant configurations with fail over support. 
The next hazardous event was the instance in which data encountered was outside the 
range of expected values. This system hazard was the result of an undetected anomaly or 
user error. Here, again, the seriousness of the hazard was negligible (one) and the chance 
of occurrence (three) was occasional. As described previously for other hazards, the 
hazard mitigation features relevant in this case included validation logic and BECS 
interrogation. Furthermore, all system critical data is stored in reference tables. Because 
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users must choose from drop-down lists, all selected values are valid. Other data was 
scanned via barcodes. Also, in the case of invalid data entry, the user was alerted with an 
error message and prohibited from proceeding until the error was corrected. 
Finally, the last hazard in this set was the event in which duplicate data entered the 
system. This system hazard was the result of user error. It fell on the borderline of 
tolerable/intolerable risks with a severity score of two and likelihood score of three. This 
indicated that it will produce minor injury/loss of function in the occasional instance that 
it does happen. The method used to mitigate this hazard involved the unique ID assigned 
to all products and business subjects within the RFID blood supply chain tracking system. 
The presence of the unique ID inhibited the user from creating or entering duplicate 
information. Also, here the BECS may again undergo interrogation to confirm the 
validity of the data being entered into the system. 
All five of the hazards described were assigned a Pre-Mitigation Risk of B. All are 
tolerable risks, although some appear on the borderline of tolerable and intolerable in the 
matrix. This simply means that greater effort or higher cost may be associated with the 
mitigation of these hazards than those in the middle or closer to the acceptable risk level. 
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IMPLEMENTATION – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: 
PREVENT EXTERNAL INTERFACE ERRORS 
There were five hazards discovered which may present a threat to the safety critical 
design requirement of preventing external interface errors. The first was the event in 
which the system fails to receive accurate data from the RFID reader interface. This was 
a system hazard caused by hardware failure. It received level two severity (minor) and 
level three (occasional) likelihood scores. The method of control to mitigate this hazard 
involves the large number of technologies integrated into the system design to ensure 
detection in case of a failure in an RFID read point. The technologies consisted of reader 
self-test diagnostics, inactivity timers, periodic heart beat signals, and positioning sentinel 
tags to verify the accurate operation of the readers. 
The second hazardous event described the instance in which the tag and barcode were 
both unreadable. This system hazard was caused by physical damage from handling the 
product. It was assessed as very unlikely to occur (one) yet with moderate severity (three) 
when it does transpire. The mitigation strategy applied was quite simple. If both the RFID 
tag and barcode become unreadable, the user is instructed to proceed with standard 
operating procedures in which the blood product is disposed of appropriately due to the 
inability to reliably determine, track, and monitor the unique unit ID and related 
information. 
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The next hazardous event was the inability to read or write the RFID tag data due to a tag 
failure. This event was also a system hazard that resulted from the physical damage of 
improperly handling the product. This hazard presented a minor severity (two) which 
occurred on an occasional (three) basis. The mitigation procedure employed for this 
technology involved the RFID tracking system applications that write information to the 
user data portion of the RFID tags. These applications include: 
1. Collection (handheld reader). 
2.  Label Product (pad reader). 
3. Check-in Imports (pad or handheld reader). 
4. Check-in Returns (pad or handheld reader). 
For these applications, the software writes blood bag information into the RFID tag. The 
software then immediately rereads the tag to confirm that the data was successfully 
written and, if the write/read cycle failed, then an error message is delivered. 
Additionally, because none of these applications depend on information read from the 
user data portion for subsequent processing, there is no risk of misreading the tag 
information. Furthermore, the TIN is read at numerous times throughout the supply 
chain. The hardware and air-protocols used for communication between the reader and 
the tag ensure that tag IDs are properly read and written to the application. 
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The fourth hazardous event in this set was the situation in which data received from 
BECS does not pass correct data structure. This system hazard was due to unrecognized 
data being received from the BECS. It is a fairly serious hazard, receiving a moderate 
severity score (three) and remote likelihood of occurrence score (two). The function 
responsible for mitigating this hazard was related to the interface definition and 
communication between the iTraceTM and the BECS. The definition of the BECS 
interface to iTraceTM is based on a set of web services and consists of error messages and 
information exchanged between the applications. Also, a system-level assertion is raised 
and the operation rolled back in the instance that an error outside of the definition 
appears. 
The final hazard that fell under this category was the event in which errors detected in the 
BECS were not handled properly. Like the previous hazard, this hazard was caused by 
unrecognized data from the BECS. This hazard was perhaps the least impactful of all 
potential hazards described thus far, receiving severity and likelihood scores of one and 
one. Here, again, the mitigation method involved the way in which the BECS is defined. 
Furthermore, the BECS executes different procedures when dealing with critical vs. non-
critical data. For critical data, the BECS will deliver an error message to the user. For 
non-critical data, the BECS will not update the data, but will log the exception using 
normal BECS functionality.  
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While this hazard received a Pre-Mitigation Risk score of A, the other four hazards 
described in this set were given a score of B. Therefore, the risk of the BECS not 
handling errors appropriately can be deemed negligible in comparison to the others 
described in this category. It is believed to have the least impact on the safety critical 
design requirement of preventing external interface errors. 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS 
 
The functional hazards identified and tested are also components of SysLogic, Inc.’s 
known and foreseeable list of risks associated with medical devices. Functional hazards 
consist of any known risks to the performance of the system or device in an operational 
setting. They are comprised of concerns related to the ability of the system to record read 
and written information appropriately and accurately. They also include other software 
design and capability issues such as security, access, traceability, notification, alerts, 
monitoring, tracking, and labeling. The following safety and critical design requirements 
will be addressed in this chapter: 
• Preventing Unauthorized Entry or Override of System Data 
• Preventing Loss of Traceability 
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• Preventing Packing in Improper Containers at Collection Sites 
• Ensuring Reconciliation of Materials from Collection Site 
• Ensuring Blood Product Labeling Information is Properly Captured from BECS 
• Preventing Unsuitable Products from Being Released to Distribution 
 
 
FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT 
UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY OR OVERRIDE OF SYSTEM DATA 
There were three system security hazards that could potentially impact the safety critical 
design requirement of preventing unauthorized entry or override of system data. The first 
and second hazards described situations in which the system was accessed by 
unauthorized and untrained users respectively, and the third hazard went a step further in 
that the unauthorized personnel was able to actually modify records. All instances were 
due to security failures in which the system failed to prevent entry of undesignated users 
into the system. The middleware application of the iTraceTM was based on Microsoft 
Windows.Net authentication and authorization services. This application employs a role-
based security subsystem that is designed to prohibit and regulate access as desired. 
Moreover, standard operating procedures are in place that give the system administrator 
control over who may obtain access as well as the process by which to do so. 
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All three hazards were given a Severity score of two and a Likelihood score of one. As a 
result, the Pre-Mitigation Risk for all were A. Due to the controls in place, it is 
improbable that these hazards will take place and, if they were to occur, would have only 
a minor effect. 
 
FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT 
LOSS OF TRACEABILITY 
Six hazards were found to be capable of affecting the system’s ability to prevent loss of 
traceability. The first was the circumstance in which someone other than a responsible 
user enters or modifies the data. This hazard may be caused by a system failure to track 
those responsible for making database modifications. As with the hazardous events 
described above, this hazard can be controlled by the design features of the middleware 
and the standard operating procedures in place. Additionally, activity logs and audit trails 
were created and maintained for each business object in the iTraceTM RFID tracking 
system. The activity logs, which may be viewed, extracted, and reported from the 
application, detail what the activity was, when the activity occurred, and who initiated the 
activity.  
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The Severity and Likelihood scores assigned to this hazard were two and one 
respectively. Hence, the Pre-Mitigation Risk was A. This shows that the hazard is an 
acceptable risk for the implementation of the iTraceTM.  
The remaining five hazards within this category dealt with the incorrect recording of 
blood unit information. These hazards may be caused by the failure of the system to 
record data for whole blood collection, the breakdown of the system in capturing data for 
apheresis collection, and the malfunctioning of the system in distinguishing between 
autologous and therapeutic donation types. All can be mitigated by the validation logic 
incorporated into the system. Furthermore, before information is submitted to the 
database for further processing, the BECS may also be subject to interrogation to verify 
that this information being input is valid. When invalid data is entered as a result of user 
errors, the user receives an error message and is prevented from proceeding until the error 
is resolved. 
Moreover, the application requires that collection data is entered in sequential order and 
designated format. The user is prohibited from varying from the process order. Data 
capture must be complete in order for the acceptance of the donation. The user would 
have to revert to manual procedures in this circumstance.  
What is more, the procedural methods further enabled the correct identification of 
donation type by mandating that autologous donations were tie tagged with a label to 
136 
 
 
 
identify them as a donation to fill physician orders. Therapeutic donations were given 
discarded labels which were attached to collection bags to identify them as unacceptable 
donations. BECS functionality may be used in this instance as well to correct the 
donation type.  
These five hazardous events were rated a three and one respectively on the Severity and 
Likelihood scales. In the very unlikely instance that they would occur, they could have a 
moderate impact. Blood unit information must be accurate to enable the most precise 
collection of data and reduce the potential transfusion errors that could arise. The Pre-
Mitigation Risk given is a level B. As such, the hazard is tolerable, yet mitigation may 
lead to some costs. 
 
FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT 
PACKING IN IMPROPER CONTAINER AT COLLECTION SITE 
Three system hazards were identified as being able to possibly affect the need for packing 
products in appropriate containers at collection sites. All of these hazards were due to 
software design or unavailable software capability. The first hazardous event was the 
general case in which the system fails to ensure that product is packed in the correct 
container. The method of control initiated in this case primarily involved assigning a 
specification for the type of shipping container required for each product to each product 
137 
 
 
 
code. There are four types of containers utilized by this system: 1) Blood Donation 
Record (BDR) pouches, 2) blood bag coolers, 3) platelet containers, and 4) test tube 
coolers. The secondary method of control was the five properties by which each container 
was further distinguished. The five properties included: 1) container type (including rated 
description), 2) label prefix, 3) ISBT bar code, 4) capacity, and 5) RFID TIN. 
Consequently, when a user attempts to pack products in inappropriate or unsuitable 
containers, an error message is displayed.  
The next hazard in this group described the situation when the system fails to maintain 
appropriate container capacity for packed product. Similar to the mitigation method 
provided for the aforementioned hazard, the strategy here also relied on type of 
containers and their properties thereof. One of these properties is capacity. On the 
occasion when a user exceeds the capacity suitable for packing a particular container, the 
user will receive an error message. 
The two hazards discussed thus far received severity and likelihood scores of two and 
two, as well as Pre-Mitigation Risks of level B. These hazards were believed to have a 
minor impact in the rare instances that they occur. As such, they were deemed tolerable 
hazards.  
The last hazard in this category was a bit more acceptable than the two previously 
mentioned. The event in which the system fails to notify the user when attempting to 
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pack an already packed item was given a Pre-Mitigation Risk level of A. The severity 
score was a one, indicating a negligible risk, and the likelihood score was a two, 
signifying a rare occurrence. The mitigation strategy for this hazard involved the unique 
Tag ID (TID) attached to each product. The tracking mechanisms of the iTraceTM, in 
conjunction with the TID, reduce the potential of multiple records existing for DIN/bag 
type combinations. As a result, the user receives an error message when trying to pack a 
product multiple times. 
 
FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: ENSURE 
RECONCILIATION OF MATERIALS FROM COLLECTION SITE 
Two key hazardous events threatened to impede the accuracy of the material 
reconciliation process from collection sites. These system hazards were also due to 
software design or unavailable software capacity. The first was the situation in which a 
container is left at the collection site. The system employs a thoroughly defined pick-up 
operation as the method of control for this hazard. As characterized in the system, a pick-
up entails the identification and loading of all containers holding collection materials. 
The system will not enable the release of a pick-up unless and until all packed containers 
have been loaded.  
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This was a tolerable hazard. It was assigned severity and likelihood scores of two for 
each, and a Pre-Mitigation Risk level of B. Therefore, it was considered to be a minor 
hazard that will transpire only under rare circumstances.  
The second hazard was slightly less significant, receiving a Pre-Mitigation Risk level of 
A. This risk was acceptable as it was given severity and likelihood scores of one and two 
respectively. It described the incident when the system failed to generate a manifest. This 
hazard will have only a negligible impact during the rare times that it will actually take 
place. This is because the mitigation strategy involving the manifest data consisted of two 
components. The first is that database is updated with manifest data whenever containers 
are added to pick-up. The second is that the system generates a manifest report listing all 
containers included in the pick-up process. Thus, even if the manifest report is not 
obtained at the production facility, the manifest can be viewed online. Materials from the 
pick-up are then reconciled using the database. 
 
FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: ENSURE 
BLOOD PRODUCT LABELING INFORMATION IS PROPERLY CAPTURED 
FROM BECS 
Two system hazards may impact the appropriate capturing of blood product labeling 
information from the BECS. The first – system fails to receive labeling data from BECS 
140 
 
 
 
– may be mitigated by features of the BECS interface design. The BECS interface 
consists of web services which include a definition of the error messages and information 
exchanged between applications. When an error takes place outside of this definition, 
three events will transpire: 1) an error message will be sent to the user, 2) a system-level 
assertion will be raised, and 3) the operation will be rolled back.  
Consequently, in the instance that this occurs, the severity was rated only minor (two) 
and the likelihood only rare (two). A Pre-Mitigation Risk of level B was assigned to this 
hazard, as it was a tolerable risk. The costs were not expected to be high in reducing this 
hazard.  
The second hazard had an even lower cost expectation in reducing the hazard with a Pre-
Mitigation Risk of level A.  It denoted the incident in which the system failed to verify 
data received from BECS was written to the RFID tag. This hazard possessed a 
likelihood factor score of one and a severity of two, meaning that, in the improbable 
instance that it does actually occur, it will only have a minor impact.  
The method of control for this hazard began with the use of ISBT standards to physically 
label all blood products. The ISBT label serves as a system of record label that is used 
throughout the lifecycle of the product as a form of identification. The system uses web 
services to request label information from the BECS. The information was then written to 
the iTraceTM database and subsequently to the RFID tag. Finally, the tag was read again 
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to confirm that the data was written correctly. As with the previous hazard, when an error 
arises, a message is sent to the user, a system-level assertion is raised, and the operation 
is rolled back. 
 
FUNCTIONAL – SAFETY CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT: PREVENT 
UNSUITABLE PRODUCT FROM BEING RELEASED TO DISTRIBUTION 
The only hazard found that may impact the ability of the system to prevent an unsuitable 
product from being released to distribution was the event in which an unsuitable product 
was released into inventory. This hazard may be prevented with inherent functionality of 
the BECS. The BECS may perform multiple checks to ensure the appropriateness of all 
products prior to their being checked into inventory, packed, or released. If the product is 
unsuitable for any reason, the user is notified via an error message and the state of the 
product remains the same. 
This hazard represented an extremely low risk. It was given a one on the severity scale 
showing that it is of negligible consequence. It was also given a one on the likelihood 
scale, indicating that its occurrence is highly unlikely. In other words, in the implausible 
instance that this hazard does transpire, it will induce only a trivial effect. Hence, the Pre-
Mitigation Risk level was A, as this was deemed an acceptable risk. 
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS 
 
This chapter summarizes the findings obtained during the protocol, unit, and system 
testing approaches. 
 
 
PROTOCOL TESTING RESULTS 
 
The results of the protocol testing are all discussed in the technology hazard analysis 
above. Worst-case scenarios, traditional performance expectations, survivability tests, 
and EMI/communications investigations, accompanied by methods of control either in 
the features, design, or functioning of the technology, confirmed the benefits of utilizing 
the iTraceTM. All of the study results fell under the threshold and within the acceptance 
criteria designated. The outcomes essentially showed that the technological design and 
capabilities of the iTraceTM may be relied upon to perform as expected without any 
significant impact to the safety and critical design requirements of applying the device to 
everyday operations.   
 
UNIT TESTING RESULTS 
 
The results of the unit tests were all favorable. The operations all performed as expected, 
and there were no discrepancies or deviations from the anticipated scenarios. Hence, the 
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potential hazards had no significant effect on the safety critical design requirements. The 
system was highly functional and effective throughout all of the processes tested from 
donor to Blood Center of the Blood Transfusion Supply Chain. 
 
SYSTEM TESTING RESULTS 
As with the results of the unit testing, the outcomes of the system testing proved to be 
very promising. The system testing results also displayed a great deal of usability and 
efficiency in the system. The potential hazards had no significant impact on operations. 
There was, however, one minor discrepancy in the system testing. During test case six 
(ST6), in which the processing of multiple donations and procedure types in the 
collection techniques, as well as the attributes and interdictions triggered based on 
donation and procedure types were all tested, there was an error in the transmission to the 
BECS. The autologous type of donation should have a CUE passed as “S.” Instead, the 
CUE was passed as “Y.” This incorrect read/write or transmission of information of 
information would have a minor impact. Nevertheless, this error was retested in ST22. 
This time, the outcome was successful. Therefore, the appropriate fix was applied and 
this hazard appeared to be reduced. The results may be viewed in the Traceability Matrix 
tables (Appendix A).    
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CHAPTER 8: TRACEABILITY MATRIX 
 
The RFID Transfusion Consortium recruited my assistance in creating a traceability 
matrix for the hazards and their associated verification/validation tests. The goal of 
constructing a traceability matrix is to achieve the following: 
• Ensure that identified hazards may be traced to either an approved protocol/study 
or to the software requirements specification (SRS) for each function and/or 
various third-party tools.  
• Validate that the appropriate methods of control and acceptable results were 
achieved to mitigate or eliminate hazards. 
The importance of the traceability matrix underscores the need for documenting all 
possible hazards, and ultimately making them known and accessible in central 
repositories. The potential hazards evaluated for the application of the iTraceTM are all 
accounted for in the system requirements specifications, through study exploration, or 
through unit (UT) and/or system testing (ST). Appendix A displays the connection of the 
hazards to one or more of these aforesaid sources. 
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
This chapter contains thorough analyses of each research question evaluated in this study. 
The following inquiries were answered:  
RQ 1: How do the benefits of using the iTraceTM outweigh the potential RFID-related 
hazards?  
RQ 2: How sufficient are the mitigation and correction strategies for managing RFID-
related hazards in the blood transfusion medicine supply chain from the donation to blood 
center distribution? 
RQ3: How can the methods utilized in this paper effectively qualify and quantify the 
associated hazards into standard categories which may be transferable to other newly 
deployed RFID-based healthcare technologies? 
 
BENEFITS VS. RISKS 
The benefits of implementing the iTraceTM have been referenced comprehensively 
throughout this document. This novel RFID-enabled solution has been shown to possess 
valuable abilities and functionalities which can significantly revamp the processes of the 
blood transfusion supply chain. These processes include: labeling, tracking, monitoring, 
packing, and documenting, leading to improved traceability and increased productivity of 
workflow operations. 
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On the other hand, the risks of employing the system have also been illustrated. There 
were a total of 62 possible hazards identified throughout the analysis of the iTraceTM. In 
order to compare the advantages vs. disadvantages of utilizing the system, the level of the 
risks must be weighed and measured in relation to the benefits. 
As described above, a Pre-Mitigation Risk of Level A is indicative of an acceptable risk. 
The likelihood of these risks tends to be rare, while the severity is minor at most. This 
score suggests that the risk is so slight that it can be neglected compared to the risks of 
other hazards, and there may not be a need to reduce the risk. 
Of the 62 hazards discovered, 28 received Pre-Mitigation Risk Levels of A. The hazards 
which fall into this category are illustrated in Appendix B. 
The architecture of the system, as well as the procedures designed for its use, play a role 
in the low risk rating of these hazards. It is important to note that the hazards listed in this 
category include those which essentially define the iTraceTM application. They may 
potentially impact what the system was created to do. This group contains the hazards 
identified as adversely impacting the safety and usability of blood products, the 
performance of the tags, the security of the system, the appropriate packing and labeling 
of items, and ultimately the release of damaged products into inventory. Since the 
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hazards which may, arguably, best characterize the application appear to be trivial, it 
appears that the cost of employing the iTraceTM is outweighed by the benefits. 
In contrast, the next set of hazards fall into the Pre-Mitigation Risk level of B. A risk 
level of B signifies tolerable hazards. Tolerable hazards are not detrimental to the 
employment of the application, but can have a meaningful impact. Consequently, they 
must be reduced, mitigated, or corrected to ensure the best and safest use of the system. 
The strategies undertaken to do so may lead to significant resource and labor costs. 
There were 34 hazards that attained the rating of Pre-Mitigation Risk Level B, as shown 
in Appendix C. 
As opposed to the defining traits encompassed by the Level A hazards, the Level B 
hazards represent the utility attributes of the iTraceTM. The Level B hazards consist of 
those involved in read/write failures, data loss/corruption, tag survivability, external 
interface errors, product and information traceability, and interference and 
communication transmission disruptions. These hazards embody the risks to the system’s 
functional efficacy. They could possibly impact how the system performs and sustains 
operational integrity. Therefore, these hazards are substantial as well. 
The methods of control associated with these hazards were either incorporated into the 
system design, or were thoroughly assessed via system, unit, and protocol testing. The 
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positive results of all tests demonstrated the low cost that would need to be expelled in 
order to mitigate the hazards. Thus, the resource and labor cost for employing the system 
appears to be lower than the benefits.  
In addition to the resource and labor cost, there is the necessity for economic justification. 
Briggs et al (2009) assessed the economic cost for RFID-enablement. They noted the 
quality gains which could be earned by eliminating the number of damaged products and 
facilitating increased traceability by reducing the number of misplaced products. 
Additionally, quality gains can be viewed through better reconciliation and tracking of 
products. Furthermore, they evaluated efficiency gains. These benefits were illustrated 
through faster reconciliation, enhanced productivity, and decreased labor. Ultimately, this 
would lead to a return on investment by a blood center of approximately three years. 
Hence, the advantages of implementing the iTraceTM significantly offset the costs. The 
technology will serve as a valuable means of improving the blood transfusion supply 
chain processes. 
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EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MITIGATION AND CORRECTION 
STRATEGIES  
The method of control listed for each hazard included strategies to prevent the hazard 
from happening, resolving the hazard post-occurrence, or a combination of both.  There 
are three categories under which each approach may fall. They are the following: 
• I. Prevents/Mitigates the Hazard from Occurring: This measurement reflects the 
ability of the method of control to deter the risk from happening.  It is the most 
highly desired effect of the controls. 
• II. Corrects/Remedies the Situation Following the Occurrence of the Hazard: This 
measurement reflects the ability of the method of control to respond to the hazard 
post-occurrence. It includes resolution strategies and back-up plans to account for 
hazards. It is not as appealing as the prevention methodologies, but it does 
provide an effective solution to dilemmas that may unfold.  
• III. No Effect on Hazard Mitigation or Correction: This measurement reflects the 
total inability of the strategy to proactively inhibit or counter the risks associated 
with iTraceTM use. It consists of the most undesired methodologies due to the 
lack of efficiency in negating or amending processes in the face of hazards. 
150 
 
 
 
Each hazard’s method of control was placed into one of these categories. If the strategy 
consisted of a combination of both prevention and correction measures, then it was given 
a I rating, as it demonstrated the reduction and resolution of the hazard.  
There were 58 hazard strategies that received an I rating. Included in this group were 
those which apply aversion or resolution design features and procedures for each 
hazardous event. The great amount of strategies belonging to the I category confirm their 
efficacy. 
The remaining four hazards fell into the II category. They are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: Hazards in Risk Mitigation Category II 
Hazard 
ID Hazardous Event   Hazard Type 
Safety 
Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Pre-Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - Acceptable             
B - Tolerable                
C - Intolerable) 
Risk 
Mitigation 
Category (I, 
II, III) 
T.1.2. RFID Read/Write Fails RFID Technology 
Prevent Data 
Read/Write 
Error/Failure B II 
T.1.5. 
DIN number on tags 
created at final labeling is 
altered 
RFID 
Technology/System 
Prevent Data 
Read/Write 
Error/Failure B II 
T.1.6. ABO rewritten on tag 
RFID 
Technology/System 
Prevent Data 
Read/Write 
Error/Failure B II 
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Hazard 
ID Hazardous Event   Hazard Type 
Safety 
Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Pre-Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - Acceptable             
B - Tolerable                
C - Intolerable) 
Risk 
Mitigation 
Category (I, 
II, III) 
I.3.2. 
Tag and barcode are both 
unreadable System 
Prevent 
External 
Interface 
Errors B II 
 
Ultimately, since the majority of methods fall in the I category, the design elements and 
processes instituted to mitigate the hazards appear to be highly effective. Even the 
hazards that require resolution only after the hazard has transpired have pre-mitigation 
risk levels of B, indicating they are tolerable hazards. Moreover, none of the hazards had 
a risk level of III. This means that all of the approaches taken to reduce the threat of the 
hazard have some positive impact. Hence, the strategies are successful. Therefore, the 
mitigation and correction strategies for managing RFID-related hazards in the blood 
transfusion medicine supply chain from the donor to blood center distribution are 
effective. 
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EVALUTATING THE EFFECTIVNESS OF THE METHODS UTILIZED IN 
THIS PAPER TO QUALIFY AND QUANTIFY HAZARDS INTO STANDARD, 
TRANSFERABLE, AND GENERALIZABLE CATEGORIES 
The process described in this paper consisted of several tactical steps. It began with the 
research and recognition of previously discovered hazards that are applicable to similar 
medical devices. These hazards were related to the use of RFID technology in clinical 
settings. Additionally, due to the familiarity with some of these comparable devices, the 
FDA CBER and CDRH governing bodies were able to provide guidance on particular 
protocols to perform. The devised protocols were examined to uncover potential harms 
which could be caused through application of the system and the technology itself. RFID 
technology, functions, and the use of the system in both traditional and extreme settings 
were analyzed to discover the effects of implementing and verify the usability of the 
system.  
The system design, requirements, and standard operating procedures were then evaluated. 
These documents were used to determine what other hazards could occur from utilizing 
the iTraceTM. They were also assessed to reveal both the system features which could be 
employed and/or measures which could be taken to avoid and/or correct each hazard. 
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After that, further validation tests were performed. These tests examined the likelihood of 
the hazard existence and the strategies for mitigating and correcting them. I included an 
additional measure to account for the distinction between when the strategy prevents or 
resolves the hazard to provide a further calculation of its efficiency. The validation tests 
also assessed the use of the iTraceTM in its normal setting. Unit and system tests were 
performed for all functions and applications of the iTraceTM along the blood transfusion 
supply chain to ensure that the system executed all desired capabilities as expected. 
Next, a traceability matrix was created to record and track the hazards and tests. The 
matrix served as a record of the specific design component and/or test performed to 
evaluate each hazard, establishing an important link between each hazard and its means 
of evaluation. As a result, if the same hazards were to be identified in other similar 
devices, the characteristics and tests associated with them would be evident, and the 
knowledge would be readily available for those evaluating them. Thus, the necessity for 
documenting each hazard and its associated tests so that they may be recognizable and 
accessible was highlighted with the formation of the traceability matrix. 
The next steps consisted of several analyses. The first was weighing the benefits versus 
the risks of employing the device based on the existence of the identified hazards, their 
severity, likelihood, and the ability to mitigate and correct them. Then, the effectiveness 
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of these strategies was assessed to gauge whether these methods were suitable and 
efficient enough to reduce the threat of the hazard. Finally, standard risk assessment 
measures to quantify the hazards into categories of severity and likelihood, as well as a 
novel measure to group the strategies based on their ability to either prevent the hazard 
from occurring or resolve it post-occurrence were employed. The process for building the 
framework for iTraceTM-related hazards in the blood transfusion supply chain – 
identifying, measuring, and analyzing the risks – was very thorough and may be used for 
the deployment of other similar medical devices using RFID technology. Therefore, the 
methods utilized in this paper effectively quality and quantify the associated hazards into 
standard categories which may be transferable to other newly-deployed RFID-based 
healthcare technologies. 
 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
 
The RFID Blood Center Consortium is implementing the first ever RFID-enabled 
solution for the tracking and maintaining of blood products throughout the entire blood 
transfusion supply chain. The iTraceTM will serve as a purposeful approach towards 
reducing medical errors originated in the blood transfusion supply chain and, ultimately, 
transforming the delivery of care. There are numerous benefits of the iTraceTM, but there 
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are also several hazards. The costs for implementing the device are offset by the benefits. 
The hazards may be successfully mitigated via valuable design features and operating 
procedures.  
The RFID Transfusion Consortium needed help in identifying possible RFID technology 
hazards and analyzing all of the potential hazards that could come about from using the 
iTraceTM. The comprehensive analysis presented in this paper, which focused on the 
blood transfusion supply chain from the donor to blood center distribution, is a valuable 
starting point for RFID hazard management in the blood supply chain. The 62 hazards 
identified include those associated with the technology, implementation, and 
functionality of the device. All of these hazards were accompanied by successful methods 
of control, demonstrating the effectiveness of the strategies and the tool itself. All new 
medical devices must undergo detailed examination of the potential benefits and harms it 
may cause. Due to the extensiveness of the research presented through my work and in 
this paper, the iTraceTM was shown to be useful and worthwhile. Ultimately, this study 
showed that the benefits of the iTraceTM outweighed the costs and that the correction and 
mitigation strategies were effective. Thus, the answers to research questions 1 and 2 were 
derived. 
As a result, the foundation for establishing a systematic framework for RFID hazard 
mitigation in the blood transfusion supply chain from donation to distribution at the blood 
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center was set for this system as well as for future use with other similar technologies. 
The methods revealed the overall approach of identifying the hazards, validating and 
verifying the hazards, determining the means of mitigating and correcting the hazards, 
qualitatively and quantitatively ranking their level of severity, and assessing the 
effectiveness of the correction strategies. As the project lead for the technology hazard 
analysis component, I identified the technology hazards, evaluated all of the hazard types, 
investigated the mitigation and correction methods for all of the hazards, assisted in 
protocol tests, and prepared valuable documentation for all of these steps. My work, 
which significantly bridged the gaps in RFID technology hazard identification and 
overall system hazard analysis, is considered an important step towards the 
commercialization and implementation of the iTraceTM. Since this evaluation of the 
possible hazards that could occur from utilization of this novel medical device is all-
encompassing, it is possible to apply the aforementioned methodology to other medical 
devices and technologies. Additionally, as technology continues to advance, this 
methodology will become increasingly practical and important. The strategies discussed 
and hazards identified may be generalizable and usable for other RFID-enabled medical 
devices. Therefore, the answer to research question 3 was received as well.   
Moreover, the hazard identification, analysis, and mitigation processes discussed in this 
paper may also be effective for Phase Two of this device analysis: blood center 
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distribution to patient. The means used take into account technology hazards and 
mitigation strategies will not change. For example, verification strategies such as the 
Wireless Considerations Protocol evaluated the interference of HF RFID on wireless and 
communication systems. The methods and results of this study may be applicable in a 
hospital setting as well, where there are several such potential instances for disturbance. 
In addition, the functional and implementation identification and analysis processes are 
similar in some areas as well. For instance, validation strategies such as system and unit 
testing, as well as pilot and performance qualification studies will be essential towards 
determining whether the iTraceTM is fully applicable in a hospital environment. Even in 
the many areas where differences do exist, the need for identification, validation, 
verification, and analysis will remain. 
 Nevertheless, there are several additional hazards that may potentially occur from the use 
of this system in the different environment examined during Phase Two. This phase 
represents the remaining steps of supply chain. For example, safety hazards – hazards 
affecting the patient receiving the actual transfusion and staff involved in the blood 
supply chain – may also occur. The effects of interaction with other hospital systems and 
safety hazards that may come about during the actual transfusion portion of the blood 
supply chain may lead to other complex hazards and, consequently, additional analysis 
techniques. Yet, the framework established in this paper may certainly be used as a 
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foundation. Upon completion of the hazard analysis throughout this portion of the 
process, a wholly conclusive framework for RFID hazard management may be 
formulated. 
Future research may consist of a Post-Mitigation Risk study. Although this study 
included references to several protocols and tests utilized to assess the efficacy of the 
mitigation strategies, it will be valuable to fully assess the methods after the system has 
been put to use daily. Similar tactics may be used at this stage to verify the risk levels 
assigned.  
Future research may also investigate any potential hazards that may be triggered by the 
mitigation strategies themselves. For instance, it may be possible that the data locking 
feature applied to the memory fields could malfunction and render the RFID tags 
incapable of being reused. It would be valuable to ensure that no further hazards 
transpired as a result of the methods employed to reduce the originally-discovered 
hazards.  
Nevertheless, the approach taken in this paper to evaluate the tool and its potential 
hazards are effective. The groundwork of the strategic framework for managing RFID-
enabled hazards in the blood transfusion supply chain has been laid. As such, an 
important step on the road towards the elimination of avoidable medical errors has been 
taken with the development of the iTraceTM.   
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.1.1. RFID 
Read/Write 
Fails 
Handhel
d or pad 
RFID 
reader 
fails to 
read/writ
e the tag 
for any 
number 
of 
reasons. 
B Design Audible sound signaled 
each time tag is 
read/written; handheld 
and/or work station 
display is updated; error 
detection software 
included. 
N/A N/A 3.1. N/A 
T.1.2. RFID 
Read/Write 
Fails 
Tunnel 
reader 
fails to 
read the 
tag for 
any 
number 
of 
reasons. 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Tunnel reader 
reconciles items, 
flagging them as excess 
or missing. The 
operator then manually 
inspects contents to 
correct issue. 
N/A N/A 4.2.1. N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.1.3. Bad data on the 
tag 
Data is 
corrupte
d on the 
tag 
B Design A new ISBT128 data 
structure was developed 
to facilitate detection of 
tag memory corruption.  
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Centrifugation; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - Blast 
Freezing; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Gamma 
Irradiation 
Survivabilit
y Testing 
Results 
3.2.                            
Appendix B 
N/A 
T.1.4. DIN number 
written on tag at 
collection is 
subsequently 
altered 
DIN 
field 
locking 
on the 
tag not 
enforced 
B Design The application is 
configurable to allow 
the organization to use 
the DIN locking feature 
at the point of collection 
or at labeling.  
N/A N/A Appendix B             
3.2. 
N/A 
T.1.5. DIN number on 
tags created at 
final labeling is 
altered 
DIN 
field 
locking 
on the 
tag not 
the tag 
not 
enforced 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Programming the 
ISBT128 label data 
structure and launching 
the application 
N/A N/A 4.2.2.                         
Appendix B 
N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.1.6. ABO rewritten 
on tag 
--- B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Programming the 
ISBT128 ABO data 
structure and launching 
the appl9cation 
N/A N/A 4.2.2.                         
Appendix B 
N/A 
T.2.1. The maximum 
temperature 
increase of the 
RBCs and 
Platelets exceed 
acceptable level 
of 1.5 °C 
RF 
Radiatio
n 
A Direction 
for Use 
Tested using Limit Test 
Protocol which 
confirmed lack of 
significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood 
products. 
Limit Testing - 
Part One - 
Protocol - 
RBCs/Platelets
; Limit Testing 
- Part Two - 
(Continuation) 
- Protocol - 
Aged 
RBCs/Plasma 
Limit 
Testing - 
Part One - 
Results - 
RBCs/Plate
lets 
(Temperatu
re Impact); 
Limit 
Testing - 
Part Two - 
Results - 
Aged 
RBCs/Plas
ma 
(Temperatu
re Impact)  
N/A N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.2.2. The cellular and 
protein 
structures of 
RBCs (complete 
blood counts 
including 
sample weight, 
RBC count, Hb, 
Hct, MCV; 
potassium, 
aluminum; free 
hemoglobin; 
level of blood 
gases) are 
degraded or 
altered beyond 
the acceptable 
level of ≤1% 
hemolysis. 
RF 
Radiatio
n 
A Direction 
for Use 
Tested using Limit Test 
Protocol which 
confirmed lack of 
significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood 
products. 
Limit Testing - 
Part One - 
Protocol - 
RBCs/Platelets
; Limit Testing 
- Part Two - 
(Continuation) 
- Protocol - 
Aged 
RBCs/Plasma 
Limit 
Testing – 
Part One – 
Results – 
RBCs/Plate
lets 
(Cellular 
and Protein 
Impact); 
Limit 
Testing – 
Part Two – 
Results – 
Aged 
RBCs/Plas
ma 
(Biological 
Impact) 
N/A N/A 
T.2.3. The cellular and 
protein 
structures 
(Lactate, 
Aluminum, P-
Selectin, and 
complete blood 
counts including 
sample weight, 
WBDP count, 
Plt, and MPV) 
of WBDPs are 
degraded such 
RF 
Radiatio
n 
A Direction 
for Use 
Tested using Limit Test 
Protocol which 
confirmed lack of 
significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood 
products. 
Limit Testing – 
Part One – 
Protocol – 
RBCs/ 
Platelets.  
Limit 
Testing – 
Part One – 
Results – 
RBCs/Plate
lets 
(Cellular 
and Protein 
Impact)  
N/A N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
that the pH 
decreases 
beyond 
acceptable level 
of ≥6.2 
T.2.4. The maximum 
temperature 
increase of 
plasma types 
(FFP, FP24, and 
TP) exceeds 
acceptable level 
of 4 °C. 
RF 
Radiatio
n 
A Direction 
for Use 
Tested using Limit Test 
Protocol which 
confirmed lack of 
significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood 
products. 
Limit Testing – 
Part Two 
(Continuation) 
– Protocol – 
Aged 
RBCs/Plasma 
Limit 
Testing – 
Part Two – 
Results – 
Aged 
RBCs/Plas
ma 
(Temperatu
re Impact) 
N/A N/A 
T.2.5. The activity of 
coagulation 
factors (PT, 
aPTT, 
Antithrombin 
Activity, Factor 
V, Factor VIII, 
Factor XI, 
Protein C, 
Protein S,  
VWF: RCo) 
RF 
Radiatio
n 
A Direction 
for Use 
Tested using Limit Test 
Protocol which 
confirmed lack of 
significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood 
products. 
Limit Testing – 
Part Two 
(Continuation) 
– Protocol – 
Aged 
RBCs/Plasma 
Limit 
Testing – 
Part Two – 
Results – 
Aged 
RBCs/Plas
ma 
(Biological 
Impact) 
N/A N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
levels of all 
types (FFP, 
FP24, and TP) 
of thawed 
plasma products 
are altered 
beyond an 
acceptable level 
of 20% 
T.3.1. The time to read 
headers of 20-
bags-equivalent 
exceeds 
maximum 
threshold 
established for 
specific 
container/reader 
combinations. 
System 
Capabilit
y 
A Direction 
for Use 
Tested using 
Performance Test 
Protocol which 
confirmed ability of 
device to sustain 
operational efficiency 
under different 
circumstances 
RFID 
Performance 
Testing 
RFID 
Performanc
e Testing 
N/A N/A 
T.3.2. The time to 
read/write all 28 
memory blocks 
of 20-bags-
equivalent 
exceeds 
maximum 
threshold 
established for 
specific 
container/reader 
combinations. 
System 
Capabilit
y 
A Direction 
for Use 
Tested using 
Performance Test 
Protocol which 
confirmed ability of 
device to sustain 
operational efficiency 
under different 
circumstances 
RFID 
Performance 
Testing 
RFID 
Performanc
e Testing 
N/A N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.3.3. The time to 
write all blocks 
exceeds 
maximum 
threshold 
established for 
specific 
container/reader 
combinations 
System 
Capabilit
y 
A Direction 
for Use 
Tested using 
Performance Test 
Protocol which 
confirmed ability of 
device to sustain 
operational efficiency 
under different 
circumstances 
RFID 
Performance 
Testing 
RFID 
Performanc
e Testing 
N/A N/A 
T.4.1. The tag does not 
survive the 
process 
Centrifu
gation, 
Blast 
Freezing, 
or 
Gamma 
Irradiatio
n Effects 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and 
reversion to barcode 
only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Centrifugation; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - Blast 
Freezing; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Gamma 
Irradiation 
Survivabilit
y Testing 
Results 
3.2.      
Appendix B 
N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.4.2. The ability of 
the RFID tag to 
read data within 
30 seconds of 
the start is 
damaged 
Centrifu
gation, 
Blast 
Freezing, 
or 
Gamma 
Irradiatio
n Effects 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and 
reversion to barcode 
only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Centrifugation; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - Blast 
Freezing; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Gamma 
Irradiation 
Survivabilit
y Testing 
Results 
N/A N/A 
T.4.3. The ability of 
the RFID tag to 
write 
information 
within 30 
seconds of the 
start is damaged. 
Centrifu
gation, 
Blast 
Freezing, 
or 
Gamma 
Irradiatio
n Effects 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and 
reversion to barcode 
only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Centrifugation; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - Blast 
Freezing; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Gamma 
Irradiation 
Survivabilit
y Testing 
Results 
N/A N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.4.4. The time it takes 
to read the tag 
after it was seen 
for the first time 
(header) 
increases greater 
than 20 seconds. 
Centrifu
gation, 
Blast 
Freezing, 
or 
Gamma 
Irradiatio
n Effects 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and 
reversion to barcode 
only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Centrifugation; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - Blast 
Freezing; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Gamma 
Irradiation 
Survivabilit
y Testing 
Results 
3.2.      
Appendix B 
N/A 
T.4.5. The time it takes 
to read all 
blocks of tag 
memory 
increases by 
more than 45 
seconds 
Centrifu
gation, 
Blast 
Freezing, 
or 
Gamma 
Irradiatio
n Effects 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and 
reversion to barcode 
only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Centrifugation; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - Blast 
Freezing; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Gamma 
Irradiation 
Survivabilit
y Testing 
Results 
3.2.      
Appendix B 
N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.4.6. The time it takes 
to write 
information 
after the tag 
acknowledges 
encoding 
completion of 
all blocks 
increases by 
greater than 75 
seconds 
Centrifu
gation, 
Blast 
Freezing, 
or 
Gamma 
Irradiatio
n Effects 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and 
reversion to barcode 
only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Centrifugation; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - Blast 
Freezing; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Gamma 
Irradiation 
Survivabilit
y Testing 
Results 
3.2.      
Appendix B 
  
T.4.7. The integrity of 
the written data 
is compromised  
Centrifu
gation, 
Blast 
Freezing, 
or 
Gamma 
Irradiatio
n Effects 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and 
reversion to barcode 
only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Centrifugation; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - Blast 
Freezing; 
Survivability 
Testing 
Protocol - 
Gamma 
Irradiation 
Survivabilit
y Testing 
Results 
3.7. and 
Appendix B 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.5.1. Connections/co
mmunication 
links are lost 
without warning 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
The HF RFID 13.56 
MHz radio 
communication 
protocols as dictated by 
the ISO/IEC 15693 
standard, as well as the 
ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 
1 standard, are used in 
the RFID readers for 
this application. The 16-
bit cyclic redundancy 
check (CCITT CRC-16) 
is run on the message 
bits right from the start 
of the flags to the end of 
data and the CRC-16 
accompanies the 
message as it is sent. 
Furthermore, additional 
protection is provided 
via the tag data 
encoding procedure. 
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
2.1. N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.5.2. Systems 
experience a 
failure to 
establish 
communication 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
The key information for 
safe transfusion is 
carried in ISBT-128 
barcodes, as well as in 
human readable form, 
on the bag itself. In the 
event of any 
communication failure 
of the RFID system, bar 
code data will be used. 
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
2.1. and 
Appendix B 
N/A 
T.5.3. Degradation of 
service/transmis
sion of 
information 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
The HF RFID 13.56 
MHz radio 
communication 
protocols as dictated by 
the ISO/IEC 15693 
standard, as well as the 
ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 
1 standard, are used in 
the RFID readers for 
this application. The 16-
bit cyclic redundancy 
check (CCITT CRC-16) 
is run on the message 
bits right from the start 
of the flags to the end of 
data and the CRC-16 
accompanies the 
message as it is sent. 
Furthermore, additional 
protection is provided 
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
2.1. and 
Appendix B 
N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
via the tag data 
encoding procedure. 
T.5.4. Delays and 
packet loss in 
the transmission 
of information 
to and from a 
handheld reader 
or a netbook/ 
laptop 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
A Design The WLAN 
communication used 
adheres to the IEEE 
802.11b and 802.11g 
standards which define 
one Medium Access 
Control (MAC) layer 
and multiple physical 
layers (PHY).  
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
3.7.3. N/A 
T.5.5. The wireless 
transmission of 
critical medical 
device alarms is 
disabled 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
There are two steps for 
effective control for 
preventing this hazard 
from occurring for 
future acquisition or 
upgrading of key 
equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
N/A N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.5.6. The 
transmission of 
physiological 
waveform data 
is impeded 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
There are two steps for 
effective control for 
preventing this hazard 
from occurring for 
future acquisition or 
upgrading of key 
equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
N/A N/A 
T.5.7. The real-time 
control of 
therapeutic 
medical devices 
is prevented 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
There are two steps for 
effective control for 
preventing this hazard 
from occurring for 
future acquisition or 
upgrading of key 
equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
N/A N/A 
T.5.8. The 
transmission of 
time-critical 
medical 
telemetry is 
hindered 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
There are two steps for 
effective control for 
preventing this hazard 
from occurring for 
future acquisition or 
upgrading of key 
equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
N/A N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
T.5.9. The wireless 
control of 
therapeutic 
devices is 
obstructed 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
There are two steps for 
effective control for 
preventing this hazard 
from occurring for 
future acquisition or 
upgrading of key 
equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
N/A N/A 
T.5.10. Data corruption 
and/or errors are 
produced 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
The HF RFID 13.56 
MHz radio 
communication 
protocols as dictated by 
the ISO/IEC 15693 
standard, as well as the 
ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 
1 standard, are used in 
the RFID readers for 
this application. The 16-
bit cyclic redundancy 
check (CCITT CRC-16) 
is run on the message 
bits right from the start 
of the flags to the end of 
data and the CRC-16 
accompanies the 
message as it is sent. 
Furthermore, additional 
protection is provided 
via the tag data 
encoding procedure. 
The WLAN 
communication used 
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
3.2. N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
adheres to the IEEE 
802.11b and 802.11g 
standards which define 
one Medium Access 
Control (MAC) layer 
and multiple physical 
layers (PHY).  
T.5.11. Unauthorized 
access during 
the 
communication 
between the 
transmitter and 
receiver 
EMI/Wir
eless 
Commun
ication 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Provisions in the air 
protocols and standards 
that make it difficult to 
inappropriately access 
data while the 
transmitter and receiver 
are communicating. 
Also, the tag structure 
design includes data 
bits stored on the tag 
that have an associated 
CCITT 16-bit CRC 
stored in the tag 
memory. Moreover, the 
key information for 
same transfusion is 
carried in ISBT-128 
barcodes and human 
readable form on the 
bag itself. Finally, the 
wireless network 
includes data encryption 
security that prevents 
hackers from 
connecting to protected 
Wireless Test 
Protocol 
Wireless 
Test 
Summary 
3.2. N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
networks and stealing 
information.  
I.1.1. Processing steps 
do not occur in 
sequence 
expected 
User 
Error 
A Design Finite state machine, 
wizard-like interfaces, 
and validation logic 
N/A N/A 3.7., 4.1.1., 
5.0., 5.1., 5.2., 
7.0. 
N/A 
I.1.2. Multiple users 
are allowed 
access to update 
the same record 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
software 
capabilit
y 
B Design Relational Database and 
Transaction Processing 
Techniques, ACID 
Properties, "All-or-
Nothing" Semantics 
N/A N/A 3.7. N/A 
I.1.3. System fails to 
receive timely 
data from an 
external 
application 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
software 
capabilit
y 
A Design BECS interface, 
definition of error 
messages, system-level 
assertion, rolled back 
operations 
N/A N/A 7.0. N/A 
I.2.1. User error 
causes data to be 
corrupted 
User 
Error 
B Design Validation logic; BECS 
interrogation 
N/A N/A 3.7., 7.0. N/A 
I.2.2. Data is lost or 
corrupted due to 
hardware disk 
crash, other 
hardware or 
power failure 
Disk 
crash, 
other 
hardware 
or power 
failure 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Relational Database and 
Transaction Processing 
Techniques, ACID 
Properties, "All-or-
Nothing" Semantics; 
Best Practice Back-Up 
Techniques; SQL 
N/A N/A 3.7., 7.0. N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
I.2.3. Data is lost or 
corrupted due to 
malfunction of 
program routine 
Incomple
te 
transacti
on 
B Design Relational Database and 
Transaction Processing 
Techniques, ACID 
Properties, "All-or-
Nothing" Semantics; 
Spotlight middleware 
and related relational 
database technology 
N/A N/A 2, 3.7., 7.0. N/A 
I.2.4. Data 
encountered is 
outside the 
range of 
expected values 
Undetect
ed 
anomaly 
or user 
error 
B Design Validation logic; BECS 
interrogation; reference 
tables; drop-down lists; 
error messages 
N/A N/A 3.7., 7.0. N/A 
I.2.5. Duplicate data 
enters the 
system 
User 
Error 
B Design Validation logic; DIN; 
BECS interrogation 
N/A N/A 1.2., 3.1., 3.7., 
4.1.1., 7.0. 
N/A 
I.3.1. System fails to 
receive accurate 
data from the 
RFID reader 
interface 
Hardwar
e failure 
B Design Technologies such as 
reader self-test 
diagnostics, inactivity 
timers, periodic heart 
beat signals, and 
positioning sentinel tags 
to confirm correct end-
to-end operation of 
readers 
N/A N/A 3.2. N/A 
I.3.2. Tag and barcode 
are both 
unreadable 
Physical 
damage 
from 
handling 
product 
B Direction 
for Use 
Product disposal N/A N/A 3.2.      
Appendix B 
N/A 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
I.3.3. Unable to read 
or write the 
RFID tag data 
due to a tag 
failure 
Physical 
damage 
from 
handling 
product 
B Design Read/Write 
applications; RFID TIN 
N/A N/A 3.2.      
Appendix B 
N/A 
I.3.4. Data received 
from BECS does 
not pass correct 
data structure 
Unrecog
nized 
data is 
received 
from 
BECS 
B Design BECS interface, 
definition of error 
messages, system-level 
assertion, rolled back 
operations 
N/A N/A 7.0. N/A 
I.3.5. Errors detected 
in BECS are not 
handled 
properly 
Unrecog
nized 
data is 
received 
from 
BECS 
A Design BECS interface, 
definition of error 
messages, system-level 
assertion, rolled back 
operations 
N/A N/A 7.0. N/A 
F.1.1. The system is 
accessed by an 
unauthorized 
person 
Security 
failure 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
System Administration 
of user access; Spotlight 
Microsoft Windows.Net 
Authentication and 
Authorization 
N/A N/A 3.7. N/A 
F.1.2. An untrained 
user accesses the 
system 
System 
fails to 
prevent 
untrained 
user 
access 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
System Administration 
of user access; Spotlight 
Microsoft Windows.Net 
Authentication and 
Authorization 
N/A N/A 3.7. N/A 
  
 
 
185
 
Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
F.1.3. Unauthorized 
personnel 
modify 
computer 
records 
System 
fails to 
restrict 
access to 
computer 
records 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
System Administration 
of user access; Spotlight 
Microsoft Windows.Net 
Authentication and 
Authorization 
N/A N/A 3.7. N/A 
F.2.1. Someone other 
than a 
responsible user 
enters or 
modifies data 
System 
fails to 
track 
persons 
responsi
ble for 
database 
modifica
tions 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
System Administration 
of user access; Spotlight 
Microsoft Windows.Net 
Authentication and 
Authorization; Activity 
Logs/Audit Trails 
N/A N/A 3.7. N/A 
F.2.2. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
System 
fails to 
record 
data for 
whole 
blood 
collectio
n 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data 
entry in specific order 
and format for 
particular collections 
N/A N/A 3.7., 4.1.1., 
5.0., 5.1., 5.2., 
7.0. 
UT1, UT2, 
ST1, ST4, 
ST5, ST7, 
ST8, ST12, 
ST13 
F.2.3. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
System 
fails to 
capture 
data for 
apheresis 
collectio
n 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data 
entry in specific order 
and format for 
particular collections 
N/A N/A 3.7., 4.1.1., 
5.0., 5.1., 5.2., 
7.0. 
UT3, ST2, 
ST3, ST4, 
ST5, ST9, 
ST10, ST12, 
ST13, ST15, 
ST16 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
F.2.4. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
System 
fails to 
identify 
donation 
type 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data 
entry in specific order 
and format for 
particular collections 
N/A N/A 3.7., 4.1.1., 
5.0., 5.1., 5.2., 
7.0. 
UT1, UT2, 
UT3, UT4, 
UT6, UT7, 
UT8, UT9, 
UT11, UT12, 
ST1, ST2, 
ST3, ST4, 
ST5, ST6, 
ST7, ST8, 
ST9, ST10, 
ST11, ST12, 
ST13, ST15, 
ST16, ST19, 
ST22, ST24, 
ST28 
F.2.5. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
System 
fails to 
identify 
autologo
us 
donation 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data 
entry in specific order 
and format for 
particular collections 
N/A N/A 3.7., 4.1.1., 
5.0., 5.1., 5.2., 
7.0. 
UT4, ST6, 
ST11, ST22, 
ST24, ST28 
F.2.6. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
System 
fails to 
identify 
therapeut
ic 
donation 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data 
entry in specific order 
and format for 
particular collections 
N/A N/A 3.7., 4.1.1., 
5.0., 5.1., 5.2., 
7.0. 
UT4, ST6, 
ST11, ST22, 
ST24, ST28 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
F.3.1. System fails to 
ensure that 
product is 
packed in the 
correct container 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
software 
capabilit
y 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Product code/product 
reference table; 
container properties; 
user packing 
N/A N/A 4.1.2. UT5, UT6, 
UT7, UT8, 
UT9, UT11, 
UT12, ST1, 
ST2, ST3, 
ST4, ST5, 
ST6, ST7, 
ST8, ST9, 
ST10, ST11, 
ST12, ST13, 
ST15, ST16, 
ST19, ST22, 
ST24, ST28  
F.3.2. System fails to 
maintain 
appropriate 
container 
capacity for 
packed product 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
software 
capabilit
y 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Container properties; 
user packing 
N/A N/A 4.1.2. UT5, UT6, 
UT7, UT8, 
UT9, UT11, 
UT12, ST1, 
ST2, ST3, 
ST4, ST5, 
ST6, ST7, 
ST8, ST9, 
ST10, ST11, 
ST12, ST13, 
ST15, ST16, 
ST19, ST22, 
ST24, ST28  
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
F.3.3. System fails to 
notify user when 
trying to pack an 
item already 
packed 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
software 
capabilit
y 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
TID assignments; user 
packing 
N/A N/A 4.1.2. UT5, UT6, 
UT7, UT8, 
UT9, UT11, 
UT12, ST1, 
ST2, ST3, 
ST4, ST5, 
ST6, ST7, 
ST8, ST9, 
ST10, ST11, 
ST12, ST13, 
ST15, ST16, 
ST19, ST22, 
ST24, ST28  
F.4.1. A container is 
left at the 
collection site 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
software 
capabilit
y 
B Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Numerous pick-up 
states; disabled release 
until loading complete; 
user standard operating 
procedures 
N/A N/A 4.1.3., 4.1.4. UT7, UT8, 
UT9, UT10, 
UT11, UT12, 
ST1, ST2, 
ST3, ST4, 
ST5, ST6, 
ST7, ST8, 
ST9, ST10, 
ST11, ST12, 
ST13, ST15, 
ST16, ST19, 
ST22, ST24, 
ST28 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
F.4.2. System fails to 
generate a 
manifest 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
software 
capabilit
y 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
Manifest report 
generation & database 
updating; user standard 
operating procedures. 
N/A N/A 4.1.3., 4.1.4. UT7, UT8, 
UT9, UT10, 
UT11, UT12, 
ST1, ST2, 
ST3, ST4, 
ST5, ST6, 
ST7, ST8, 
ST9, ST10, 
ST11, ST12, 
ST13, ST15, 
ST16, ST19, 
ST22, ST24, 
ST28 
F.5.1. System fails to 
receive labeling 
data from BECS 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
software 
capabilit
y 
B Design BECS interface, 
definition of error 
messages, system-level 
assertion, rolled back 
operations 
N/A N/A 4.2.2., 7.0. UT13, ST15, 
ST16, ST17, 
ST18, ST19, 
ST20, ST21, 
ST22, ST23, 
ST28 
F.5.2. System fails to 
verify data 
received from 
BECS is written 
to RFID tag 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
software 
capabilit
y 
A Design/ 
Direction 
for Use 
ISBT labeling; BECS 
interrogation; BECS 
interface, definition of 
error messages, system-
level assertion, rolled 
back operations; user 
standard operating 
procedures 
N/A N/A 4.2.2., 7.0. UT13, ST15, 
ST16, ST17, 
ST18, ST19, 
ST20, ST21, 
ST22, ST23, 
ST28 
F.6.1. Unsuitable 
product is 
released into 
inventory 
Software 
design or 
unavaila
ble 
A Design BECS interface, 
definition of error 
messages, system-level 
assertion, rolled back 
N/A N/A 4.2.3., 7.0. UT5, UT6, 
UT7, UT8, 
UT9, UT11, 
UT12, UT14, 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Cause 
 
 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
Method 
of 
Control 
Type 
Method of Control 
Description 
Protocol Test 
Document 
Protocol 
Results 
Document 
Software 
Requirements 
Specification 
(SRS)  
Number 
Unit/ System 
Test Number 
software 
capabilit
y 
operations; final 
verification 
ST1, ST2, 
ST3, ST4, 
ST5, ST6, 
ST7, ST8, 
ST9, ST10, 
ST11, ST12, 
ST13, ST15, 
ST16, ST17, 
ST18, ST19, 
ST20, ST21, 
ST22, ST23, 
ST24, ST26, 
ST28  
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APPENDIX B: PRE-MITIGATION RISK LEVEL A HAZARDS 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
T.2.1. The maximum 
temperature 
increase of the 
RBCs and 
Platelets exceed 
acceptable level 
of 1.5 °C 
Ensure No 
Adverse 
Effects of 
RFID 
Technology on 
Blood Products 
Product/ 
Patient 
RF Radiation 2 1 A Tested using Limit Test Protocol which 
confirmed lack of significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood products. 
T.2.2. The cellular and 
protein structures 
of RBCs 
(complete blood 
counts including 
sample weight, 
RBC count, Hb, 
Hct, MCV; 
potassium, 
aluminum; free 
hemoglobin; 
level of blood 
gases) are 
degraded or 
altered beyond 
the acceptable 
level of ≤1% 
hemolysis. 
Ensure No 
Adverse 
Effects of 
RFID 
Technology on 
Blood Products 
Product/ 
Patient 
RF Radiation 2 1 A Tested using Limit Test Protocol which 
confirmed lack of significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood products. 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
T.2.3. The cellular and 
protein structures 
(Lactate, 
Aluminum, P-
Selectin, and 
complete blood 
counts including 
sample weight, 
WBDP count, 
Plt, and MPV) of 
WBDPs are 
degraded such 
that the pH 
decreases beyond 
acceptable level 
of ≥6.2 
Ensure No 
Adverse 
Effects of 
RFID 
Technology on 
Blood Products 
Product/ 
Patient 
RF Radiation 2 1 A Tested using Limit Test Protocol which 
confirmed lack of significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood products. 
T.2.4. The maximum 
temperature 
increase of 
plasma types 
(FFP, FP24, and 
TP) exceeds 
acceptable level 
of 4 °C. 
Ensure No 
Adverse 
Effects of 
RFID 
Technology on 
Blood Products 
Product/ 
Patient 
RF Radiation 2 1 A Tested using Limit Test Protocol which 
confirmed lack of significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood products. 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
T.2.5. The activity of 
coagulation 
factors (PT, 
aPTT, 
Antithrombin 
Activity, Factor 
V, Factor VIII, 
Factor XI, 
Protein C, 
Protein S,  VWF: 
RCo) levels of 
all types (FFP, 
FP24, and TP) of 
thawed plasma 
products are 
altered beyond 
an acceptable 
level of 20% 
Ensure No 
Adverse 
Effects of 
RFID 
Technology on 
Blood Products 
Product/ 
Patient 
RF Radiation 2 1 A Tested using Limit Test Protocol which 
confirmed lack of significant effect RF 
Radiation had on blood products. 
T.3.1. The time to read 
headers of 20-
bags-equivalent 
exceeds 
maximum 
threshold 
established for 
specific 
container/reader 
combinations. 
Ensure 
Performance 
Capability of 
RFID Tags 
During the 
Most Common 
Blood Supply 
Chain 
Processes 
System System 
Capability 
1 2 A Tested using Performance Test 
Protocol which confirmed ability of 
device to sustain operational efficiency 
under different circumstances 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
T.3.2. The time to 
read/write all 28 
memory blocks 
of 20-bags-
equivalent 
exceeds 
maximum 
threshold 
established for 
specific 
container/reader 
combinations. 
Ensure 
Performance 
Capability of 
RFID Tags 
During the 
Most Common 
Blood Supply 
Chain 
Processes 
System System 
Capability 
1 2 A Tested using Performance Test 
Protocol which confirmed ability of 
device to sustain operational efficiency 
under different circumstances 
T.3.3. The time to write 
all blocks 
exceeds 
maximum 
threshold 
established for 
specific 
container/reader 
combinations 
Ensure 
Performance 
Capability of 
RFID Tags 
During the 
Most Common 
Blood Supply 
Chain 
Processes 
System System 
Capability 
1 2 A Tested using Performance Test 
Protocol which confirmed ability of 
device to sustain operational efficiency 
under different circumstances 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
T.5.1. Connections/com
munication links 
are lost without 
warning 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency 
(HF) and 
Electromagneti
c Interference 
(EMI) with 
other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communicati
on 
2 1 A The HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio 
communication protocols as dictated 
by the ISO/IEC 15693 standard, as 
well as the ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1 
standard, are used in the RFID readers 
for this application. The 16-bit cyclic 
redundancy check (CCITT CRC-16) is 
run on the message bits right from the 
start of the flags to the end of data and 
the CRC-16 accompanies the message 
as it is sent. Furthermore, additional 
protection is provided via the tag data 
encoding procedure. 
T.5.2. Systems 
experience a 
failure to 
establish 
communication 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency 
(HF) and 
Electromagneti
c Interference 
(EMI) with 
other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communicati
on 
2 1 A The key information for safe 
transfusion is carried in ISBT-128 
barcodes, as well as in human readable 
form, on the bag itself. In the event of 
any communication failure of the RFID 
system, bar code data will be used. 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
T.5.3. Degradation of 
service/transmiss
ion of 
information 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency 
(HF) and 
Electromagneti
c Interference 
(EMI) with 
other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communicati
on 
2 1 A The HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio 
communication protocols as dictated 
by the ISO/IEC 15693 standard, as 
well as the ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1 
standard, are used in the RFID readers 
for this application. The 16-bit cyclic 
redundancy check (CCITT CRC-16) is 
run on the message bits right from the 
start of the flags to the end of data and 
the CRC-16 accompanies the message 
as it is sent. Furthermore, additional 
protection is provided via the tag data 
encoding procedure. 
T.5.4. Delays and 
packet loss in the 
transmission of 
information to 
and from a 
handheld reader 
or a netbook/ 
laptop 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency 
(HF) and 
Electromagneti
c Interference 
(EMI) with 
other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communicati
on 
2 1 A The WLAN communication used 
adheres to the IEEE 802.11b and 
802.11g standards which define one 
Medium Access Control (MAC) layer 
and multiple physical layers (PHY).  
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
T.5.5. The wireless 
transmission of 
critical medical 
device alarms is 
disabled 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency 
(HF) and 
Electromagneti
c Interference 
(EMI) with 
other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communicati
on 
2 1 A There are two steps for effective 
control for preventing this hazard from 
occurring for future acquisition or 
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
T.5.6. The transmission 
of physiological 
waveform data is 
impeded 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency 
(HF) and 
Electromagneti
c Interference 
(EMI) with 
other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communicati
on 
2 1 A There are two steps for effective 
control for preventing this hazard from 
occurring for future acquisition or 
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
T.5.7. The real-time 
control of 
therapeutic 
medical devices 
is prevented 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency 
(HF) and 
Electromagneti
c Interference 
(EMI) with 
other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communicati
on 
2 1 A There are two steps for effective 
control for preventing this hazard from 
occurring for future acquisition or 
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
T.5.8. The transmission 
of time-critical 
medical 
telemetry is 
hindered 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency 
(HF) and 
Electromagneti
c Interference 
(EMI) with 
other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communicati
on 
2 1 A There are two steps for effective 
control for preventing this hazard from 
occurring for future acquisition or 
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
T.5.9. The wireless 
control of 
therapeutic 
devices is 
obstructed 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency 
(HF) and 
Electromagneti
c Interference 
(EMI) with 
other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communicati
on 
2 1 A There are two steps for effective 
control for preventing this hazard from 
occurring for future acquisition or 
upgrading of key equipment: sourcing 
and procurement.  
I.1.1. Processing steps 
do not occur in 
sequence 
expected 
Prevent 
Sequencing 
Timing Error 
System User Error 2 1 A Finite state machine, wizard-like 
interfaces, and validation logic 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
I.1.3. System fails to 
receive timely 
data from an 
external 
application 
Prevent 
Sequencing 
Timing Error 
System Software 
design or 
unavailable 
software 
capability 
2 1 A BECS interface, definition of error 
messages, system-level assertion, 
rolled back operations 
I.3.5. Errors detected 
in BECS are not 
handled properly 
Prevent 
External 
Interface 
Errors 
System Unrecognized 
data is 
received from 
BECS 
1 1 A BECS interface, definition of error 
messages, system-level assertion, 
rolled back operations 
F.1.1. The system is 
accessed by an 
unauthorized 
person 
Prevent 
Unauthorized 
Entry or 
Override of 
System Data 
System Security 
failure 
2 1 A System Administration of user access; 
Spotlight Microsoft Windows.Net 
Authentication and Authorization 
F.1.2. An untrained 
user accesses the 
system 
Prevent 
Unauthorized 
Entry or 
Override of 
System Data 
System System fails 
to prevent 
untrained user 
access 
2 1 A System Administration of user access; 
Spotlight Microsoft Windows.Net 
Authentication and Authorization 
F.1.3. Unauthorized 
personnel modify 
computer records 
Prevent 
Unauthorized 
Entry or 
Override of 
System Data 
System System fails 
to restrict 
access to 
computer 
records 
2 1 A System Administration of user access; 
Spotlight Microsoft Windows.Net 
Authentication and Authorization 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
F.2.1. Someone other 
than a 
responsible user 
enters or 
modifies data 
Prevent Loss of 
Traceability 
System System fails 
to track 
persons 
responsible 
for database 
modifications 
2 1 A System Administration of user access; 
Spotlight Microsoft Windows.Net 
Authentication and Authorization; 
Activity Logs/Audit Trails 
F.3.3. System fails to 
notify user when 
trying to pack an 
item already 
packed 
Prevent 
Packing in 
Improper 
Container at 
Collection Site 
System Software 
design or 
unavailable 
software 
capability 
1 2 A TID assignments; user packing 
F.4.2. System fails to 
generate a 
manifest 
Ensure 
Reconciliation 
of Materials 
from 
Collection Site 
System Software 
design or 
unavailable 
software 
capability 
1 2 A Manifest report generation & database 
updating; user standard operating 
procedures. 
F.5.2. System fails to 
verify data 
received from 
BECS is written 
to RFID tag 
Ensure Blood 
Product 
Labeling as 
Data is 
Properly 
Received from 
BECS 
System Software 
design or 
unavailable 
software 
capability 
1 2 A ISBT labeling; BECS interrogation; 
BECS interface, definition of error 
messages, system-level assertion, 
rolled back operations; user standard 
operating procedures 
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Hazard 
ID 
Hazardous 
Event 
Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity at 
Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- 
Moderate       
4 - 
Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - 
Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - 
Frequent) 
Pre-
Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - 
Tolerable                
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control Description 
F.6.1. Unsuitable 
product is 
released into 
inventory 
Prevent 
Unsuitable 
Product from 
Being Released 
to Distribution 
System Software 
design or 
unavailable 
software 
capability 
1 1 A BECS interface, definition of error 
messages, system-level assertion, 
rolled back operations; final 
verification 
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APPENDIX C: PRE-MITIGATION RISK LEVEL B HAZARDS 
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Hazard ID Hazardous Event Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity 
at Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- Moderate       
4 - Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - Frequent) 
Pre-Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - Tolerable        
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control 
Description 
T.1.1. RFID Read/Write 
Fails 
Prevent Data 
Read/Write 
Error/Failure 
System Handheld or pad 
RFID reader fails 
to read/write the 
tag for any 
number of 
reasons. 
1 3 B Audible sound signaled each 
time tag is read/written; 
handheld and/or work station 
display is updated; error 
detection software included. 
T.1.2. RFID Read/Write 
Fails 
Prevent Data 
Read/Write 
Error/Failure 
System Tunnel reader 
fails to read the 
tag for any 
number of 
reasons. 
1 3 B Tunnel reader reconciles items, 
flagging them as excess or 
missing. The operator then 
manually inspects contents to 
correct issue. 
T.1.3. Bad data on the tag Prevent Data 
Read/Write 
Error/Failure 
System Data is corrupted 
on the tag 
3 1 B A new ISBT128 data structure 
was developed to facilitate 
detection of tag memory 
corruption.  
T.1.4. DIN number 
written on tag at 
collection is 
subsequently 
altered 
Prevent Data 
Read/Write 
Error/Failure 
System DIN field locking 
on the tag not 
enforced 
2 2 B The application is configurable 
to allow the organization to use 
the DIN locking feature at the 
point of collection or at 
labeling.  
T.1.5. DIN number on 
tags created at final 
labeling is altered 
Prevent Data 
Read/Write 
Error/Failure 
System DIN field locking 
on the tag not the 
tag not enforced 
2 2 B Programming the ISBT128 
label data structure and 
launching the application 
T.1.6. ABO rewritten on 
tag 
Prevent Data 
Read/Write 
Error/Failure 
System --- 3 1 B Programming the ISBT128 
ABO data structure and 
launching the application 
T.4.1. The tag does not 
survive the process 
Ensure RFID Tag 
Survivability after 
Experiencing the 
Most Demanding 
System Centrifugation, 
Blast Freezing, or 
Gamma 
Irradiation Effects 
3 2 B Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and reversion to 
barcode only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
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Hazard ID Hazardous Event Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity 
at Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- Moderate       
4 - Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - Frequent) 
Pre-Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - Tolerable        
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control 
Description 
Conditions in the 
Blood Supply 
Chain 
T.4.2. The ability of the 
RFID tag to read 
data within 30 
seconds of the start 
is damaged 
Ensure RFID Tag 
Survivability after 
Experiencing the 
Most Demanding 
Conditions in the 
Blood Supply 
Chain 
System Centrifugation, 
Blast Freezing, or 
Gamma 
Irradiation Effects 
2 2 B Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and reversion to 
barcode only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
T.4.3. The ability of the 
RFID tag to write 
information within 
30 seconds of the 
start is damaged. 
Ensure RFID Tag 
Survivability after 
Experiencing the 
Most Demanding 
Conditions in the 
Blood Supply 
Chain 
System Centrifugation, 
Blast Freezing, or 
Gamma 
Irradiation Effects 
2 2 B Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and reversion to 
barcode only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
T.4.4. The time it takes to 
read the tag after it 
was seen for the 
first time (header) 
increases greater 
than 20 seconds. 
Ensure RFID Tag 
Survivability after 
Experiencing the 
Most Demanding 
Conditions in the 
Blood Supply 
Chain 
System Centrifugation, 
Blast Freezing, or 
Gamma 
Irradiation Effects 
2 2 B Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and reversion to 
barcode only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
T.4.5. The time it takes to 
read all blocks of 
tag memory 
increases by more 
than 45 seconds 
Ensure RFID Tag 
Survivability after 
Experiencing the 
Most Demanding 
Conditions in the 
Blood Supply 
System Centrifugation, 
Blast Freezing, or 
Gamma 
Irradiation Effects 
2 2 B Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and reversion to 
barcode only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
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Hazard ID Hazardous Event Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity 
at Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- Moderate       
4 - Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - Frequent) 
Pre-Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - Tolerable        
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control 
Description 
Chain 
T.4.6. The time it takes to 
write information 
after the tag 
acknowledges 
encoding 
completion of all 
blocks increases by 
greater than 75 
seconds 
Ensure RFID Tag 
Survivability after 
Experiencing the 
Most Demanding 
Conditions in the 
Blood Supply 
Chain 
System Centrifugation, 
Blast Freezing, or 
Gamma 
Irradiation Effects 
2 2 B Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and reversion to 
barcode only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
T.4.7. The integrity of the 
written data is 
compromised  
Ensure RFID Tag 
Survivability after 
Experiencing the 
Most Demanding 
Conditions in the 
Blood Supply 
Chain 
System Centrifugation, 
Blast Freezing, or 
Gamma 
Irradiation Effects 
2 2 B Tag design, tag supplier 
certification, and reversion to 
barcode only procedure in the 
event of tag failure. 
T.5.10. Data corruption 
and/or errors are 
produced 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency (HF) 
and 
Electromagnetic 
Interference (EMI) 
with other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communication 
3 1 B The HF RFID 13.56 MHz radio 
communication protocols as 
dictated by the ISO/IEC 15693 
standard, as well as the 
ISO/IEC 18000-3 mode 1 
standard, are used in the RFID 
readers for this application. The 
16-bit cyclic redundancy check 
(CCITT CRC-16) is run on the 
message bits right from the 
start of the flags to the end of 
data and the CRC-16 
accompanies the message as it 
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Hazard ID Hazardous Event Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity 
at Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- Moderate       
4 - Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - Frequent) 
Pre-Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - Tolerable        
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control 
Description 
is sent. Furthermore, additional 
protection is provided via the 
tag data encoding procedure. 
The WLAN communication 
used adheres to the IEEE 
802.11b and 802.11g standards 
which define one Medium 
Access Control (MAC) layer 
and multiple physical layers 
(PHY).  
T.5.11. Unauthorized 
access during the 
communication 
between the 
transmitter and 
receiver 
Ensure No 
Interference of 
RFID High 
Frequency (HF) 
and 
Electromagnetic 
Interference (EMI) 
with other systems 
System EMI/Wireless 
Communication 
3 1 B Provisions in the air protocols 
and standards that make it 
difficult to inappropriately 
access data while the 
transmitter and receiver are 
communicating. Also, the tag 
structure design includes data 
bits stored on the tag that have 
an associated CCITT 16-bit 
CRC stored in the tag memory. 
Moreover, the key information 
for same transfusion is carried 
in ISBT-128 barcodes and 
human readable form on the 
bag itself. Finally, the wireless 
network includes data 
encryption security that 
prevents hackers from 
connecting to protected 
networks and stealing 
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Hazard ID Hazardous Event Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity 
at Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- Moderate       
4 - Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - Frequent) 
Pre-Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - Tolerable        
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control 
Description 
information.  
I.1.2. Multiple users are 
allowed access to 
update the same 
record 
Prevent Sequencing 
Timing Error 
System Software design 
or unavailable 
software 
capability 
2 3 B Relational Database and 
Transaction Processing 
Techniques, ACID Properties, 
"All-or-Nothing" Semantics 
I.2.1. User error causes 
data to be corrupted 
Prevent Data 
Loss/Corruption 
System User Error 1 3 B Validation logic; BECS 
interrogation 
I.2.2. Data is lost or 
corrupted due to 
hardware disk 
crash, other 
hardware or power 
failure 
Prevent Data 
Loss/Corruption 
System Disk crash, other 
hardware or 
power failure 
3 2 B Relational Database and 
Transaction Processing 
Techniques, ACID Properties, 
"All-or-Nothing" Semantics; 
Best Practice Back-Up 
Techniques; SQL 
I.2.3. Data is lost or 
corrupted due to 
malfunction of 
program routine 
Prevent Data 
Loss/Corruption 
System Incomplete 
transaction 
1 3 B Relational Database and 
Transaction Processing 
Techniques, ACID Properties, 
"All-or-Nothing" Semantics; 
Spotlight middleware and 
related relational database 
technology 
I.2.4. Data encountered is 
outside the range of 
expected values 
Prevent Data 
Loss/Corruption 
System Undetected 
anomaly or user 
error 
1 3 B Validation logic; BECS 
interrogation; reference tables; 
drop-down lists; error messages 
I.2.5. Duplicate data 
enters the system 
Prevent Data 
Loss/Corruption 
System User Error 2 3 B Validation logic; DIN; BECS 
interrogation 
I.3.1. System fails to 
receive accurate 
data from the RFID 
reader interface 
Prevent External 
Interface Errors 
System Hardware failure 2 3 B Technologies such as reader 
self-test diagnostics, inactivity 
timers, periodic heart beat 
signals, and positioning sentinel 
tags to confirm correct end-to-
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Hazard ID Hazardous Event Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity 
at Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- Moderate       
4 - Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - Frequent) 
Pre-Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - Tolerable        
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control 
Description 
end operation of readers 
I.3.2. Tag and barcode 
are both unreadable 
Prevent External 
Interface Errors 
System Physical damage 
from handling 
product 
3 1 B Product disposal 
I.3.3. Unable to read or 
write the RFID tag 
data due to a tag 
failure 
Prevent External 
Interface Errors 
System Physical damage 
from handling 
product 
2 3 B Read/Write applications; RFID 
TIN 
I.3.4. Data received from 
BECS does not 
pass correct data 
structure 
Prevent External 
Interface Errors 
System Unrecognized 
data is received 
from BECS 
3 2 B BECS interface, definition of 
error messages, system-level 
assertion, rolled back 
operations 
F.2.2. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
Prevent Loss of 
Traceability 
System System fails to 
record data for 
whole blood 
collection 
3 1 B Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data entry in 
specific order and format for 
particular collections 
F.2.3. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
Prevent Loss of 
Traceability 
System System fails to 
capture data for 
apheresis 
collection 
3 1 B Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data entry in 
specific order and format for 
particular collections 
F.2.4. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
Prevent Loss of 
Traceability 
System System fails to 
identify donation 
type 
3 1 B Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data entry in 
specific order and format for 
particular collections 
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Hazard ID Hazardous Event Safety Critical 
Design 
Requirement 
Entity 
at Risk 
Cause Severity            
(1 - 
Negligible    
2 - Minor           
3- Moderate       
4 - Critical) 
Likelihood             
(1 - 
Improbable     
2 - Remote           
3 - Occasional         
4 - Probable          
5 - Frequent) 
Pre-Mitigation 
Risk Level                   
(A - 
Acceptable             
B - Tolerable        
C - 
Intolerable) 
Method of Control 
Description 
F.2.5. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
Prevent Loss of 
Traceability 
System System fails to 
identify 
autologous 
donation 
3 1 B Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data entry in 
specific order and format for 
particular collections 
F.2.6. Blood unit 
information is 
recorded 
incorrectly 
Prevent Loss of 
Traceability 
System System fails to 
identify 
therapeutic 
donation 
3 1 B Validation logic; error 
messages and disabled 
proceeding; application 
requirements of data entry in 
specific order and format for 
particular collections 
F.3.1. System fails to 
ensure that product 
is packed in the 
correct container 
Prevent Packing in 
Improper Container 
at Collection Site 
System Software design 
or unavailable 
software 
capability 
2 2 B Product code/product reference 
table; container properties; user 
packing 
F.3.2. System fails to 
maintain 
appropriate 
container capacity 
for packed product 
Prevent Packing in 
Improper Container 
at Collection Site 
System Software design 
or unavailable 
software 
capability 
2 2 B Container properties; user 
packing 
F.4.1. A container is left 
at the collection site 
Ensure 
Reconciliation of 
Materials from 
Collection Site 
System Software design 
or unavailable 
software 
capability 
2 2 B Numerous pick-up states; 
disabled release until loading 
complete; user standard 
operating procedures 
F.5.1. System fails to 
receive labeling 
data from BECS 
Ensure Blood 
Product Labeling as 
Data is Properly 
Received from 
BECS 
System Software design 
or unavailable 
software 
capability 
2 2 B BECS interface, definition of 
error messages, system-level 
assertion, rolled back 
operations 
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